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ABSTRACT 
Elizabeth Cahn Goodman: The Potential Implications of the Medicare Advantage Stars Methodology for 
Plans Serving Low Socioeconomic Status Communities 
(Under the direction of Pam Silberman) 
Medicare Advantage (MA) now serves nearly one-third of all Medicare beneficiaries.  Many MA 
participants have low socioeconomic status (SES). The Affordable Care Act (ACA) modified the five-star 
quality measurement program applied to MA plans (“Medicare stars”) imposing substantial financial 
incentives and penalties based on plan performance.  
This study uses a mixed methods approach to examine (1) whether and how serving low-SES 
participants impact an MA plans’ ability to achieve high Medicare stars scores, (2) whether plans are 
using enhanced and supplemental benefits to offset SES-related barriers to high performance under the 
Medicare stars program, and (3) changes policy makers should consider to offset SES-related barriers to 
high-quality performance under the Medicare stars program.  
Thirty key informants were interviewed in phase one. Each expressed support, often qualified, for 
the Medicare Stars program. Each concurred that beneficiary SES factors impact the level of effort 
required of MA plans to achieve a high Medicare stars scores.  They identified a number of specific SES 
factors that form barriers to high-quality performance and an array of recommended policy changes 
designed to acknowledge and to offset those barriers.  
Phase two uses a multivariate analysis of publicly available plan filing data for the years 2014 and 
2015 to examine the effect of the percentage of low-income subsidy (LIS) eligible beneficiaries and the 
level of deprivation in the county in which the plan was offered on the inclusion of benefits and plan 
design features identified by phase one respondents as likely to offset SES-related barriers to quality care. 
Neither the percentage of LIS-eligible membership nor county-level deprivation were consistently found 
to be significantly associated with the inclusion of any of the studied benefits, other than supplemental 
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meals. Designation as a Special Needs Plan (SNP) was significantly associated with the inclusion of 
nearly all of the studied benefits. 
In phase 3, five of the phase one respondents participated in follow-up surveys and interviews to 
evaluate the policy recommendations most commonly made by the phase 1 key informants. Those 
recommendations form the basis for the plan for change presented in the final chapter.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Section 1.1 Statement of the Issue 
As of December 2016, nearly 18.7 million Medicare beneficiaries received their health insurance 
benefits through the Medicare Advantage (MA) program (Medicare Advantage, Cost, PACE, Demo, and 
Prescription Drug Plan Contract Report - Monthly Summary Report, 2016). Many of these MA enrollees 
possess socioeconomic characteristics (educational achievement, income, poverty, and wealth) often 
associated with poorer health outcomes. A higher proportion of MA participants are low income and/or 
members of racial and ethnic minority communities compared with participants in traditional Medicare. 
In 2012, 58.5% of MA participants had incomes below $29,999, as compared with 37.8% of beneficiaries 
in traditional Medicare, and 30% of MA participants were Hispanic or African American versus 23% of 
traditional Medicare participants (Americas Health Insurance Plans Center for Policy and Research, 
2015).  
MA serves a slightly smaller proportion of individuals who are dually eligible for Medicare and 
Medicaid (“dual eligibles”) than the traditional Medicare program. According to the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission (MedPAC), individuals who are dually eligible represent 16% of MA participants 
while they represent 19% of participants in the traditional Medicare program (Harrison & Zarabozo, 
2014). However, the number of dual eligibles participating in MA is rapidly growing. Between 2009 and 
2012, the number of individuals dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid who participated in MA 
increased from 11% to 23% (Harrison & Zarabozo, 2014).    
Since 2008 the quality of MA plans has been measured by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) using a five-star scale referred to as the Medicare Stars program (“MA stars”). In an 
effort to improve the quality of care delivered by MA plans the Affordable Care Act (ACA) imposed 
substantial incentives and penalties on MA plans based on their annual Medicare stars performance. In 
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doing so, the ACA transformed  the Medicare stars program from solely a quality measurement program 
to an important component of how MA plans are paid (PPACA, 2010).  
The MA stars methodology grades each contract on a broad set of clinical and operational quality 
measures. Each measure includes specific inclusion and exclusion criteria designed to ensure that only 
patients who are clinically eligible for and would benefit from the measured service or procedure are 
included in the determination of whether a health plan delivered the appropriate care or achieved the 
appropriate outcome. Plan sponsors enter into contracts with the CMS. These contracts may include one 
or more health plans. CMS grades the performance of each MA contract on each measure by applying one 
of two statistical methods, clustering or relative distribution and significance testing. In this way each 
contract’s performance on a given measure is judged relative to all other measured contracts (Medicare 
2017 Part C & D Star Rating Technical Notes, 2016). For the 2017 plan year, CMS evaluated part C 
plans on 32 quality measures quality and part D plans on 15 (Medicare Part C & D Star Ratings: Update 
for 2017: August 3, 2016 Part C & D User Group Call, 2016). Plans that offer both Medicare parts C and 
D are evaluated based on the full set of measures.  
CMS groups individual quality measures at a second level into a series of domains. Domain level 
scores reflect a combined measurement of similar services (Medicare 2017 Part C & D Star Rating 
Technical Notes, 2016)  The part C domains are: staying healthy, managing chronic conditions, member 
experience with health plan, member complaints, and changes in the health plan’s performance and health 
plan customer service. The part D domains are: drug plan customer service, member complaints and 
changes in the drug plan’s performance, member experience with drug plan, and drug safety and accuracy 
of drug pricing. Plans receive scores based on each individual measure, the domain, and the plan type 
(Medicare part C or part D), as well as an overall score (Medicare 2017 Part C & D Star Rating 
Technical Notes, 2016). 
While the socioeconomic characteristics of plan members substantially vary between plans, only 
a small subset of the measures is adjusted for other factors, including socioeconomic status characteristics 
(Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing 
 3 
 
Program, 2016). Several studies have shown that health plans with high proportions of members with low 
socioeconomic status (SES), including members who are dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, tend 
to score lower under the MA stars methodology (Cahow, Creighton, & Richards-Burke, 2010; Inovalon, 
2013, 2015, 2014b; Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-
Based Purchasing Program, 2016; Young, Rickles, Chou, & Raver, 2014). This performance variation 
has caused plans and provider organizations to raise concerns about whether the stars rating and payment 
system, as currently implemented, fairly judges the performance of health plans serving higher 
proportions of members with low SES status and led CMS in 2017 to apply an interim adjustment to 
plans’ star score results in order to account for performance variation on certain stars measures based on 
the  proportion of low income subsidy, dual eligible and disabled members served under the contract 
(Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2017 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and 
Medicare  Advantage and Part D Payment Policies and Final Call Letter, 2016). Further, this 
performance differential raises questions about whether the current Medicare stars rating system has 
inadvertently created incentives for MA plans to avoid serving low SES communities.  
Section 1.2 Study Questions 
A significant body of literature examines the negative impact that the social risk factors, 
including low SES, have on individuals’ experiences with the health care system, access to care, and 
overall health outcomes (Adler & Newman, 2002; Adler & Stewart, 2006; Braveman, Egerter, & 
Williams, 2011; Heiman, 2015; National Academies of Sciences, 2016b; Pampel, 2010; Young, 2005). 
Failure to fully account for SES characteristics in measuring health plan quality could place plans that 
serve substantial numbers of individuals with low SES and the providers that participate in these plans’ 
networks at a significant financial and, to the extent that consumers rely on the Medicare stars in choosing 
a health plan, a significant reputational disadvantage as a consequence of the program. The purpose of 
this study is to more fully understand the implications of the post-ACA Medicare stars quality 
measurement methodology to begin to answer the following questions: What impact, if any, has the post-
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ACA MA stars methodology had on Medicare Advantage beneficiaries in the form of changes to the 
products and services offered by Medicare Advantage plans serving socially and economically vulnerable 
Medicare beneficiaries? And, what steps can and should policy makers and organizational leaders take to 
offset SES-related barriers, if any, to high stars performance among plans serving high proportions of low 
SES members? 
Section 1.3 Study Design 
The study consists of three phases. Phase one is a qualitative analysis of the interviews of thirty 
key informants who represent six different Medicare stakeholder groups: Provider representatives; 
Consumer representatives; Plan representatives; Regulators, policy makers, and quality measurement 
officials (“Regulators”); and academics and thought leaders (“Thought leaders”). Phase two is a 
quantitative analysis of MA plan benefit packages. This phase of the study evaluates the impact of the 
proportion of low-income plan members (those eligible for a low-income subsidy under Medicare part D) 
and the level of deprivation of the county in which a plan operates (as measured using the Area 
Deprivation Index (Health Innovation Program, 2014)) on the inclusion of certain plan design features (a 
premium payment requirement and specific supplemental benefits) identified by key informants in phase 
1 as associated with SES-related barriers to high-quality care. In phase three, five of the key informants 
who participate in phase one participate in follow-up interviews to provide their perspective on policy 
recommendations commonly made by key informants in phase one. The results of phase 3 inform the plan 
for change which is the final phase of the research.  
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CHAPTER 2: SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ISSUE 
Millions of Americans rely on MA for the delivery of their health care services. Plan 
participation, plan financing, and, ultimately, consumer choice of plans and benefit packages are 
substantially impacted by performance under the post-ACA MA stars methodology. If the program 
improves the quality of care delivered by MA plans and reduces disparities between high and low 
resource communities, program enrollees could greatly benefit from these policy changes  However, if, 
by failing to consistently account for the SES characteristics of MA plan members, the Medicare stars 
program creates disincentives sufficient to cause plans to avoid serving communities with SES-related 
risk characteristics, program enrollees could lose access to the plans and supplemental benefits on which 
they have come to rely.  
The Medicare stars quality measurement system is one among a large and growing number of 
quality measurement systems currently in use in the Medicare program and elsewhere in the United States 
and globally to judge the quality of health care. Many of these programs use measures similar to those 
used in the Medicare stars program. As a result, the findings of this study can inform discussions not only 
about the appropriateness of including SES characteristics in the MA stars methodology but also in 
similar programs applied to the performance of physicians, hospitals, and other providers in the traditional 
Medicare program and elsewhere.  
Finally, the results of this study complement ongoing work in this area by CMS and the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation 
(ASPE) (Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2017 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and 
Medicare  Advantage and Part D Payment Policies and Final Call Letter, 2016; National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering and Medicine. (2016c),; National Academies of Sciences, 2017; Examining the 
Potential Effects of Socioeconomic Factors on Star Ratings, 2015; Report to Congress: Social Risk 
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Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016) by providing a 
detailed qualitative and quantitative analysis of the impact of the post-ACA stars methodology on 
Medicare Advantage health plans serving large populations of low SES beneficiaries and by identifying 
and analyzing proposed policy options for improving the quality of care delivered to low SES populations 
participating in Medicare Advantage. 
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CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND 
 Medicare provides preventive, acute, and post-acute health care to older and disabled Americans. 
Established in 1965, Medicare is among the country’s two largest social safety net programs. The use of 
private health plans in Medicare has long been a matter of some controversy. Initially authorized in 1972, 
the program, now referred to as MA, serves more than 18.7 million beneficiaries today  (Medicare 
Advantage, Cost, PACE, Demo, and Prescription Drug Plan Contract Report - Monthly Summary Report, 
2016) and is projected to grow to 30 million by 2026 (Total Medicare Private Health Plan Enrollment, 
Current and Projected, 2016). 
Figure 1. Total MA enrollment, 1992-2026 
 
 According to MedPAC, in 2010, the year the ACA passed, health plans participating in MA were 
paid 109% of the cost of serving an individual in the traditional Medicare program. For 2016, MedPAC 
found that while plan bids, on average, were estimated to be 98% of the cost of serving a beneficiary in 
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the traditional Medicare program because 70% of MA participants will be in plans that are eligible for 
quality bonuses, MA plans will be paid, on average, 102% of what it costs to serve a beneficiary in the 
same county under the traditional Medicare program (Commission, 2016). 
The remainder of this chapter will review of the legislative history of the use of private health 
plans in Medicare, a history of the use of quality measurement in Medicare participating health plans, and 
a description of post-ACA policy activity related to the issue of including SES factors to help determine 
Medicare health plan performance on quality measures. Because the focus of this dissertation is solely on 
the impact of the post-ACA stars methodology on the delivery of quality care to low SES populations, 
this section is not intended to provide a full social and political history of the use of private health plans in 
the Medicare program. 
Section 3.1 History of Managed Care in Medicare from Inception to the ACA 
 The Medicare program was established in 1965 (The Social Security Amendments of 1965, 1965) 
to provide health insurance coverage to elderly (ages 65 and up) beneficiaries of Social Security. Later, in 
1972, the Social Security Act was amended to expand Medicare coverage to individuals with disabilities 
and end-stage renal disease. The Social Security Act also was amended that year to enable Medicare to 
contract with managed care plans. (McDowell, 2009) In 1982, Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act (TEFRA), which authorized Medicare to contract with health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) at 95% of the average cost of serving a Medicare beneficiary in the traditional 
Medicare program in the county in which the plan was offered (McDowell, 2009; Medicare Advantage 
Fact Sheet, 2014). In 1995, Republican majorities in Congress attempted to wring substantial savings 
from the Medicare program, including efforts to impose spending caps on Medicare and to broadly 
expand private Medicare plans. This effort was ultimately vetoed by President Bill Clinton (Oberlander, 
2003).  
In 1997, under mounting concerns regarding the federal budget deficit and concerns about the 
cost of the HMO program, lack of competition between plans, and limited plan coverage areas, Congress 
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passed the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) (Oberlander, 2003; McDowell, 2009; Scanlon, 1999). The BBA 
created the Medicare+Choice program. Beginning in 1999, as a result of the BBA, Medicare began 
contracting with preferred provider organizations (PPOs), private fee-for-service plans (PFFSs), and 
Medical Savings Account Plans (MSAs) (Christensen, 1997; Payments to Medicare+Choice 
Organizations, 2010). In addition, the BBA reduced plan cost growth; established a per county payment 
floor to attract plans to underserved, especially rural counties; and enhanced the risk adjustment program 
used to reflect the health of the beneficiaries participating in each Medicare health plan. (Scanlon, 1999). 
The Benefits Improvement and Protection Act (BIPA) of 2000 expanded these payment floors to 
additional areas (Medicare Advantage Fact Sheet, 2014).  
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) renamed 
Medicare+Choice Medicare Advantage and established the Medicare drug benefit (Medicare part D). 
MMA authorized three types of Medicare health plans: those that offered only drug benefits (part D 
plans), those that offered only the services covered in Medicare parts A and B (MA plans), and those that 
offered both the services covered in Medicare parts A and B and drug benefits (MA-PD plans) (CMS, 
2011; The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, 2003).  
In response to concerns that MA plans were gaming the risk adjustment system. the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005 required CMS to make an across-the-board adjustment to the MA plan risk scores 
to make them more consistent with FFS coding (The Medicare Advantage Program: Status Report, 2016). 
In 2006, Medicare instituted a bidding process in which plans submit packages of benefits that 
meet parameters established by CMS and that are based on the average cost of delivering the services 
covered under Medicare parts A and B and, in the case of MA-PD plans, Medicare part D (Medicare 
Advantage Fact Sheet, 2014). These bids are compared against a cap or benchmark amount for the service 
area (CMS, 2011). If the bid is lower than the benchmark, the plan may use the difference or rebate 
amount to provide supplemental benefits or to lower the out-of-pocket costs imposed on beneficiaries 
(CMS, 2011). Payments to each MA plan are risk adjusted to reflect the health status of their membership 
using a formula referred to as the CMS-Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) risk adjustment model 
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(CMS, 2011). This model adjusts plan payments to reflect beneficiary health conditions, eligibility for 
Medicaid, residence in an institution and disability as a reason to Medicare entitlement but does not 
account for other SES-related characteristics, for example educational attainment or residency in a high 
poverty or high crime area.  
The Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) changed the 
benchmark setting process to remove the cost of medical education from the calculation of MA 
benchmarks and made other changes to the program, including changes designed to increase the 
coordination of Medicare and Medicaid benefits and slow the growth of certain types of MA plans 
(McDowell, 2009; Medicare Advantage Fact Sheet, 2014; Medicare Improvements for Patients and 
Providers Act of 2008, 2008).  
Table 1. Time line: Evolution of Medicare-managed care and quality measurement in MA   
Month Year Action 
July 1965 The Medicare program is established to provide health insurance coverage to 
elderly (ages 65 or up) beneficiaries of Social Security ( Social Security Act: 
Title XVIII-Health insurance for the aged and disabled, 1965). 
October 1972 The Social Security Act is amended to enable Medicare to contract with health 
maintenance organizations (Social Security Act: Title XVIII-Health insurance 
for the aged and disabled, 1965). 
October 1972 The Social Security Act is amended to cover individuals with disabilities and 
end-stage renal disease in Medicare (Social Security Act: Title XVIII-Health 
insurance for the aged and disabled, 1965). 
  1982 Medicare initiates quality improvement activities in Medicare health plans 
(McIntyre, Rogers, & Heier, 2001). 
September 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) authorizes Medicare to 
contract with health maintenance organizations (HMOs) at 95% of the average 
cost of serving a Medicare beneficiary in the relevant county (Medicare 
Advantage Fact Sheet, 2014). 
December 1995 Republicans in Congress attempt to wring substantial savings from the Medicare 
program, including efforts to impose spending caps on Medicare and to broadly 
expand private Medicare plans. The effort is vetoed by President Bill Clinton 
(Oberlander, 2003). 
  1996 CAHPS is implemented in Medicare+Choice (McIntyre et al., 2001).  
  1996 Medicare+Choice plans begin submitting HEDIS data ( Emergency Clearance: 
Public Information Collection Requirements, 1996). 
August 1997 The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) passes, thereby creating the Medicare+Choice 
program (The Balanced Budget Act, 1997). 
  1998 The Health Outcomes Survey (HOS) is developed by CMS, NCQA, Health 
Assessment Lab (HAL), and other experts and implemented by CMS (Health 
Services Advisory Group, 2014). 
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Month Year Action 
  1999 Authorized under the BBA, Medicare begins contracting with preferred provider 
organizations (PPOs), private fee-for-service plans (PFFSs), and Medical 
Savings Account Plans (MSAs) (Christensen, 1997; Payments to 
Medicare+Choice Organizations, 2010). 
December 2000 The Benefits Improvement and Protection Act (BIPA) is expanded to floors on 
payments to Medicare+Choice plans (Medicare Advantage Fact Sheet, 2014). 
December 2003 The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) 
is renamed Medicare+Choice Medicare Advantage; the Medicare drug benefit 
(Medicare part D) is established (CMS, 2011; The Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, 2003). 
  2006 Medicare institutes a bidding process based on the average cost of delivering the 
services covered under Medicare parts A and B and, in the case of MA-PD 
plans, Medicare part D (Medicare Advantage Fact Sheet, 2014). 
  2007 CMS begins grading Medicare part D plans using a star rating system (Medicare 
Part D Performance Metrics Technical Notes November 9, 2006, 2006; 
Pharmacy, 2014; Statement by Kerry Weems Acting Administrator CMS Centers 
for Medicare & Medicaid Services on Medicare Advantage Increased Spending 
Relative to Medicare Fee-for-Service, 2008). 
March  2007 Sen. Max Baucus (D-MT) announces a broad outline for health care reform 
(Health Care Reform from Conception to Final Passage, 2010). 
  2008 CMS commences grading MA and MA-PD plans by using a 1- to 5-star rating 
system (Medicare Health Plan Quality and Performance Ratings Technical 
Notes 11/01/2007, 2007). 
June  2008 Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act (MIPPA) changes the 
benchmark setting process, increases the coordination of Medicare and 
Medicaid benefits, and slows the growth of certain types of MA plans (Medicare 
Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, 2008). 
October 2009 Senate considers House Resolution 3590 (HR 3590), the Service Members 
Home Ownership Tax Act by Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY), which 
had passed the House (Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009, 
2009). 
October 2009 Senate Bill 1796 (“S 1796”), America’s Healthy Future Act, is approved by the 
Senate Finance Committee (America's Healthy Future Act, 2009). 
October 2009 The Preservation of Access to Care for Medicare Beneficiaries and Pension 
Relief Act of 2010, House Resolution 3962 (HR 3962), is introduced to the 
House of Representatives (Preservation of Access to Care for Medicare 
Beneficiaries and Pension Relief Act of 2010, 2010). 
March 2010 The House of Representatives concurs in the Senate amendments to HR 3590 
and, along with it, passes the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, 
House Resolution 4872 (HR 4872) (Health Care and Education Reconciliation 
Act of 2010, 2010). 
March  2010 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is presented to and signed by 
President Obama on March 23, 2010 (The Affordable Care Act, 2010). 
  2011 CMS requires MA and part D contracts with more than 600 members to 
administer a plan-specific CAHPS survey (Quality). 
  2012 Medicare stars quality bonus demonstration program begins (Cosgrove, 2012) 
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Month Year Action 
  2013 Health Outcomes Survey (HOS) (v.2.5) is implemented (Health Services 
Advisory Group, 2014). 
March 2014 An expert panel appointed by the National Quality Forum (NQF) issues a draft 
report in which they recommend that certain quality measures be risk adjusted to 
account for sociodemographic differences, in addition to differences based on 
health status (National Quality Forum, 2014b).  
August 2014 NQF Board of Directors ratify a trial to assess the impact of risk adjusting 
certain measures for sociodemographic factors (National Quality Forum, 
2014c).  
September 2014 CMS uses their regulatory discretion not to terminate plans that score fewer than 
three Medicare stars for three consecutive years and issues a request for 
information regarding differences in star rating performance among plans 
serving individuals who are dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid and those 
who are only eligible for Medicare (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, 2014f). 
September 2014 NQF Consensus Standard Approval Committee adopts parameters for the SES 
adjustment trial (National Quality, 2014d). 
October 2014 The Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014 (“the 
IMPACT Act”) becomes law, thereby requiring the Secretary to conduct a study 
that examines the effect of individuals’ SES on quality measures, resource use, 
and other measures for individuals under Medicare (Improving Medicare Post-
Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014, 2014). 
November 2014 CMS closes the opportunity to reply to a request for information regarding 
differences in star rating performance among plans serving individuals who are 
dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid and those who are only eligible for 
Medicare (Sanders, 2014).  
December 2014 The Quality Bonus Demonstration program ends (Cosgrove, 2012). 
February 2015 CMS issues the Advance Notice of Methodological Changes for Calendar Year 
(CY) 2016 for Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates, part C and part D 
Payment Policies and 2016 Call Letter (“The Advance Notice”) and proposes a 
change (reduce the weight of seven targeted measures by 50%) to the stars 
methodology for all plans regardless of the proportion of LIS/dual membership 
(Advance Notice of Methodological Changes for Calendar Year (CY) 2016 for 
Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates, Part C and Part D Payment 
Policies and 2016 Call Letter, 2015). 
March 2015 HHS issues a notice of intent to award a single source contract to the National 
Academy of Science Institute of Medicine (now the National Academy of 
Medicine (NAM)/National Research Council to conduct the IMPACT Act study 
(Accounting for Socioeconomic Status in Medicare Payment Program, 2015). 
April 2015 NAM convenes an ad hoc committee to provide a definition of SES for the 
purposes of application to Medicare quality measurement and payment 
programs, to identify the social factors that have been shown to impact health 
outcomes of Medicare beneficiaries, and to specify criteria that could be used in 
determining which social factors should be accounted for in Medicare quality 
measurement and payment programs (Accounting for Socioeconomic Status in 
Medicare Payment Program, 2015). 
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Month Year Action 
April 2015 CMS issues the Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2016 Medicare 
Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and part D Payment 
Policies and Final Call Letter. They reverse course and confirm their intent to 
terminate any remaining contracts that score fewer than three stars for three 
years in either Medicare part C or part D (Announcement of Calendar Year 
(CY) 2016 for Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates and Medicare 
Advantage  and Part D Payment Policies and Final Call Letter, 2015). 
April 2015 A memorandum is issued by the NQF staff outlining the process for the SES 
adjustment trial period, a time line for further activity, and evaluation criteria ( 
Burstin, Amin, & Isijola, 2015). 
September 2015 CMS releases technical notes of RAND Corporation study of the effect of low-
income and disability status on MA plan performance on 16 clinical quality 
measures finding that socioeconomic status does not show significant 
independent effect on quality scoring when LIS/disability is taken into account 
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015a, 2015b).  
September 2015 MedPAC presents findings of an analysis of variation in quality measures across 
plans by plan population mix discussing alternative methodologies and 
justifications for calculating star rating bonus payments (Zarabozo, 2015). 
November 2015 CMS releases a request for comments on the proposed 2017 stars methodology, 
including two proposed interim adjustment methodologies: application of a 
categorical adjustment index (CAI) and the use of indirect standardization (IS) 
(Larrick, 2015). 
February 2016 CMS proposes moving forward with the application of a categorical adjustment 
index (CAI) approach, beginning with the 2017 Star Ratings (Advance Notice of 
Methodological Changes for Calendar Year (CY) 2017 for Medicare Advantage 
(MA) Capitation Rates, Part C and Part D Payment Policies and 2017 Call 
Letter, 2016). 
April 2016 CMS finalizes the application of the CAI for 2017 in the final call letter 
(Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2017 Medicare Advantage Capitation 
Rates and Medicare  Advantage and Part D Payment Policies and Final Call 
Letter, 2016).  
October  2016 CMS releases the 2017 star results and are the first to include the CAI 
calculation. Based on those results, approximately 49% of all MA-PD plans, 
nearly 68% of enrollment weighted plan membership received four or more 
stars, and over 90% of MA-PD enrollees are in contracts with ratings of 3.5 or 
more stars. 23 contracts: 14 MA-PD, 3 MA-only, and 6 PDP received five stars 
(2017 Star Ratings, 2016).  
December 2016 On December 13, 2016 President Barack Obama signed HR 34, the 21st 
Century Cures Act (21st Century Cures Act, 2016).  HR 34 delayed termination 
of persistently low-performing MA plans pending the results of the IMPACT 
Act studies.  
December 2016 ASPE releases the first of the reports required under the IMPACT Act modeling 
the impact of social risk factors on performance under Medicare’s value based 
purchasing programs finding a relationship between social risk and performance 
under the MA Stars methodology both between contracts serving high and low 
proportions of beneficiaries with social risk factors and within contracts and 
laying out a series of policy options for addressing this performance differential 
(Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's 
Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016). 
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Month Year Action 
 
2016-
2017 
The NAM releases five reports on Accounting for Social Risk Factors in 
Medicare Payment defining social risk factors, examining best practices in 
serving populations with social risk factors, defining criteria, factors and 
methods to account for social risk factors in Medicare payment, identifying 
current and potential data sources that could be used to account for social risk 
factors in Medicare payment and making recommendations based on those 
analyses (Board on Population Health and Public Health Practice; Board on 
Health Care Services; Health and Medicine Division, 2017; National Academies 
of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, 2017; National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d).  
 
Section 3.2 Medicare Advantage, the ACA and Quality Measurement 
By 2009 when Congress began debating the law that became the ACA, MA plans were paid, on 
average, 15% to 30% more than the cost of serving a patient in the traditional Medicare program (Altman, 
2011). This payment differential was due to a variety of factors related to the bidding methodology 
described in the previous section and was substantially increased as a result of the previously described 
benchmark increases which were a part of the 2003 MMA (Altman, 2011). In addition to this payment 
differential, MedPAC and others expressed concerns regarding the uneven quality of care delivered by the 
various MA plans and the variability of available supplemental benefits (Gold, 2008; The Medicare 
Advantage Program in 2014). In crafting the ACA, Congress sought to address both these quality and 
cost concerns (Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009, 2009).  
In February of 2007, Sen. Max Baucus (D-MT), then Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, 
announced a broad outline for health care reform (Health Care Reform from Conception to Final Passage, 
2010). This proposal ultimately became Senate Bill 1796 (“S 1796”), America’s Healthy Future Act, 
which was approved by the Senate Finance Committee on October 13, 2009 (America's Healthy Future 
Act, 2009). With respect to the quality of MA plans, S 1796 created a bonus payment of between 0.5% 
and 2% of the national monthly per capita cost of expenditures for individuals enrolled in traditional 
Medicare to plans that offer one or more of a series of care management programs. In addition, beginning 
in 2014, it required the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“the Secretary”) 
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to make monthly payments of 2% of the national monthly per capita cost for expenditures for individuals 
enrolled in traditional Medicare to MA plans that achieve, at least, a three-star rating and 4% to plans that 
achieve a four- or five-star rating. In addition, in situations in which an MA plan did not achieve three 
stars but CMS deemed the plan to be an improved quality plan, S1976 would have required CMS to make 
monthly bonus payments of 1%. S 1796 required the five-star rating system to measure clinical quality, 
enrollee satisfaction, and performance. In addition, it required the Secretary to risk adjust the distribution 
of performance bonuses under this program using the same risk-adjustment program utilized in rate 
setting (America's Healthy Future Act, 2009).  
The Preservation of Access to Care for Medicare Beneficiaries and Pension Relief Act of 2010, 
House Resolution 3962 (HR 3962), was introduced by Rep. John Dingell (D-MI), Chairman of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, on October 29, 2009 (Thomas.gov, 2010). The act was renamed 
the Affordable Health Care for America Act, and it passed the House of Representatives on November 7, 
2009 (Thomas.gov, 2010). HR 3962 created a quality-based payment adjustment applicable to MA plans. 
Under this legislation, the benchmarks against which plans bid would have been raised by 5% over a 
period of 3 years based on the plan’s quality performance. HR 3962 included explicit instruction to CMS 
regarding how to measure quality performance. It required the Secretary to initially assess quality based 
on a blend of performance on the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS), Consumer 
Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS), and other measures of clinical quality as 
specified by the Secretary. In addition, it required CMS to include measures that reflect the outcomes of 
care. Those outcome measures were required, over time, to make up the preponderance of the measures. 
HR 3962 allowed the Secretary to risk adjust the measures as the Secretary deemed appropriate.   
In early December 2009, the Senate began debate and consideration of HR 3590 (HR 3590), the 
Service Members House Ownership Tax Act by Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY), which had 
passed the House on October 8, 2009 (Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009, 2009). The 
contents and title of HR 3590 were amended, thereby creating the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
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Act. The amendment retained the quality bonus and risk-adjustment language included in the Healthy 
Future Act (S1796) (Congressional Record, 2009).  
During the course of debate on the amendment, Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) described the quality 
provisions contained in the amendment as follows: 
I had an opportunity to work closely with Chairman Baucus in terms of addressing Medicare 
Advantage, and I think that with the chairman’s leadership, it has been possible to show you can 
find savings in the Medicare Program without harming older people, without reducing their 
guaranteed benefits, their essential benefits, as we have learned, with Medicare Advantage [. . .]. 
The way we have been able to do that is essentially through a two-part strategy: first, encourage 
competitive bidding and, second, provide incentives for quality, which is done through the bonus 
payment provisions that are in the legislation. First, on competitive bidding, you have plan bids, 
and you use the plan bids to set Medicare Advantage benchmarks which would encourage the 
plans to compete more directly on the basis of price and quality rather than on the level of extra 
benefits offered to those who are enrolling. With the competitive bidding, plans compete to be 
the most efficient and hold down costs [. . .]. In addition, in the Finance Committee I offered an 
amendment with several colleagues that would boost the payments to those plans that, according 
to the government—and the government uses a system of stars, in effect, to reward quality—our 
amendment would boost the payments to those Medicare Advantage plans with four- and five-
star quality ratings. So, in effect, with our legislation there are both carrots and sticks. 
Competitive bidding plus bonus payments offers both, so the plans compete to provide the best 
value for seniors. (Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009, 2009)  
 
On March 21, 2010, the House of Representatives concurred in the Senate amendments to HR 
3590 and, along with it, passed the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, House Resolution 
4872 (HR 4872). HR 4872 revised the benchmark and quality measurement programs, removing bonus 
payments for three star and improving plans, removing risk adjustment from the quality measurement 
methodology, and including performance on the stars quality measurement methodology in the 
calculation of benchmarks and rebates (Health Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation Act of 
2010, 2010).  
On March 24, 2010, in debate on HR 4872, Republican members of the Senate opposed the 
revisions as further cuts to the MA program, while Democratic Senators supported the changes as 
furthering efforts to improve quality. Senator Baucus, author of the America’s Healthy Future Act, 
defended the revised provisions, stating, “[. . .] it is important to remember that health care reform will 
reduce excessive overpayments to Medicare Advantage plans, while at the same time rewarding high-
quality, efficient plans for providing care to seniors. Medicare Advantage plans that achieve high-quality 
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rankings . . . will receive an increase in payments. That is very important because, today, Medicare 
Advantage plans are paid the same amount regardless of the quality of care they provide. For the first 
time, under this legislation, payments to plans would be based on performance. I think that is something 
all seniors would prefer” (Consideration of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, 
2010). Both bills, now known in combination as the Affordable Care Act (ACA), were presented to and 
signed by President Barack Obama on March 23, 2010 (Thomas.gov, 2010). 
As enacted, the ACA imposed an array of reductions in MA spending (Altman, 2011; 
Commission, 2011), including a phased-in reduction to the benchmarks against which plans bid, and 
reductions in payments to account for identified patterns of differential assessment of patient health risk 
between MA and traditional Medicare otherwise referred to as coding intensity adjustments (The 
Affordable Care Act, 2010). The benchmark reductions were complete effective January 1, 2017. As a 
result, each county is now categorized into one of four quartiles, which range from 95% to 115% of 
spending in the traditional Medicare program in that county (The Affordable Care Act, 2010). In addition, 
each plan’s benchmark and rebate amount, as well as access to bonus payments, are now contingent on 
quality performance (The Affordable Care Act, 2010). Despite the inclusion of risk adjustment in several 
earlier drafts of the legislation the ACA does not address the issue of risk adjustment of the Medicare 
stars program. As a result of this combination of policy changes, the ACA creates significant financial 
risk for plans unable to achieve quality bonus eligibility. 
On October 6, 2014, President Barak Obama signed the Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care 
Transformation Act of 2014 (the IMPACT Act) (Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation 
Act of 2014, 2014). This legislation requires the Secretary to conduct a series of studies that examine the 
effect of individual SES on quality measures, resource use and other measures under Medicare 
(Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014, 2014). 
On December 13, 2016, President Barack Obama signed HR 34, the 21st Century Cures Act (21st 
Century Cures Act, 2016). This law delays the ACA provisions requiring the termination of MA plans 
that receive fewer than three stars under the MA stars methodology for 3 years pending the results of the 
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IMPACT Act studies and recommendations. Specifically, it states that it is the intent of Congress to 
continue to study and request input on the effects of socioeconomic status and dual-eligible populations 
on the Medicare Advantage STARS rating system. Pending the results of those studies and stakeholder 
input, Section 1857(h) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395w–27(h)) is amended to require that 
“…through the end of plan year 2018, the Secretary may not terminate a contract under this section with 
respect to the offering of an MA plan by a Medicare Advantage organization solely because the MA plan 
has failed to achieve a minimum quality rating under the five-star rating system under section 1853(o)(4)” 
(21st Century Cures Act, 2016). 
On December 21, 2016, ASPE released the first of the IMPACT Act required reports concluding 
that “Dually-enrolled beneficiaries, beneficiaries living in low-income neighborhoods, Black 
beneficiaries, rural beneficiaries and beneficiaries with disabilities experienced worse outcomes compared 
with other beneficiaries on many to most of the quality metrics included in the Medicare Advantage 
Quality Star Rating program” (Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under 
Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016). In this report ASPE simulated a series of policy 
options and offered several recommendations for revising the Medicare Stars program to address the 
impact of social risk factors on plan performance under the Medicare Stars program (Report to Congress: 
Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016). 
Section 3.3 MA Plan Designs 
MA plans can be delivered through health maintenance organizations (HMOs), local or regional 
preferred provider organizations (PPOs), Medicare medical savings account (MSA) plans, special needs 
plans (SNPs), private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans, or religious fraternal benefit (RFB) plans. Within each 
MA plan, enrollees may obtain care from a network of doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers. 
In addition, some types of MA plans offer care coordination services, such as case and disease 
management programs, to assist beneficiaries in navigating and obtaining access to care. Each year, 
Medicare defines the maximum allowable out-of-pocket cost for MA beneficiaries by service type. For 
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example, in 2015, CMS established the maximum deductible (the amount a beneficiary must pay before 
insurance coverage begins) for the drug benefit under Medicare part D at $320. In addition, total cost 
sharing for parts A and B services may not exceed cost sharing for those services in the traditional 
Medicare program on an actuarially equivalent basis (Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2016 for 
Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies and 
Final Call Letter, 2015). This means that they must provide the same general level of financial protection 
to plan beneficiaries. 
In designing the individual plan benefit packages, MA plans may require beneficiaries to pay a 
monthly premium, a deductible, or a portion of the cost of each service or prescription in the form of 
coinsurance or copayments. MA plans also typically offer additional supplemental benefits, such as dental 
care, vision care, or over-the-counter drugs, not available in traditional Medicare. MA plans also often 
have lower out-of-pocket costs compared with traditional Medicare, thereby reducing or eliminating the 
need for beneficiaries to purchase supplemental insurance.  
 Each MA plan must apply to CMS for approval to serve a designated service area. The service 
area is a geographic region made up of a county, multiple counties, or, in the case of a regional plan, a 
region designated by CMS. When approved to serve a service area, the plan must be made available to all 
eligible Medicare beneficiaries residing in the service area. CMS may approve a plan to serve less that an 
entire county within in a service area. 
Section 3.4 Demographics of Medicare Advantage 
As of December 2016, nearly 18.7 million Medicare beneficiaries, approximately 30% of all 
Medicare enrollees, receive their benefits through the Medicare Advantage (MA) program (Medicare 
Advantage, Cost, PACE, Demo, and Prescription Drug Plan Contract Report - Monthly Summary Report, 
2016). Between 2009 and 2012, the number of individuals dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid who 
participated in MA increased from 11% to 23% of all individuals who are dually eligible (Harrison & 
Zarabozo, 2014). According to MedPAC, individuals who are dually eligible represent 16% of MA 
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participants (Harrison & Zarabozo, 2014). This is 3% less than the share of the traditional Medicare 
program represented by individuals who are dually eligible (19%) (Harrison & Zarabozo, 2014).  
While new Medicare enrollees were more likely to enroll in Medicare Advantage than traditional 
Medicare, in the years 2006-2011, dual eligibles were less likely than other Medicare beneficiaries to 
choose MA (Jacobson, Neuman, & Damico, 2015). However, MedPAC has found that partial dual 
eligibles (individuals eligible for Medicaid-funded assistance, but not full Medicaid benefits) are more 
likely than full dual eligibles (those entitled to full Medicaid benefits) to enroll in MA (Harrison & 
Zarabozo, 2014). Recent changes in policy related to dual eligibles including an ongoing federal/state 
demonstration program designed to enroll individuals into fully integrated MA programs (Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2014g) and state efforts to align Medicaid managed care contracts with 
available Duals Special Needs Plans (DSNPs) (Philip, Archibald, & Sope, 2016) likely account for a 
substantial proportion of the growth in enrollment of dually eligible beneficiaries in MA.   
Many MA beneficiaries have low incomes. In 2012, 10.8% of MA beneficiaries had incomes less 
than $10,000, as compared with 12.5% of beneficiaries in traditional Medicare. Twenty-six percent of 
MA beneficiaries had incomes between $10,000 and $19,999, as compared to 21.1% of beneficiaries in 
traditional Medicare, and 21.7% of MA beneficiaries had incomes between $20,000 and $29,999, as 
compared with 16.7% of beneficiaries in traditional Medicare (Americas Health Insurance Plans Center 
for Policy and Research, 2015). 
MA plans serve a higher proportion of individuals who are Hispanic and African American than 
the traditional Medicare program (30% in MA versus 23% in traditional Medicare). In 2012, the most 
recent year for which data are available, Hispanic noninstitutionalized Medicare beneficiaries represented 
9.8% of all Medicare beneficiaries. However, while Hispanic noninstitutionalized beneficiaries 
represented 14.9% of MA beneficiaries, only 7.7% of Hispanic noninstitutionalized beneficiaries 
participated in traditional Medicare (Americas Health Insurance Plans Center for Policy and Research, 
2015). African Americans comprised 9.8% of all Medicare beneficiaries. They represent 10.2% of MA 
beneficiaries as compared with 9.7% of beneficiaries served in traditional Medicare. In addition, in 2012, 
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57% of dual eligibles participating in MA were members of racial or ethnic minorities (Americas Health 
Insurance Plans Center for Policy and Research, 2015), while 47% of duals served by traditional 
Medicare were racial or ethnic minorities (Americas Health Insurance Plans Center for Policy and 
Research, 2015). 
Section 3.5 Social Determinants of Health and MA 
The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) defines the social determinants of health as the “. . . 
circumstances in which people are born, grow up, live, work, and age, as well as the systems put in place 
to deal with illness. These circumstances are in turn shaped by a wider set of forces: economics, social 
policies, and politics” (Centers for Disease Control, 2014). Examples of social determinants include 
access to educational, economic, and job opportunities; disparities in access to health care services; and 
racism, socioeconomic conditions, language, literacy, and culture (U. S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2014). Based on a meta-analysis of nearly 50 studies, researchers estimated that social 
factors, including education, racial segregation, social supports, and poverty accounted for over a third of 
total deaths in the United States in a year” (Heiman, 2015).  
The sources of disparities in health care are many and varied. They include both SES factors, 
such as income and education; other factors, such as the conditions of the community in which the patient 
resides, access to food and recreational facilities, proximity to environmental hazards, chronic stress, 
receipt of lower-quality care, more difficulty accessing care, difficulty navigating the health care system, 
provider ignorance or bias, provider difficulty communicating with patients, providers lacking sufficient 
time to spend with patients, and patient nonadherence to recommended treatment (Bahls, 2011). 
Healthy People 2020, the public health goals as set under the leadership of the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS), include understanding and addressing the social determinants of 
health to achieve the goal of creating social and physical environments that promote good health for 
everyone (U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2014). Specifically Healthy People 2020 sets 
a goal of “. . . working to establish policies that positively influence social and economic conditions and 
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those that support changes in individual behavior, we can improve health for large numbers of people in 
ways that can be sustained over time. Improving the conditions in which we live, learn, work, and play 
and the quality of our relationships will create a healthier population, society, and workforce” (Centers for 
Disease, 2014). Given the demographics of MA, many MA enrollees have socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics, such as high poverty, low educational attainment, poor neighborhood 
conditions, and exposure to racism that directly or indirectly can act as social determinants, contributing 
to poorer health outcomes (Braveman et al., 2011). 
Section 3.6 Quality Measurement in Medicare Managed Care 
The current MA stars program is used both to assist Medicare beneficiaries in selecting a plan and 
as a mechanism for regulators to determine benchmarks, rebates, and quality bonuses paid to the plans. 
The MA stars measure set rates plans based on process of care, patient outcome, experience of care, and 
access to care measures (Medicare 2017 Part C & D Star Rating Technical Notes, 2016). However, 
quality measurement in Medicare is not new. Medicare health plans have been participating in quality 
improvement activities since 1982 (D. McIntyre, Rogers, L., Heier, E.J., 2001). Medicare+Choice plans 
began submitting HEDIS data in 1996 ( Emergency Clearance: Public Information Collection 
Requirements, 1996). They began participating in CAHPS in 1996 and in the Medicare Health Outcomes 
Survey (HOS) in 1998 ( McIntyre, Rogers, & Heier, 2001). 
 Medicare drug plans (part D plans) have been subject to quality measurement since their 
inception (American Pharmacists Association and Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy, 2014). The 
MMA created the Medicare prescription drug benefit (part D) and required the Secretary to provide 
consumers with comparative information, including comparisons of quality and performance and the 
results of consumer satisfaction surveys (The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and 
Modernization Act of 2003, 2003). In addition, it required each MA plan sponsor to have an ongoing 
quality improvement program and required each MA plan sponsor to collect, analyze, and report “. . . data 
that permits the measurement of health outcomes and other indices of quality” (The Medicare Prescription 
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Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, 2003). Medicare initially graded part D plans using a 
scale of one to three stars. (Pharmacy, 2014) Medicare has been rating the quality of part D plan using a 
system of one to five stars since 2007 (Medicare Part D Performance Metrics Technical Notes November 
9, 2006, 2006; Pharmacy, 2014; Statement by Kerry Weems Acting Administrator CMS Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services on Medicare Advantage Increased Spending Relative to Medicare Fee-
for-Service, 2008) and MA and MA-PD plans since 2008 (Medicare Health Plan Quality and 
Performance Ratings Technical Notes 11/01/2007, 2007). The Medicare stars measurement program in its 
current form began in 2008.  
Section 3.7 The Impact of the ACA and Subsequent Policy Making on the MA Stars Program 
As discussed, according to CMS, prior to the passage of the ACA, MA plans were paid on 
average 114% of the cost of serving the same beneficiary in the traditional Medicare program 
(Cavanaugh, 2016). This inequity which had been a concern of liberals throughout the life of the MA 
program was substantially exacerbated as a result of the MMA which raised the benchmarks in counties 
with low costs in the traditional Medicare program (Altman, 2011). As discussed, the ACA sought to 
address this payment inequity and to address concerns regarding uneven plan quality, and positive risk 
selection by among plans (Commission, 2009; Nicholas, 2009). To do so, the ACA modified Section 
1853 of the Social Security Act (Payments to Medicare+Choice Organizations, 2010), changing the 
methodology used to pay MA plans and placing a substantial portion of plan compensation at risk based 
on plan performance under MA stars quality rating system. In 2016 MedPAC estimated that, the 
benchmark or maximum amount that Medicare will pay an MA plan, including the quality bonus dollars, 
in 2017 will amount to 107% of traditional Medicare and that, on average, plans will actually be paid 
102% of what CMS spends for each participant in the traditional Medicare program (Commission, 2016).  
This difference likely reflects a combination of lower bids and variable stars performance impacting both 
bonus and rebate eligibility among plans.  
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Under Section 3202 of the ACA, “. . . quality rating for a plan shall be determined according to a 
five-star rating system . . . .” (The Affordable Care Act, 2010). Plans that score 3.5 or more Medicare 
stars receive a higher premium amount. This percentage increase in premium grows as performance under 
the five-star system increases (3.5, 4, 4.5, and 5). The law also allows plans to “earn” as much as a 5% 
bonus for achieving five Medicare stars. This bonus revenue must be used for providing extra benefits or 
lowering premiums for enrollees. Moreover, CMS has the authority to terminate plans that fail to achieve 
three Medicare stars for three consecutive years (Termination of Contract by CMS, 2005), a provision 
temporarily suspended by Congress in December 2016 under the 21st Century Cures Act (21st Century 
Cures Act, 2016).  
Under the law, in calendar year 2012, plans achieving four or more stars were eligible to receive a 
1.5% bonus in 2012, a 3% bonus in 2013, and a 5% bonus in 2014 and subsequent years. To allow plans 
time to improve their quality scores prior to the imposition of the full bonus program, CMS created a 
transitional financing program called the Quality Bonus Demonstration program (Centers for Medicare 
Medicaid Services, 2010). Under this program, plans that achieved three or more Medicare stars received 
bonus payments. The quality bonus demonstration program ended on December 31, 2014. As a 
consequence, results for the 2015 plan year (based on 2014 performance) were the first under the full 
force of the ACA provisions. As a consequence, the quantitative analysis included as phase 2 this study 
focuses on changes, if any, made between 2014 and 2015 on plan service areas and product filings.  
In addition to the changes related to the MA stars program, the ACA sought to align MA and 
traditional Medicare rates. According to CMS, the ACA cut $68 billion by “Reducing excessive Medicare 
payments to private insurers who operate in Medicare Advantage” (CMS, 2012). To do so, Congress 
established a new methodology for calculating the MA county benchmark rates against which plans 
annually bid. To smooth this transition, a blended benchmark was used during a transition period from 
2011 to 2017 (The Affordable Care Act, 2010). In 2017 (Commission, 2016), counties in all fifty states 
and the District of Columbia were assigned by CMS to benchmark quartiles, ranging from 95% to 115% 
of traditional Medicare in the most recent year in which the rates were rebased.  
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Additional changes included in the ACA, as well as subsequent legislation, have further increased 
the financial pressure on MA plans. For example, the ACA imposed a non-tax-deductible fee on most 
health plans, including MA. The actuarial firm Milliman has estimated the impact of that fee to be 
between 1.7% and 3% of plan revenue (Doucet & Yahnke, 2013; Swanson & Goetsch, 2015). However, 
the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Division Q, Title II, Section 201 suspended this fee for the 
2016 calendar year which would be paid by plans in 2017 (Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, 
2015).  
CMS has also used its regulatory authority to increase the relative importance of the MA Star 
scores. Star scores are widely publicly reported on the Medicare plan finder (online enrollment) website 
and elsewhere to aid in consumer plan selection (Medicare Plan Finder, 2017). Plans deemed persistently 
low-performing (fewer than three stars for 3 years) are so noted on that website (receiving what is 
referred to as a low-performing icon) and are unable to receive online enrollment. In addition, Medicare 
beneficiaries are allowed to switch to plans earning five stars at any point in the calendar year, while 
lower performing plans are restricted to the annual open enrollment period (Medicare 2017 Part C & D 
Star Rating Technical Notes, 2016; Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under 
Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016). 
In addition to the changes made in the ACA and subsequently by CMS, the American Taxpayer 
Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA) ("American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012," 2013), and subsequent CMS 
regulations reduced MA rates to reflect differences in risk coding between health plans and traditional 
Medicare (known as a coding intensity adjustment) (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2014a). 
In April 2013, Congress imposed a 2% “sequestration” across the board to cut all of Medicare, including 
MA (2014). For the 2017 plan year CMS modified this same risk-adjustment methodology in an effort to 
more appropriately compensate plans serving sicker and more disabled beneficiaries. This had the effect 
of further reducing revenue to some MA plans (Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2016 for Medicare 
Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies and Final Call 
Letter, 2015; Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2017 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and 
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Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies and Final Call Letter, 2016; Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, 2014a). In a report created for the MA trade group The Better Medicare Alliance 
describing the cumulative impact of these changes, the actuarial firm Milliman estimated that while 
average annual premiums paid to MA plans between 2012 to 2015 increased by $18.96, the annual 
“benefit value” (meaning the extra benefits received by MA participants but not available to beneficiaries 
in traditional Medicare, such as reduced cost sharing and supplemental benefits) fell by $132.72 
(Swanson & Goetsch, 2015). 
The combination of reimbursement changes required by the ACA and subsequent legislation, as 
well as the threat of contract termination for repeated low stars performance, has created an imperative for 
MA plans to achieve high Medicare stars scores in order to obtain the bonus revenue necessary to ensure 
their products remain financially viable. For the 2015 plan year, the consulting firm McKinsey estimated 
that plans with fewer than four stars would forgo $3.47 billion in bonus payments (Carlton, Ladsariya, & 
Machado-Pereira, 2014). For the 2016 plan year, because more plans were able to achieve bonus 
eligibility and more beneficiaries joined MA plans with four or more stars, that number dropped to a still 
substantial $2.03 billion (Hurley, Ladsariya, Machado-Pereira, & Vaskov, 2015; Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission Public Meeting, 2015). Simply dividing that number by the total number of 
beneficiaries participating in plans below four stars, the revenue lost by a plan failing to achieve four stars 
in 2016 was $362.5 per beneficiary. 
Section 3.8 Medicare Advantage Stars Methodology 
Each year CMS establishes the set of measures under which each plan will be scored in the 
following year. In making changes from year to year, CMS states, “Our priorities include enhancing the 
measures and methodology to reflect the true performance of organizations and sponsors, maintaining 
stability to the link to payment, and providing advance notice of future changes” (Advance Notice of 
Methodological Changes for Calendar Year (CY) 2015 for Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates, 
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Part C and Part D Payment Policies and 2015 Call Letter, 2014). Despite this stated goal, the type and 
magnitude of changes made from year to year are not consistent.  
The inconsistency manifests in several ways. First, some of the measures included in the scoring 
methodology in one year are not included in the next year. Second, the weight applied to the measure can 
change from year to year. For example, each measure receives a weight of one in the scoring 
methodology in the first year that it is a part of the methodology, but that weight can be increased over 
time. Third, the organizations that promulgate the measures used in the methodology, (such as CMS or 
the National Committee on Quality Assurance (NCQA)) can change each measure’s parameters from year 
to year.  
Phase 2 of this study focuses on the transition from the quality bonus demonstration program to 
the full effect of the stars methodology required under the ACA which occurred on January 1, 2015. 
Using this transition as an example, between 2014 and 2015 four MA stars measures were changed as a 
result of changes in NCQA’s HEDIS specifications: one measure was moved to the display page; one 
measure was retired (removed entirely); the specifications for four measures implemented by CMS were 
changed; and CMS changed the scoring methodology to increase the weight of the summary measure of 
year-over-year improvement (Advance Notice of Methodological Changes for Calendar Year (CY) 2015 
for Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates, Part C and Part D Payment Policies and 2015 Call 
Letter, 2014). A table created by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services that lists the measures 
included in the methodology by year from 2008 to 2016 is included as Appendix H (CMS, 2014a).  
The measures included in the MA stars methodology are derived from four sources: HEDIS, 
CAHPS, HOS and CMS administrative data. HEDIS is a measurement tool developed by the NCQA and 
used by Medicare, Medicaid, and commercial health plans to assess plan performance according to 
specific domains of care: effectiveness of care, experience of care, access/availability of care, utilization, 
and relative resource use (National Committee for Quality Assurance, 2014; National Committee on 
Quality Assurance). CAHPS surveys are designed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ) for the purpose of measuring patients’ experiences of care (Agency for Healthcare Research and 
 28 
 
Quality, 2014). Since 2011, CMS has required MA and part D contracts with more than 600 members to 
administer a plan-specific CAHPS survey. The survey includes six composite measures: getting needed 
care, getting care quickly, doctors who communicate well, health plan customer service, getting needed 
prescription drugs, and getting information from the health plan regarding prescription drug coverage and 
cost (Quality, 2014). HOS evaluates patient-reported outcomes based on a random sample of each MA 
plan’s participants. Developed by CMS, NCQA, Health Assessment Lab (HAL), and other experts, the 
HOS survey has been used since 1998. The current version of HOS (v.3.0) contains questions regarding 
health status, physical and mental health outcomes, questions on impairments in activities of daily living, 
four HEDIS effectiveness of care measures, and demographic questions regarding race, ethnicity, primary 
language, sex, and disability status as required under the Affordable Care Act. HOS is administered to a 
random sampled of 1200 MA participants from each MA organization with more than 500 enrollees. Two 
years later the same respondents are surveyed again. For example, the 2016 administration of the HOS 
survey administered the initial survey to HOS cohort 19 and the resurvey to cohort 17 who were initially 
surveyed in 2014 (Health Services Advisory Group, 2014). CMS administrative data include information 
about member satisfaction, plans’ appeals processes, audit results, and customer service.  
The MA stars methodology measures the MA plan’s performance against each measure in the 
year before the plan receives its score. That score then applies for the subsequent year. For example, the 
2015 plan year score (the score that beneficiaries saw when shopping for a plan for the calendar year 
2015) was received by each plan in 2014. That score was a measure of the plans’ performance under the 
2015 stars methodology using 2013 data.  
Plans are given ratings by domain of care, part C and part D summary score, and an overall 
summary rating of between one to five Medicare stars. The summary rating is derived from all four data 
sets. In 2014, the total measure set included 48 measures. Of those measures, 31 made up approximately 
61% of a health plan’s overall star score (Medicare.gov, 2014). Twenty measures, 39% of the overall 
score, were based on CMS and other administrative data sources, including data, such as call center 
reports, complaint and appeals reports, and disenrollments (Medicare.gov, 2014).  
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Each clinical measure includes specifications (a numerator and denominator of patients) and 
clinical exclusions. For the 2014 plan year, in addition to clinical specifications, nine measures (18.8%) 
each of which come from the CAHPS and HOS surveys were adjusted to account for some SES attributes 
of the measured population, including age, race, education, income, and dual status. Only one measure, 
plan all-cause readmissions, was adjusted for clinical comorbidities (Medicare.gov, 2014). This unique 
measure, plan all-cause readmissions, calculates the percentage of acute inpatient stays during a given 
year that were followed by an acute readmission for any reason within 30 days of discharge. The formula 
used to calculate this measure divides the actual (observed) readmission rate by an expected readmission 
rate (a weighted average for each of three age bands: 65-74, 75-84, and 85+) and then multiplies this 
result by the national average observed rate (Centers for Medicare Medicaid Services, 2014).  
Section 3.9 Socioeconomic Status and Other Demographic Factors and MA Stars 
Whether and how to measure—and pay for—quality in health care has long been debated 
(McIntyre, Rogers, & Heier, 2001). As the financial impact of performance under CMS’s various quality 
measurement systems has increased, policy makers, researchers, regulators, and providers have offered a 
variety of opinions regarding the impact that these factors have on quality measure performance (Joynt & 
Jha, 2012) and whether and how to account for SES and other demographic factors in this context. Some 
commentators have recommended including an adjustment for SES (Atkinson & Giovanis, 2014; 
Berenson, 2013; Girotti, Shih, & Dimick, 2014; Joynt & Jha, 2013a; Report to Congress: Social Risk 
Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016), stratifying 
performance results (Bernheim, 2014; Stensland, Lisk, & Glass, 2013), measuring improvement as 
opposed to achievement on certain measures (Berenson, Paulus, & Kalman, 2012; Bhalla & Kalkut, 
2010), creating measures specific to safety-net providers (Chatterjee, Joynt, Orav, & Jha, 2012), and 
changing the underlying measure specifications (Girotti et al., 2014; Joynt & Jha, 2013a). Others have 
opposed adjustments based on concerns that adjustments may not have a meaningful impact on results 
(Bernheim, 2014; Frakt, 2013) and could mask existing health disparities (Kertesz, 2014). Additional 
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concerns with adjustment focus on the concern that disparities in outcomes for low SES patients stem 
from lower quality patient care rather than patient factors (Bernheim, 2014; Kertesz, 2014). One 
commentator questioned the overall validity of the hospital readmissions measure by citing economic 
disadvantage as a potential confounder (Axon, 2011). 
An expert panel appointed by the National Quality Forum (NQF) issued a report in the spring of 
2014 recommending that certain quality measures be risk adjusted to account for sociodemographic 
differences, in addition to differences based on health status (National Quality Forum, 2014b). In a follow 
up to that report and based on recommendations from the NQF Consensus Standards Approval 
Committee, the Board of Directors of NQF ratified a trial to assess the impact of risk adjusting certain 
measures for sociodemographic factors (National Quality Forum, 2014a).  
The decision was controversial. In fact, in their response to the draft recommendations, CMS 
stated,  
Currently, CMS does not adjust quality outcome measures for patient socio-economic status 
(SES) because of the concern that doing so would establish a different standard of care for 
providers based on the socioeconomic status of the patients they care for, and can mask 
disparities in the quality of care provided [. . .]. Risk adjustment of quality measures for SES 
may reduce incentives to achieve high quality clinical goals for the economically disadvantaged. 
Previous analyses have shown that in some cases patients with low SES do concentrate in 
providers, hospitals, and plans that provide lower quality of care to all patients, so adjusting for 
this patient characteristic could adjust away true differences in quality across plans [. . .]. In 
addition, evidence was provided at the steering committee meetings that many providers who 
care for large proportions of low SES and disadvantaged patients are able to achieve high quality 
care. Such evidence should be recognized in the report as counter-argument to risk adjustment 
for SES; an argument that was discussed at length during the steering committee deliberations 
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2014b).  
 
In their final report, issued August 15, 2014, the NQF expert panel recommended 
sociodemographic adjustments be made to measures used for comparative assessment under certain 
conditions. However, if a measure is adjusted for sociodemographic factors, the measure must also be  
reported on a stratified basis in order to make health disparities visible (National Quality Forum, 2014b). 
The NQF Consensus Standards Approval Committee recommended, and the NQF Board of Directors 
approved, a trial period during which the NQF restriction against adjustment would be lifted and tested to 
generate data to inform permanent policy on this issue (National Quality Forum, 2014c, 2014d). On 
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September 3, 2014, the Consensus Standard Approval Committee adopted parameters for the trial. During 
that period, the NQF policy which restricts the use of sociodemographic factors in statistical risk models 
used in quality measurement is suspended only if (1) the Standing Committee approves the use of SES 
factors for that individual measure; (2) there is a conceptual and empirical basis for the adjustment; and 
(3) measure developers include both stratification of an adjusted and unadjusted version of the measure. 
During the trial, if adjustment is deemed appropriate, the NQF requires that each measure have 
specifications to compute the adjusted results, the nonadjusted result and stratification of the nonadjusted 
version in order to expose disparities (National Quality Forum, 2014d). Measure promulgators were given 
until April 1, 2015, to submit measures for participation in the pilot program. On April 7, 2015, a 
memorandum was issued by staff at the NQF outlining parameters for the trial period, a time line for 
further activity, and evaluation criteria (Burstin, Amin, & Isijola , 2015). 
In September 2014, CMS used their regulatory discretion not to terminate plans that scored fewer 
than three Medicare stars for three consecutive years and issued a request for information regarding 
differences in star rating performance among plans serving individuals who are dually eligible for 
Medicare and Medicaid and those who are only eligible for Medicare (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, 2014f). Responses to that RFI were due November 3, 2014.  
On October 6, 2014, during the CMS comment period, President Obama signed into law the 
Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014 (the IMPACT Act) (Improving 
Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014, 2014). This law primarily addresses quality and 
payment for post-acute care in traditional Medicare. It also includes a provision requiring the Secretary to 
conduct a series of studies that examine the effect of individuals’ SES on quality measures, resource use 
and other measures for individuals under Medicare. It requires the Secretary to report to Congress not 
later than two years from the enactment of the Act (Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation 
Act of 2014, 2014). On March 23, 2015, HHS issued a notice of intent to award a single source contract 
to the National Academy of Medicine (NAM)/National Research Council to conduct a study to: 
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1. Define SES; 
2. Identify the best practices of high-quality providers who serve disproportionate shares of low SES 
patients; 
3. Identify SES factors that impact the health outcomes of Medicare beneficiaries; 
4. Establish a set of criteria to be used to determine whether an SES factor should be accounted for 
in Medicare payment programs; and 
5. Suggest data sources and strategies for collecting needed data on SES factors for incorporation 
into Medicare payment programs.  
(Accounting for Socioeconomic Status in Medicare Payment Program, 2015)  
These studies examined the impact of SES factors not only at MA and part D but also on other 
Medicare quality measurement programs including the Medicare Hospital Readmission Reduction 
Program, the Medicare Hospital Value Based Purchasing Program, the Medicare Hospital Acquired 
Condition Payment Reduction, the Physician Value Based Modifier Program, the Medicare Shared 
Savings Program (ACOs), End Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program, and the Post-Acute Care 
Value-Based Purchasing Program. (Accounting for Socioeconomic Status in Medicare Payment Program, 
2015).  
On February 20, 2015, CMS issued the Advance Notice of Methodological Changes for Calendar 
Year (CY) 2016 for Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates, Part C and Part D Payment Policies 
and 2016 Call Letter (Advance Notice of Methodological Changes for Calendar Year (CY) 2016 for 
Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates, Part C and Part D Payment Policies and 2016 Call Letter, 
2015) (The Advance Notice). For the first time, CMS substantially addressed the issue of differential 
performance on the stars ratings program between plans with high and low proportions of individuals 
with low SES. They announced that, while they planned to continue studying the issue, they proposed to 
change the stars methodology for all plans regardless of the proportion of LIS/dual membership by 
reducing the weight of seven targeted measures by 50% (Advance Notice of Methodological Changes for 
Calendar Year (CY) 2016 for Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates, Part C and Part D Payment 
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Policies and 2016 Call Letter, 2015). They proposed to de-weight the following measures: Breast Cancer 
Screening, Colorectal Cancer Screening, Diabetes Care-Blood Sugar Controlled, Osteoporosis 
Management in Women Who Had Fracture, Rheumatoid Arthritis Management, Reducing Risk of Falling 
and only for part D plans, and Medication Adherence for Hypertension in part D plans (PDP) only 
((Advance Notice of Methodological Changes for Calendar Year (CY) 2016 for Medicare Advantage 
(MA) Capitation Rates, Part C and Part D Payment Policies and 2016 Call Letter, 2015). These 
measures were chosen on the basis of “statistical and practical significance” (Advance Notice of 
Methodological Changes for Calendar Year (CY) 2016 for Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates, 
Part C and Part D Payment Policies and 2016 Call Letter, 2015) Specifically, CMS said, “The reduced 
weights will target immediate relief to plans with significant Duals/LIS enrollment while maintaining 
incentives for all plans to improve on these important measures. Given the uncertainty about what is 
driving the association, long-term adjustments should be based on further in-depth examination of the 
issue by CMS and it HHS partners in quality measurement, as well as external measure developers, to 
determine the driving factors for the difference that has been observed in the preliminary research and 
RFI submissions” (Advance Notice of Methodological Changes for Calendar Year (CY) 2016 for 
Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates, Part C and Part D Payment Policies and 2016 Call Letter, 
2015) 
 This proposal would have reduced the effect of the chosen measures on the overall stars 
calculation, while increasing the weight and significance of other, more heavily weighted measures. This 
proposal met with substantial stakeholder resistance, and on April 6, 2015, when CMS issued their 
Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2016 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare 
Advantage and Part D Payment Policies and Final Call Letter, they reversed course (Announcement of 
Calendar Year (CY) 2016 for Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and 
Part D Payment Policies and Final Call Letter, 2015). Citing the results of their internal research, 
information obtained in response to the RFI, and comments received in response to the Advance Notice, 
they concluded, 
 34 
 
Given the uncertainty about what factors are driving the associations observed in the preliminary 
research, further in-depth examination by CMS, our HHS partners, MAOs, and Part D sponsors 
in quality measurement, as well as external measure developers, is warranted. The goal of the 
research is to provide the scientific evidence as to whether sponsors that enroll a 
disproportionate number of Dual/LIS beneficiaries are systematically disadvantaged by the Star 
Ratings and, if so, how such sponsors are disadvantaged (e.g. to identify specific quality 
measures) and to what extent they are disadvantaged. We recognize that the solution must 
acknowledge the unique challenges of serving traditionally underserved subsets of the 
population. The original request from some industry representatives was that certain quality 
measures be adjusted for the SES of their enrollees. The nature of such a statistical adjustment is 
that some plans would benefit, while others would experience lower measured performance. We 
note that a number of proposals submitted by the industry during the comment period were not 
consistent with this approach and were not budget neutral. In addition, we must be cognizant that 
the policy response must adequately address the unique situations in the territories. Upon 
completion of additional research, adjustments for the 2017 Star Ratings or other appropriate 
adjustments would be proposed in the fall Request for Comments. Depending on the research 
findings, solutions could include case-mix adjustments, different weighting options, excluding 
certain measures, or payment solutions. As we continue to explore this important issue, we will 
continue to be transparent and welcome collaboration with all stakeholders (Announcement of 
Calendar Year (CY) 2016 for Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates and Medicare 
Advantage and Part D Payment Policies and Final Call Letter, 2015). 
In addition, in that same notice, CMS confirmed their intent to terminate any remaining contracts 
that scored fewer than three stars for three years in either Medicare part C or part D (Announcement of 
Calendar Year (CY) 2016 for Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and 
Part D Payment Policies and Final Call Letter, 2015). 
In 2015, in support of ASPE’s work on this issue, the NAM convened an ad hoc committee to 
provide a definition of SES for the purposes of application to Medicare quality measurement and payment 
programs, to identify the social factors that have been shown to impact health outcomes of Medicare 
beneficiaries, and to specify criteria that could be used in determining social factors that should be 
accounted for in Medicare quality measurement and payment programs.  
In 2015, CMS engaged the RAND Corporation to look at both the effect of low-income and 
disability status on MA plan performance on 16 clinical quality measures: adult BMI assessment, 
rheumatoid arthritis management, breast cancer screening, controlling blood pressure, diabetes care – 
blood sugar controlled, diabetes care—eye exam, diabetes care—kidney disease monitoring, colorectal 
cancer screening, osteoporosis management in women who have had a fracture, plan all-cause 
readmissions, annual flu vaccine, monitoring physical activity, reducing the risk of falling, medication 
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adherence for diabetes medications, medication adherence for hypertension, and medication adherence for 
cholesterol (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015a, 2015b) . These measures were selected 
based on a process of elimination: CAHPS and HOS measures were excluded because some of the 
measures included in HOS and CAHPS are already case mix adjusted for some beneficiary attributes, 
plan-level (versus beneficiary-level) measures were excluded because they measure plan performance 
(call center, part D price accuracy, etc.), and measures either due to be retired or revised or measures that 
were only applicable to special needs plans were also excluded (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, 2015a, 2015b).  
Looking at the differences between contracts, CMS found that vulnerable beneficiaries were less 
likely than nonvulnerable beneficiaries to receive the recommended care or outcome although, for a small 
subset of measures, they got better care (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015a, 2015b). 
They also concluded that more measures demonstrated a positive association with disability as compared 
to LIS/DE (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015a, 2015b). However, when they looked at 
the differences within contracts (in the same contract, one person is LIS/DE or disabled and another is 
not) the majority of the measures had a small, negative within-contract difference or no difference 
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015a, 2015b).  
Despite the fact that a causal link between SES factors and quality performance still had yet to be 
proven, based on RAND’s research, on November 12, 2015, CMS released their request for comments on 
the proposed 2017 stars methodology. In it they offered for comment two proposed interim adjustment 
methodologies: application of a categorical adjustment index (CAI) and the use of indirect standardization 
(IS) (Larrick, 2015).  
In that November 12, 2015 guidance, CMS stated that the stars methodology itself should not be 
modified to address between contract differences in stars performance but that these proposed 
adjustments were being offered based on what the agency characterized as their commitment to accurate 
measurement of quality care and their view that the issues of quality and payment need to be 
disaggregated (Larrick, 2015). In that same proposal, CMS encouraged the measure stewards to review 
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each of their measure specifications with an eye to the issue of low-income status and disability (Larrick, 
2015). 
Following through on this guidance, for the 2017 plan year, CMS moved forward with their plans 
to both address the accuracy of the stars measurement system and to disaggregate the issues of quality 
measurement and equity of payment to plans caring for large numbers of low SES Medicare beneficiaries 
participating in MA. They did this by making substantial revisions to the MA risk-adjustment 
methodology and by implementing the CAI. With respect to the risk adjustment methodology, they 
increased the risk scores (and therefore the rate of payment to plans) for full benefit dual eligibles 
(individuals eligible for Medicare and Medicaid), and decreased the risk score of other Medicare 
beneficiaries (Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2017 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and 
Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies and Final Call Letter, 2016). The CAI was 
implemented as a factor added to or subtracted from a contract’s overall and/or summary 2017 star rating 
to adjust for the average within-contract performance disparity based on the contract’s proportion of 
LIS/DE or disabled members (Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2017 Medicare 
Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies and Final Call 
Letter, 2016). Each MA contract received up to three CAI adjustments at the overall and summary levels. 
PDPs received one adjustment for the part D summary rating (Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2017 
Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies and Final 
Call Letter, 2016). Contracts were categorized based on their percentages of LIS/DE and disabled 
beneficiaries, and the CAI value was the same for all contracts within each adjustment category. The CAI 
calculation for MA and part D plans was performed separately (Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 
2017 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies and 
Final Call Letter, 2016).  
In applying the CAI for 2017, CMS used a subset of the measures included in the RAND study: 
Breast Cancer Screening, Colorectal Cancer Screening, Diabetes Care – Blood Sugar Controlled, 
Osteoporosis Management in Women who had a Fracture, Rheumatoid Arthritis Management, and 
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Reducing the Risk of Falling. In addition, Medication Adherence for Hypertension (RAS antagonists) will 
be included for MA-PD and part D plans (Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2017 Medicare 
Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies and Final Call 
Letter, 2016; Medicare Part C & D Star Ratings: Update for 2017: August 3, 2016 Part C & D User 
Group Call 2016). 
Because the CAI is an interim adjustment each year, CMS will annually announce whether it 
intends to continue to apply it after 2017. (Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2017 Medicare 
Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies and Final Call Letter, 
2016) Each year, prior to applying a CAI, CMS will request comments about the subset of measures to be 
included for adjustment using the CAI (Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2017 Medicare 
Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies and Final Call 
Letter, 2016). The CAI values will be released in the final Call Letter and included in the annual Stars 
Technical Notes (Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2017 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and 
Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies and Final Call Letter, 2016). The CAI values will be 
determined using the previous rating year’s measurement period (Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 
2017 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies and 
Final Call Letter, 2016).  
Between October 2015 and January 2017, pursuant to a contract with ASPE, the NAM 
Committee on Accounting for Socioeconomic Status in Medicare Payment Programs convened in 2015 
released a series of five reports. Those reports redefined socioeconomic status as “social risk factors” 
(National Academies of Sciences, 2016a), conducted a literature review and examined 60 case studies 
submitted on best practices in serving populations with social risk factors ( National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016d), defined criteria, factors and methods to account for social 
risk factors in Medicare payment ( National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016a), 
identified current and potential data sources that could be used to account for social risk factors in 
Medicare payment (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016b) and made a 
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series of recommendation to HHS regarding the various methods of accounting for social risk factors 
(National Academies of Sciences, 2017). 
On December 13, 2016, President Barack Obama signed HR 34, the 21st Century Cures Act (21st 
Century Cures Act, 2016). This law requires CMS to evaluate the results of the IMPACT Act required 
studies, to obtain stakeholder feedback on those studies and prohibits CMS from terminating MA plans 
prior to the end of plan year 2018 solely because they have failed to achieve a minimum quality rating 
under the five-star rating system under section 1853(o)(4) (21st Century Cures Act, 2016). 
Most recently, on December 21, ASPE released the first of the IMPACT Act required reports on 
the effect of socioeconomic status on performance under the Medicare quality measurement programs. 
Leveraging the work of the NAM committee, the ASPE report models the impact of social risk factors on 
performance under Medicare’s value based purchasing programs including the Medicare Stars program. 
The report concludes that there is a relationship between social risk and performance under the MA Stars 
methodology both between contracts serving high and low proportions of beneficiaries with social risk 
factors and within the contracts themselves. The report identifies and models a series of policy options for 
addressing this performance differential and makes a series of recommendations for revision to the 
Medicare Stars program (Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's 
Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016). 
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CHAPTER 4: PURPOSE AND AIMS 
The purpose of this study is to more fully understand the implications of the post-ACA Medicare 
stars quality measurement methodology so as to answer two research questions:  
1. What impact, if any, has the post-ACA MA stars methodology had on the products and services 
offered by Medicare Advantage plans serving socially and economically vulnerable Medicare 
beneficiaries?  
2. What steps can and should policy makers and organizational leaders take to offset SES-related 
barriers, if any, to high performance under the MA stars methodology by plans serving high 
proportions of low SES members? 
The study has four aims: 
1. To conduct key informant interviews to provide a qualitative analysis of the impact of SES 
characteristics on quality measure performance, what can be done to off-set the impact, and what, 
if any, changes to the measure set and/or methodology are needed to effectively address the 
methodological impact of these SES differences on quality measure performance; 
2. To conduct a statistical analysis of plan benefit packages to examine the difference, if any, in 
benefit design among plans with varying proportions of low-income members; 
3. To carry out a policy analysis of potential strategies to enhance any positive consequences and 
ameliorate any negative consequences identified in aims 1 and 2; and 
4. To develop a plan for change to improve MA quality and access based on data gathered in aims 
1-3, if any.
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CHAPTER 5: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Section 5.1 Research Question and Rationale   
The Medicare program measures the quality of health plans and hospitals based on a series of 
quality measures. However, few of these measures are adjusted to account for patient SES characteristics. 
Thus, this review of the literature poses the following question: What impact do patient/member SES 
characteristics have on plan and hospital performance on measures included in the Medicare stars quality 
program?  
Section 5.2 Methods  
This literature review examines the existing research on the impact of SES variables, such as 
race, income, gender, and educational attainment, on measures of plan performance and on hospital 
readmissions. Hospital readmissions are used as a measure of quality under both the Medicare stars 
program and the quality programs applied to hospitals in the traditional Medicare program. While not 
identical, they are quite similar and offer a robust additional source of information on the impact of 
socioeconomic status characteristics on quality performance. Health plans began submitting CAHPS and 
HEDIS data to CMS (then the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)) in 1996. As a result, the 
time period for articles reviewed is 1997 to present. Each article includes Medicare beneficiaries in the 
study populations. All articles are in English. PDFs of the relevant articles were downloaded to a Google 
drive, and references were saved in EndNoteX7. A description of the characteristics of the included 
studies is included as Appendix D. 
To capture the largest possible universe of articles, I performed several searches using PubMed 
and one using Google Scholar (see Table 2). Literature recommendations were obtained from professional 
colleagues, and additional articles referenced in relevant literature were reviewed using a snowballing 
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technique. In addition, daily Google and NCBI alerts were established to identify newer or overlooked 
articles. 
Table 2. PubMed and Google Scholar literature searches 
  
Search terms Database Article 
yield 
Healthcare effectiveness data and information set OR HEDIS AND Medicare  PubMed 81 
Healthcare effectiveness data and information set OR HEDIS AND Medicare Advantage PubMed 18 
Healthcare effectiveness data and information set OR HEDIS AND Medicare AND 
social determinants of health 
PubMed 0 
Healthcare effectiveness data and information set OR HEDIS AND Medicare AND 
socioeconomic  
PubMed 11 
Healthcare effectiveness data and information set OR HEDIS AND Medicare AND race PubMed 13 
Healthcare effectiveness data and information set OR HEDIS AND Medicare AND 
income 
PubMed 27 
Healthcare effectiveness data and information set OR HEDIS AND Medicare AND 
breast cancer 
PubMed 9 
Healthcare effectiveness data and information set OR HEDIS AND Medicare AND 
cardiovascular 
PubMed 5 
Healthcare effectiveness data and information set OR HEDIS AND Medicare AND 
cholesterol 
PubMed 10 
Healthcare effectiveness data and information set OR HEDIS AND Medicare AND 
colorectal AND cancer 
PubMed 2 
Healthcare effectiveness data and information set OR HEDIS AND Medicare AND 
glaucoma 
PubMed 0 
Healthcare effectiveness data and information set OR HEDIS AND Medicare AND body 
mass index (BMI) 
PubMed 0 
Healthcare effectiveness data and information set OR HEDIS AND Medicare AND 
medication OR drug 
PubMed 20 
Healthcare effectiveness data and information set OR HEDIS AND Medicare AND 
functional status 
Pubmed 3 
Healthcare effectiveness data and information set OR HEDIS AND Medicare AND pain PubMed 1 
Healthcare effectiveness data and information set OR HEDIS AND Medicare AND 
osteoporosis 
PubMed 2 
Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set OR HEDIS AND Medicare AND 
diabetes 
PubMed 22 
Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set OR HEDIS AND Medicare AND 
blood AND pressure 
PubMed 4 
Healthcare effectiveness data and information set OR HEDIS AND Medicare AND 
rheumatoid arthritis 
PubMed 1 
Healthcare effectiveness data and information set OR HEDIS AND Medicare AND 
readmission 
PubMed 1 
Health AND quality AND measure AND socioeconomic PubMed 409 
(((quality) AND ((measure OR measures))) AND Medicare) AND Socioeconomic PubMed 69 
“((“quality measures” OR “quality measure”) AND health) AND medical AND 
socioeconomic” 
Google 
Scholar 
23 
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Section 5.2.1 Inclusion Criteria 
As discussed in Chapter 3, measures included in the MA stars methodology change annually. 
Appendix G contains a list of the measure sets from 2008 to 2016. To take the broadest view of the 
literature, I included articles or reports (“articles”) if they examine the impact of any of the following 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics: income, wealth, Medicaid eligibility, receipt of a low-
income subsidy under Medicare part D, residence in a high poverty or low-income neighborhood, 
race/ethnicity, gender, age, or educational attainment on MA health plan performance on any quality 
measure for which there is or was an analogous measure included in the MA stars methodology in the 
year that was the subject of the study. Articles are also included if they studied hospital performance on 
any measure of readmission. Finally, articles are included if they present a review of the literature that 
met the same inclusion criteria. Appendices E and F provide the characteristics accounted for in each 
study.  
I assessed the quality of each included study based on the following criteria:  
1. Publication in a peer-reviewed journal or, if not, by a credible government or third-party 
source;  
2. Analysis of health plan, hospital, or member/patient-level quality performance in the 
Medicare program; and 
3. A comprehensive description of study methods, data sources, conclusions and limitations. 
Section 5.2.2 Exclusion Criteria 
This literature review excludes any article that does not meet the standards for inclusion. 
Additionally, because the body of literature on health disparities is enormous, this literature review 
excludes all articles that address the impact of SES characteristics on quality measure performance 
outside the Medicare program and outside of Medicare health plan and hospital quality. In addition, 
articles examining the impact of SES characteristics on hospital readmission are limited to those that 
focus on Medicare beneficiaries treated in general acute care community hospitals. As a result, articles 
using data derived from Veterans Administration, behavioral health, or specialty hospitals are excluded.  
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Section 5.2.3 Results 
The PubMed searches yielded 708 articles. I reviewed each abstract of those articles for 
relevance. From the 708 articles identified, 139 were reviewed for further relevance. The Google Scholar 
search identified 1,870 relevant articles. Because Google Scholar produces relevance-weighted search 
results, the first 100 of 1,870 abstracts were reviewed. From among that 100, 23 were examined in detail 
for further relevance. Four gray literature reports authored by consulting firms were identified and 
accessed via the Web. Four articles and six government report were identified via professional 
experience, and an additional 13 were identified via snowballing. Twenty articles were identified via 
PubMed and Google Scholar alerts after the initial searches were performed. From the 204 articles 
reviewed in detail, 58 met the criteria for inclusion. 
Figure 2. Article selection process 
 
Section 5.3 Study Design  
Fifty-three of the articles included in this review are descriptive, using data from secondary data 
source (Aranda, Johnson, & Conti, 2009; Arbaje et al., 2008a; Ayanian, Landon, Newhouse, & 
Zaslavsky, 2014; Ayanian, Landon, Zaslavsky, & Newhouse, 2013; Barnett, Hsu, & McWilliams, 2015; 
Bernheim, 2016; Bird et al., 2007; Blum et al., 2014; Brennan & Shepard, 2010; Cahow et al., 2010; 
Carey, 2016; Chou et al., 2007a; Couto et al., 2014; Eapen et al., 2015; Figueroa, Wang, & Jha, 2016; 
Fremont et al., 2005a; Greysen, Stijacic Cenzer, Auerbach, & Covinsky, 2015; Gu et al., 2014; Harman et 
Synthesis Results
204 articles 
reviewed in 
detail & 
assessed for 
inclusion
708 articles 
identified via 
PubMed 
searches, 139 
reviewed for 
further 
relevance
1870 
publications 
identified via 
Google Scholar, 
23 reviewed 
further for 
relevance
4 gray 
literature; 13 
identified via 
snowballing
4 articles/ 
reports 
identified via 
professional 
contacts, 20 via 
google and 
NCBI alert
58 
articles 
included
Search
 44 
 
al., 2010; Herrin et al., 2015; Holmes, Luo, Kuo, Baillargeon, & Goodwin, 2013; Hu, Gonsahn, & 
Nerenz, 2014; Inovalon, 2013, 2015, 2014b; Joynt & Jha, 2013b; Joynt & Jha, 2011; Jung, Palta, Smith, 
Oliver, & DuGoff, 2016; Kahn et al., 2015; Kind et al., 2014; Krumholz et al., 1997, 2000; Lindenauer et 
al., 2013; Mahmoudi, Tarraf, Maroukis, & Levy, 2016; McBean, Huang, Virnig, Lurie, & Musgrave, 
2003; McHugh, Carthon, & Kang, 2010; Nagasako, Reidhead, Waterman, & Dunagan, 2014; Priest, 
Buikema, Engel-Nitz, Cook, & Cantrell, 2012; Qato & Trivedi, 2013; Rathore et al., 2003a; Rathore et 
al., 2006; Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based 
Purchasing Program, 2016; Rodriguez, Joynt, Lopez, Saldana, & Jha, 2011; Schmajuk et al., 2011; 
Schneider, Zaslavsky, & Epstein, 2002; Sheingold, Zuckerman, & Shartzer, 2016; Singh, Lin, Kuo, 
Nattinger, & Goodwin, 2013; Trivedi, Zaslavsky, Schneider, & Ayanian, 2005, 2006; Tsai, Orav, & 
Joynt, 2014; Virnig et al., 2002, 2004; Virnig, Scholle, Chou, & Shih, 2007; Young et al., 2014). Three 
articles are reviews of the literature related to hospital readmissions (Calvillo-King et al., 2013; Damiani 
et al., 2015). One article provides both a descriptive analysis of secondary data and an analysis of key 
informant interviews with health plan representatives ( Chou et al., 2007b).  
The secondary data examined in these studies are of three types: those that make health-plan-level 
observations at the level of the contract between the MA plan sponsor and CMS, those that examine the 
experience of individual health plan participants and hospital patients, and those that look at the 
readmissions experience of hospitals participating in the traditional Medicare program. Three of the 
articles that look at health plan quality utilize plan-level data (Cahow et al., 2010; Couto et al., 2014; 
Young et al., 2014), twenty utilize individual-level data (Ayanian et al., 2013; Chou et al., 2007a, 2007b; 
Couto et al., 2014; Fremont et al., 2005; Harman et al., 2010; Holmes et al., 2013; Inovalon, 2015; Jung et 
al., 2016; Li, Cai, Glance, & Mukamel, 2007; Mahmoudi et al., 2016; Priest et al., 2012; Qato & Trivedi, 
2013; Schmajuk et al., 2011; Schneider et al., 2002; Trivedi et al., 2005, 2006; Virnig et al., 2004; Virnig 
et al., 2002, 2007), and three use both plan- and member-level data (Inovalon, 2013, 2014b; Report to 
Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Program, 
2016). Among the articles examining hospital readmissions in the traditional Medicare program, twenty 
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two articles use individual patient data (Aranda et al., 2009; Arbaje et al., 2008a; Barnett et al., 2015; 
Bernheim, 2016; Blum et al., 2014; Eapen et al., 2015; Greysen et al., 2015; Gu et al., 2014; Hu et al., 
2014b; Joynt & Jha, 2011; Krumholz et al., 1997, 2000; Lindenauer et al., 2013; McHugh et al., 2010; 
Nagasako et al., 2014; Rathore et al., 2003a, 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2011; Sheingold et al., 2016; Tsai et 
al., 2014), four examine performance at the hospital level (Carey, 2016; Joynt & Jha, 2013b;  Kahn et al., 
2015; Tsai et al., 2014), one uses both individual patient and hospital level data (Report to Congress: 
Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016), two 
examine the effect of community level factors on readmission rates (Herrin et al., 2015; Kind et al., 2014) 
and three are reviews of the literature (Calvillo-King et al., 2013; Damiani et al., 2015; Fischer et al., 
2014).  
Section 5.4 Study Quality  
All but four of the studies included clearly met the standards for credibility. They are each 
published in peer-reviewed journals or issued by government sources. The four self-published gray 
literature articles are open to debate regarding quality. The Cahow document was commissioned by the 
Association of Community Affiliated Plans, a trade association representing not-for-profit health plans 
(Cahow et al., 2010). The Inovalon documents are authored by an organization that consults with health 
plans (Inovalon, 2013, 2015, 2014b). The second and third of the Inovalon reports are sponsored by a 
group of health plans whose data are used as a part of those studies. 
Section 5.5 Dependent Variables  
The dependent variables differ by study (see Appendix D). The majority of the studies examining 
health plan performance study multiple measures of quality (Ayanian et al., 2014; Bird et al., 2007; 
Brennan & Shepard, 2010; Cahow et al., 2010; Chou et al., 2007a, 2007b ; Couto et al., 2014; Fremont et 
al., 2005a; Harman et al., 2010; Inovalon, 2014b; Jung et al., 2016; Mahmoudi et al., 2016; Priest et al., 
2012; Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based 
 46 
 
Purchasing Program, 2016; Schneider et al., 2002; Trivedi et al., 2005, 2006; Virnig et al., 2002, 2004, 
2007; Young et al., 2014). However, a few look at a single measure only. 
As discussed in the background section, the Medicare stars measure set changes annually. 
Because this study seeks to review the impact of the full effect of the Medicare stars program on health 
plan performance, and the post-ACA MA stars methodology went into full effect at the end of 2014, this 
literature review examines articles relative to the 2014 measure set.  
Several of the articles examining the impact of SES characteristics on plan performance look at 
measures that had been removed from the measure set by 2014 (Bird et al., 2007; Brennan & Shepard, 
2010; Cahow et al., 2010; Chou et al., 2007; Schneider et al., 2002; Trivedi et al., 2005; Virnig et al., 
2002, 2007), but for which similar or successor measures were included in the 2014 measure set. For 
example, ten articles look at whether hemoglobin A1C (blood sugar) is checked for diabetics (a process 
measure). This measure was not included in the 2014 star measures set, but a related intermediate 
outcome measure, blood sugar controlled in members with diabetes, was included in the methodology. 
Similarly, two articles look at follow-up after treatment for mental illness ( Virnig et al., 2004, 2007). 
This is no longer a star measure, but, in 2014, a measure was used that is derived from the Health 
Outcomes Survey entitled “improving or maintaining mental health,” which is defined as the percentage 
of plan members whose mental health is the same or better than expected after two years. This measure is 
examined in one article (Harman et al., 2010). Appendix C details the measures included in each article 
and whether that measure or a related measure was included in the 2014 measure set. 
Some of the 2014 Medicare stars measures are either not found in the literature or found 
infrequently. For example, only studies that include plan-level data (Cahow et al., 2010; Inovalon, 2013, 
2014b; Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based 
Purchasing Programs, 2016) and the 2015 Inovalon study (Inovalon, 2015) include the measure 
“management of osteoporosis following fracture,” and only two articles examine colorectal cancer 
screening (Cahow et al., 2010; Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under 
Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016). Only the recent ASPE report examines functional 
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status (Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based 
Purchasing Programs, 2016). It is possible that the data lag between the addition of these measures to the 
methodology and the publication of the identified articles is responsible for their exclusion. 
The dependent variable studied in the hospital readmission articles varies based on the 
readmission window examined and the condition studied. Eighteen articles look at readmissions within 30 
days of discharge ( Barnett et al., 2015; Bernheim, 2016; Blum et al., 2014; Carey, 2016; Eapen et al., 
2015; Greysen et al., 2015; Gu et al., 2014; Herrin et al., 2015; Hu et al., 2014b; Joynt & Jha, 2011; 
Lindenauer et al., 2013; McHugh et al., 2010; Nagasako et al., 2014; Rodriguez et al., 2011; Sheingold et 
al., 2016; Singh et al., 2013; Tsai et al., 2014); four studies look at hospitals receiving penalties under the 
hospital readmission reduction program, which uses as its measure readmissions within 30 days of 
discharge for certain conditions (Carey, 2016; Figueroa et al., 2016; Joynt & Jha, 2013b; Kahn et al., 
2015); one looks at both patient and hospital level data under the hospital readmissions reduction program 
(Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing 
Programs, 2016), one looks at readmission within 60 days of discharge (Arbaje et al., 2008a); two look at 
readmission within one year of discharge (Rathore et al., 2003a, 2006); two look at readmission within six 
months of initial admission (Aranda et al., 2009; Krumholz et al., 2000); and two look at readmission 
within six months of discharge (Krumholz et al., 1997, 2000).  
Four of the articles examine the characteristics of hospitals that received penalties under the 
Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program and Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program (Carey, 2016; 
Figueroa et al., 2016; Joynt & Jha, 2013b; Kahn et al., 2015), one looks at both patient and hospital level 
data under the hospital readmissions reduction program (Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and 
Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016). The remaining articles look at 
the impact of patient characteristics on hospital readmissions. Seven studies look at readmissions for heart 
failure (Aranda et al., 2009; Blum et al., 2014; Eapen et al., 2015; Krumholz et al., 1997, 2000; Rathore et 
al., 2003a, 2006). Eleven studies explore readmissions for heart failure, pneumonia, and acute myocardial 
infarction (Bernheim, 2016; Greysen et al., 2015; Gu et al., 2014; Herrin et al., 2015; Hu et al., 2014b; 
 48 
 
Joynt& Jha, 2011; Lindenauer et al., 2013; McHugh et al., 2010; Nagasako et al., 2014; Sheingold et al., 
2016). Two articles study readmission measures after heart failure and myocardial infarction (Damiani et 
al., 2015; Rodriguez et al., 2011). One article studies readmissions after coronary artery bypass grafting, 
pulmonary lobectomy, endovascular abdominal aortic aneurysm repair, colectomy, and hip replacement 
(Tsai et al., 2014). One article examines readmissions for heart failure, pneumonia, and acute myocardial 
infarction, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and total knee or hip arthroplasty as well as all cause 
readmission (Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based 
Purchasing Programs, 2016). Four studies examine only all-cause readmission (Arbaje et al., 2008a; 
Barnett et al., 2015; Fischer et al., 2014; Singh et al., 2013). 
Section 5.6 Independent Variables and/or Covariates  
Each article either examines the impact of a group of SES characteristics on quality performance 
or adjusts for those characteristics as covariates. Appendix E details those variables included in each 
study. Among the hospital readmission studies, 15 look at patient-level SES (Arbaje et al., 2008a; Barnett 
et al., 2015; Blum et al., 2014; Eapen et al., 2015; Greysen et al., 2015; Gu et al., 2014; Hu et al., 2014b; 
Joynt & Jha, 2011; Kind et al., 2014; Nagasako et al., 2014; Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and 
Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016; Sheingold et al., 2016; Singh 
et al., 2013; Tsai et al., 2014), 20 account for patient race (Aranda et al., 2009; Arbaje et al., 2008b; 
Barnett & McWilliams, 2015; Eapen et al., 2015; Greysen, Auerbach, & Covinsky, 2015; Gu et al., 2014; 
Hu, Gonsahn, & Nerenz, 2014; Joynt, Orav, & Jha, 2011; Kind et al., 2014; Krumholz et al.,  1997, 2000; 
McHugh et al., 2010; Nagasako, Waterman, & Dunagan, 2014; Rathore et al., 2003b, 2006; Report to 
Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 
2016; Rodriguez et al., 2011; Sheingold, 2016; Singh, Kuo, Nattinger, & Goodwin, 2013; Tsai et al., 
2014), 9 account for the population served by the hospital either based on the proportion of patients 
eligible for Medicaid or Supplemental Security Income (Carey, 2016; Figueroa & Jha, 2016; Gu et al., 
2014; Herrin et al., 2015; Joynt & Jha, 2013b; Kahn, Potetz, Walke, Hart Chambers, & Burch, 2015; 
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Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing 
Programs, 2016; Rodriguez et al., 2011; Sheingold, 2016), and 4 account for hospital status as minority 
serving (Blum et al., 2014; Joynt & Jha, 2011; Rodriguez et al., 2011; Tsai et al., 2014). Two articles 
examine the impact of community factors (Herrin et al., 2015; Kind et al., 2014) on hospital readmissions. 
Each of the studies examining individual patient characteristics account for age and gender as either an 
independent or control variable either explicitly or through applying the risk standardized readmissions 
formula used by CMS for the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, 2015c) which adjusts for age, gender and comorbidities.  
The health plan studies, in contrast, examine a wide array of measures and SES characteristics. 
Twenty-one articles include an array of independent and control variables related to SES, including 
personal income, neighborhood income and/or poverty, Medicaid eligibility, eligibility for a low-income 
subsidy, and neighborhood educational attainment (Bird et al., 2007; Brennan & Shepard, 2010; Cahow et 
al., 2010; Chou et al., 2007a, 2007b; Couto et al., 2014; Fremont et al., 2005a; Harman et al., 2010; 
Holmes et al., 2013; Inovalon, 2015, 2014b; Jung et al., 2016; Mahmoudi et al., 2016; McBean et al., 
2003; Priest et al., 2012; Qato & Trivedi, 2013; Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and 
Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016; Schmajuk et al., 2011; 
Schneider et al., 2002; Trivedi et al., 2005, 2006; Virnig et al., 2002, 2004 , 2007; G. J. Young et al., 
2014). Appendix F provides definitions of SES by study. While 9 of the health plan studies looked at 
educational attainment. (Bird et al., 2007; Cahow et al., 2010; Inovalon, 2015; Jung et al., 2016; 
Mahmoudi et al., 2016; Priest et al., 2012; Schmajuk et al., 2011; Schneider et al., 2002; Young et al., 
2014), the specific definition of educational attainment also varied by study. Again, Appendix F provides 
definitions by study. Race/ethnicity is used as a variable in twenty-two of the health plan studies (Ayanian 
et al., 2013, 2014; Bird et al., 2007; Cahow et al., 2010; Chou et al., 2007a; Harman et al., 2010; Holmes 
et al., 2013; Inovalon, 2013, 2014a, 2015; Jung et al., 2016; Mahmoudi et al., 2016; McBean et al., 2003; 
Qato & Trivedi, 2013; Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's 
Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016; Schmajuk et al., 2011; Schneider et al., 2002; Trivedi et al., 
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2005, 2006; Virnig et al., 2002, 2004, 2007). The races/ethnicities examined vary by article and also can 
be found in Appendix F.  
Gender is used as an independent or control variable in each health plan study, except for Cahow 
and Young (Cahow et al., 2010; Young et al., 2014). Comorbidities were inconsistently included as 
independent or control variables making analysis of their impact across measures of quality impossible. 
Each of the hospital readmission studies include some measure of comorbidities as a control variable, 
while only eight of the health plan articles also do so (Harman et al., 2010; Holmes et al., 2013; Inovalon, 
2013, 2014a, 2015; Jung et al., 2016; Mahmoudi et al., 2016; Priest et al., 2012). 
Section 5.7 Themes 
Several themes are identified in the body of literature. First, the association between SES and 
quality performance differs by measure. Second, that race, gender, and age are associated with differences 
in performance on both process and outcome measures. Third, educational attainment is associated with 
positive quality performance. Finally, lower-SES is associated with poorer performance on the studied 
measures of quality but the SES-related attributes that underlie that differential in performance as well as 
the extent performance differential varies significantly by study. These themes will be further discussed 
here.   
Section 5.7.1 The Measure Matters  
The impact of SES characteristics on quality measure performance varies by measure and by 
study design, making synthesis of the studies and conclusions regarding the impact of any given 
characteristic across all measures nearly impossible. As described in Appendix C, the included studies 
examine the impact of SES characteristics on a combined 203 individual quality measures. One hundred 
and three of those measures were process measures, such as breast and colorectal cancer screening; 60 
were intermediate outcome measures, such as medication adherence and blood pressure control; and 39 
were outcome measures, such as hospital readmissions and improving and maintaining physical and 
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mental health. While virtually all of the health-plan-related studies found an impact of the studied SES-
related variables on quality performance, the articles examining hospital readmissions were more mixed.  
As Appendix C indicates the vast majority of the studied outcome measures are readmissions. 
The most frequently studied intermediate outcome measures are control of blood pressure and cholesterol 
in patients with cardiac diagnoses; diabetes care measures, including cholesterol or glycemic control in 
patients with diabetes; high-risk medication prescribing; and measures of medication adherence.  
Among articles examining the impact of gender, race, and SES on intermediate outcome 
measures of glycemic, blood pressure, and cholesterol control, the articles indicate persistent but in some 
cases declining disparities. For example, Fremont and colleagues examine racial disparities on four 
measures of diabetes care, controlling for age, gender, and SES. They concluded that, after adjustment, 
significant racial disparities persist for 3 of the 4 measures and that SES disparities persist for all four 
measures (Fremont et al., 2005b). While Ayanian and colleagues look at performance on three similar 
measures and find that while the magnitude of the disparity varied by geography and by the years studied, 
black and Hispanic MA enrollees in both 2006 and 2011 were substantially less likely than white 
enrollees to have adequate control of blood pressure, blood sugar, and cholesterol, while Asian and 
Pacific Islanders were more likely than whites to have adequate control of blood pressure and cholesterol 
and were equally likely to have adequate control of blood sugar (Ayanian et al., 2014). However, the 
authors point out that substantial reductions in disparities in one specific region could be attributable not 
to the plan or region but to beneficiary characteristics not accounted for in the study design (Ayanian et 
al., 2014).  
When examining racial disparities among MA participants with diabetes, Mahmoudi and 
colleagues find that between 2006 and 2011, after adjusting for an array of health, geographic, and SES 
factors, MA had a positive impact on health disparities between white and Hispanic Medicare 
beneficiaries on all four studied measures of quality and had a small but mixed effect on disparities 
between black and white beneficiaries (Mahmoudi et al., 2016). ASPE found that Black and Hispanic 
beneficiaries have higher than average odds of receiving a diabetic eye exam or to receive monitoring for 
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kidney disease but had 17% lower than average odds of having blood sugar controlled (Report to 
Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 
2016).  
With respect to measures related to pharmaceutical prescribing and adherence, disparities are 
visible both among outcome and process measures. The articles that examine measures of medication 
adherence (which are intermediate outcome measures) consistently find a negative association between 
SES and medication adherence (Cahow et al., 2010; Couto et al., 2014; Inovalon, 2013, 2015, 2014b; 
Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing 
Programs, 2016; Young et al., 2014). Similarly, two of the three studies examining higher rates of 
prescribing high-risk medications find an association between low-SES and increased prescribing (which 
is an intermediate outcome measure) (Inovalon, 2015; Schmajuk et al., 2011). One finds higher rates of 
prescribing potentially inappropriate medications (which is a process measure (Holmes et al., 2013)) 
among lower SES beneficiaries. One article finds an association between low-SES and higher rates of 
inappropriate prescribing of pharmaceuticals used to treat rheumatoid arthritis (a process measure) (Qato 
& Trivedi, 2013). Finally, one article contains mixed findings identifying an association between a higher 
odds of high-risk medication prescribing and residence in a low-income area but lower odds of high risk 
medication prescribing among beneficiaries who are dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid or eligible 
for a low income subsidy under Medicare (Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance 
Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016). 
The articles examining the impact of individual beneficiary characteristics on health plan quality 
measures generally find an impact of race, education, SES, and gender on measure performance. The 
magnitude of this impact varies by study. Additionally, while adjusting for differential SES composition 
of plan enrollees consistently reduces differences in performance outcomes across plans, it does not 
completely eliminate them. The studies that look at the impact of these characteristics on overall health 
plan performance under the MA stars methodology consistently find an impact of plan member SES 
characteristics on plan-level performance on Medicare stars measures. 
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Among the hospital readmission studies, the independent variables examined vary significantly. 
However, where studied, they consistently find nonwhite race (Aranda et al., 2009; Damiani et al., 2015; 
Greysen et al., 2015; Hu et al., 2014b; Joynt & Jha, A. K., 2011; Krumholz et al., 1997; McHugh et al., 
2010; Rathore et al., 2003a; Rodriguez et al., 2011; Tsai et al., 2014), nonmarried status/living alone 
(Arbaje et al., 2008a; Barnett et al., 2015; Damiani et al., 2015; Herrin et al., 2015; Hu et al., 2014b), and 
functional impairments in ADLs or IADLs (Arbaje et al., 2008a; Barnett et al., 2015; Greysen et al., 
2015) to be associated with higher rates of readmission. One study, however, finds that while black and 
Hispanic beneficiaries were more likely to be readmitted, the effect of race was largely mediated when 
controlling for beneficiary status as dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid (Report to Congress: 
Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016). 
However, the effect of common SES-related variables, including income (no (Arbaje et al., 2008a), yes ( 
Barnett et al., 2015; Fischer et al., 2014; Greysen et al., 2015; Hu et al., 2014b), inconclusive (Calvillo-
King et al., 2013; Damiani et al., 2015)), wealth (yes ( Greysen et al., 2015)), education (yes (Arbaje et 
al., 2008a; Greysen et al., 2015; Hu et al., 2014b), inconclusive (Calvillo-King et al., 2013)), residence in 
a high poverty neighborhood (yes (Hu et al., 2014b)), and a composite measure of neighborhood SES (yes 
( Blum et al., 2014; Eapen et al., 2015; Kind et al., 2014; Lindenauer et al., 2013), inconclusive (Damiani 
et al., 2015; Rathore et al., 2006), no (Herrin et al., 2015)), is less consistent.  
In sum, both sets of studies suggest that certain SES characteristics measured at the patient, plan, 
hospital and community level and using census data as a proxy for individual patient attributes reveals an 
association between patient/beneficiary attributes and lower performance on the studied measures of 
quality. The magnitude of that association, the impact of individual factors, and whether the relationship 
is causal cannot be concluded from the literature currently available.   
Section 5.7.2 Effect of Race, Gender, and Age on Both Process and Outcome Measures  
In the health plan studies, while most of the performance differences correlated with gender favor 
men, a few, like within-race cholesterol control for diabetics (Chou et al., 2007a), do not. Three studies 
find persistent gender disparities on an array of measures (Bird et al., 2007; Chou et al., 2007a, 2007b). 
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Three studies find that controlling for gender modifies, but does not eliminate, disparities based on other 
factors (Trivedi et al., 2005, 2006; Virnig et al., 2002). Similarly, two addition studies find that 
controlling for gender, in addition to other demographic and SES characteristics, fails to eliminate 
disparities based on geographic location ( Virnig et al., 2007; Couto et al., 2014).  
Adjusting for the other SES characteristics, such as household and neighborhood income, 
educational attainment, and eligibility for Medicaid, moderated, but did not ameliorate, most of the 
disparities in race and gender (Ayanian et al., 2013; Bird et al., 2007; Chou et al., 2007a, 2007b; Fremont 
et al., 2005a; Qato & Trivedi, 2013; Schmajuk et al., 2011; Schneider et al., 2002; Trivedi et al., 2005; 
Virnig et al., 2002, 2007). However, as stated, 1 study finds that while black and Hispanic beneficiaries 
were more likely to be readmitted, the effect of race was largely mediated when controlling for dual 
eligibility (Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based 
Purchasing Programs, 2016). 
With respect to the articles related to readmissions, each of the studies adjusts for age and gender. 
Twenty-four of the 29 readmission studies adjust for race, but the races included and the how they are 
defined substantially differ by study. Nonwhite race (other than Asian) was consistently associated with 
higher rates of readmission (Aranda et al., 2009; Damiani et al., 2015; Greysen et al., 2015; Hu et al., 
2014b; Joynt & Jha, 2011; Krumholz et al., 1997; McHugh et al., 2010; Rathore et al., 2003a; Rodriguez 
et al., 2011; Tsai et al., 2014). Age is also consistently positively associated with readmissions. Results 
with respect to gender are mixed.  
Section 5.7.3 Educational Attainment Appears Associated with Positive Outcomes  
Among the health plan articles, Young finds that the percentage of individuals in a health plans’ 
service area who do not have a high school diploma is significantly negatively associated with plan 
performance along three medication adherence scores (Young et al., 2014). Among the readmission 
articles, several articles identify higher educational attainment as being associated with a lower risk of 
readmission (Arbaje et al., 2008a; Blum et al., 2014; Eapen et al., 2015; Herrin et al., 2015).  
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Section 5.7.4 Lower Socioeconomic Status and Quality Performance 
Each of the health-plan-level studies identify the presence of low-income and/or low SES 
beneficiaries as associated with lower performance for the health plan quality measures (Cahow et al., 
2010; Inovalon, 2013, 2014a; Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under 
Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016; Young et al., 2014). Among the articles related to 
the impact of beneficiary characteristics on health plan quality achievement, beneficiary SES is 
significantly associated with lower performance on anywhere from 1 to 17 measures of quality (Fremont 
et al., 2005b; Priest et al., 2012; Qato & Trivedi, 2013; Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and 
Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016; Schmajuk et al., 2011), 
However, the extent of the impact varies by the dependent and independent variables included in the 
study. As a result, while an association between low-SES beneficiaries and lower quality performance 
appears to exist, the extent of that association and whether it is causal cannot be concluded.  
The hospital readmission studies produce similar results. The hospital-level studies ( Figueroa et 
al., 2016; Joynt & Jha, 2013b; Kahn et al., 2015; Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and 
Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016) consistently find that hospitals 
serving a higher proportion of DSH-eligible patients receive higher readmission penalties, although one 
study finds that the most penalized hospitals are not those with the highest proportion of DSH-eligible 
patients ( Kahn et al., 2015) and three find that adjustment of those results for SES has very little impact 
on hospital performance (Bernheim, 2016; Blum et al., 2014; Sheingold, 2016). However, several articles 
find at least a modest association between specific SES factors and the risk of readmission, including dual 
eligible status and hospital dual eligible share (Gu et al., 2014; Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors 
and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016); patients residing in 
neighborhoods with high poverty, low income, and low educational levels (Hu et al., 2014b); income 
inequality (Lindenauer et al., 2013); Medicaid eligibility (Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and 
Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016; Sheingold et al., 2016; Singh 
et al., 2013); limited education (Arbaje et al., 2008a); lower quartiles of income (Lindenauer et al., 2013); 
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and neighborhood-level SES drawn from census data tied to ZIP codes ( Barnett et al., 2015; Bernheim, 
2016; Blum et al., 2014; McDowell, 2009; Nagasako et al., 2014; Rathore et al., 2006).  
The size of the impact of SES on the identified disparities in hospital readmissions and whether 
that disparity is meaningful from a policy perspective is a topic of some debate. Five of the readmissions 
studies model the effect of risk adjusting the measure of readmissions for SES. Three of those studies find 
that applying an SES adjustment does not improve the measurement methodology (Bernheim, 2014; 
Fischer et al., 2014; Sheingold, 2016), one supports the application of risk adjustment (Nagasako et al., 
2014); one finds that while applying risk adjustment to a community of hospitals did not have any impact 
on the performance of nearly all of the hospitals, for those few hospitals it did impact, the impact was not 
insignificant (Bernheim, 2016; Blum et al., 2014) and one finds that after adjusting for dual eligibility, 
risk adjustment would reduce the differential percentage of safety net and non-safety-net hospitals by 4% 
(Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing 
Programs, 2016) .  
Section 5.8 Study Quality 
While peer-reviewed literature, government studies and studies funded by health plans are 
included in this review of the literature, the findings that some SES factors impact plan and hospital 
performance on some measures of quality are consistent.  
Section 5.9 Issue Significance  
This literature review focuses on the issue of relevance for the Medicare program and its millions 
of beneficiaries. The articles identified for this literature review reflect the experience of millions of 
Medicare beneficiaries participating in hundreds of health plans and receiving treatment in nearly all of 
the nation’s hospitals. Medicare increasingly relies on quality-based or value-based payments, and the 
literature suggests that hospital and plan performance on the measures of quality can be affected by 
individual and community socioeconomic status. 
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Section 5.10 Gaps in the Current Literature 
Each of the included studies examines the correlation between a certain SES factor or factors and 
performance on measures included or closely related to those included in the Medicare stars measure set. 
These articles, as a body, appear to indicate that SES characteristics are associated with differences in 
quality measure performance but whether the association is causal remains unclear.  
This literature review raises several important questions which are, as yet, unanswered in the 
literature. Those questions include whether the association between SES and quality performance is 
causal, which specific SES characteristics impact health plan and hospital quality performance and 
whether that impact positive or negative. Possibilities include social risk factors examined in the literature 
(e.g., income, gender, race, and educational attainment), as well as other unexamined factors, such as 
health system bias, health literacy, or the availability of community resources and social supports not 
examined in these studies. The studies examining the impact of SES and other demographic factors on 
health plan performance do not consistently include health status or comorbidities as an independent or 
control variable. These same studies with respect to both health plan quality performance and hospital 
readmissions do not frequently or consistently include functional status as an independent or control 
variable. Studies bringing together SES data, functional status data and comorbidity data are needed to 
determine whether observed disparities are offset when controlling for relative disease and disability 
burden.  
As a result of limitations in the available data, virtually all of the articles use census data as a 
proxy measure of individual patient/beneficiary attributes other than race and gender, including SES, 
income, and educational attainment. While census data is widely and easily available, it does not reflect 
the specific attributes of the individual hospital patients and plan beneficiaries. In addition, because 
census areas at even the most granular level (called ZIP code tabulation areas) include thousands of 
people, they may offer an inaccurate picture of a given area due to wide disparities of wealth in that area 
(Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing 
Programs, 2016). In addition, several studies speak to the limitations on available race data. As a result, a 
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gap exists in the literature between population-level attributes (i.e., ZIP-code-level average income) and 
individual-level attributes (i.e., individual income) and the impact of these attributes on quality measure 
performance. This gap is likely to be filled by the work currently under way at ASPE under the 
requirements of the IMPACT Act (Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014, 
2014).  
Section 5.11 Implications for Future Research 
To address the gaps outlined above, access to data at the individual level, which includes 
information regarding the subject’s demographic and underlying health status, is needed. As a result of 
the requirements imposed under the ACA, a great deal of additional data regarding the SES characteristics 
of health plan participants is now being collected (PPACA, 2010). Further studies should leverage these 
data elements as well as the data identified by the NAM (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, 
and Medicine 2016b) to establish what, if any, causal link exists between SES characteristics and 
performance on quality measures. It should also leverage the recent findings of the NAM and ASPE 
under the requirements of the IMPACT Act (Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 
2014, 2014) regarding the impact of social risk factors on plan performance under the MA stars 
methodology (National Academies of Sciences, 2017; Report to Congress: Social Risk Factors and 
Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016). 
None of the studies included in this review of the literature provide a qualitative analysis of the 
impact of SES characteristics on quality measure performance, what can be done to off-set the impact, 
and what, if any, changes to the measure set and/or methodology are needed to effectively address the 
methodological impact of these SES differences on quality measure performance. This research is 
intended to fill this gap, by conducting key informant interviews of leaders in the health care quality 
measurement field, the regulatory community, the patient advocacy community, MA plans, and 
Medicare-participating providers regarding their opinion of whether SES characteristics and plan and 
provider quality performance are associated. And, if so, to gain their perspective on the individual SES 
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characteristics that pose the greatest barriers to achieving high-quality scores. This research can provide 
important insights into the potential need for changes to the measurement system. It also can assist 
measure stewards and policy makers in effectively addressing the impact, if any, of beneficiary SES 
characteristics on quality measure performance, while continuing to provide appropriate incentives to 
health plans and providers so as to achieve higher quality care for all MA beneficiaries.  
The literature included in this review shows differential performance on some quality measures 
associated with some SES characteristics. However, the literature does not, to date, fully address either 
causality or possible confounders. The NQF trial period offers an opportunity to pursue further 
quantitative research to assist in establishing a causal link between these factors and quality measure 
performance (National Quality, 2014a). 
Section 5.12 Limitations of the Review Process 
The searches used in this literature review were limited to PubMed and Google Scholar. 
Additional articles might have been identified through other databases, or more robust engagement of 
professional contacts to identify both peer reviewed and high-quality non-peer-reviewed articles. This 
review intentionally limited gray literature to the four documents that were included. A substantial 
number of other non-peer-reviewed research on this issue likely exists. In addition, this literature review 
was limited to studies of health plan performance on quality measures included in the MA stars 
methodology and hospital performance on readmissions. A substantial body of literature considers the 
impact of SES characteristics on the performance of physician groups, nursing facilities, dialysis facilities 
and home health agencies, and other provider types, both within and outside of Medicare, as well as a 
large body of international literature on the impact of SES on quality performance both were outside the 
scope of this review.  
  
 60 
 
Section 5.13 Conclusion 
Quality measurement offers health care purchasers and consumers the potential opportunity to 
select health plans and providers that deliver high-quality care. The literature included in this review 
indicates that some of the performance differences between health plans and hospitals on quality 
measures included in the Medicare stars and Hospital Readmissions Reduction Programs may be 
associated with the SES characteristics of health plan beneficiaries and hospital patients. However, the 
literature does not, to date, fully address either causality or possible confounders. Further research is 
needed to understand whether a causal link can be identified between SES factors and quality measure 
performance and what, if anything, can and should be done to address the impact of those factors.
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CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Section 6.1 Conceptual Model 
The NQF’s technical report on sociodemographic factors and quality measurement states: “There 
is a large body of evidence that various sociodemographic factors influence outcomes and thus influence 
results on outcome performance measures” (National Quality Forum, 2014b) However, as discussed 
above, the existing literature appears to indicate an association between certain SES characteristics and 
quality performance on a wide array of quality measures but has not determined that there is a causal 
relationship between the two. While causality may take decades to prove, the strength and consistency of 
the association has been sufficiently significant to lead NQF and CMS to act on this issue (Announcement 
of Calendar Year (CY) 2017 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D 
Payment Policies and Final Call Letter, 2016; National Quality, 2014a). This study similarly assumes 
that the strength of this association is sufficient to merit more sensitive use of SES and other deprivation 
factors for incentive based payment.  
Dahlgren and Whitehead (Dahlgren & Whitehead, 2007) developed one of several widely used 
conceptual models which describe the impact of demographic, lifestyle, social and environmental factors 
on the health of a given individual. This study uses a conceptual model based on the Dahlgren and 
Whitehead (Dahlgren & Whitehead, 2007) model which hypothesizes that the factors which impact the 
health of individual patients also impact how they engage with the health care system (defined as 
providers and plans). That, in turn, impacts the health care experience for those persons and the ability of 
the providers and plans that serve them to achieve the goals defined in the measures of quality included in 
the MA stars methodology.  
The conceptual model used in the study (laid out below) describes the interaction of individual 
patients/beneficiaries with their environment and the relationship of the patient/beneficiary SES context 
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on their interaction with the health care providers and health plans that serve them (Figure 3). This model 
posits that people with lower SES (e.g., those who have lower income, less education, lower health 
literacy, and language barriers), those who lack social and community networks (e.g., people who are 
homeless, isolated, or without caregiver support), and those who live in unsafe housing or communities, 
will have more difficulty interacting with the health care system and managing their health problem or 
problems. These factors may, in turn, impact plans’ and providers’ ability to deliver services and achieve 
the outcomes included as measures of plan performance under the stars methodology. In response, MA 
plans may make changes to their service areas, products, or service delivery models for the purpose of 
improving their stars scores. Such service changes may include providing supplemental benefits focused 
on gaps in the social safety net, such as enhanced transportation and nutrition benefits, or by modifying 
their model of care to improve or add care and disease management programs, or providing supplemental 
language services. Changes to product designs that could make the product less attractive to a population 
of individuals with low SES status could include requiring increased cost sharing of beneficiaries, adding 
or suspending zero or low cost-share plans, and offering networks that exclude providers who 
traditionally serve underserved communities. In this study, I use the conceptual model presented in Figure 
3 to evaluate the impact of SES characteristics on health plan quality performance under the MA stars 
methodology. Specifically, by utilizing an explanatory, mixed methods approach, I use this conceptual 
model to investigate whether patient/beneficiary SES factors impact plan performance under the stars 
methodology; determine whether plan supplemental and enhanced benefits and product designs 
associated with SES barriers to quality care changed at the same time as the full force of the post-ACA 
stars methodology was implemented and, if they did, to understand whether the identified changes in 
benefit packages and product designs differed based on the SES characteristics of plan membership; and 
finally, to develop a package of proposed changes to the MA program to address any identified effects of 
SES-related factors on plan performance under the MA stars program. 
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Figure 3. Conceptual model 
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CHAPTER 7: THE RESEARCHER’S ROLE 
The researcher’s personal values and biases must be identified prior to undertaking any study. 
When this study commenced, I was an employee of an MA plan sponsor. Today, I am employed by a 
state Medicaid agency with oversight over the state’s DSNP contracts. As a result, the equity of the MA 
stars methodology is of significant importance to both my current and former employers and my 
perceptions of the equity of the MA stars methodology have been formed in the context of those 
positions. To address the biases formed by my experiences, the phase one design included a series of 
oversight and validation processes. A second coder was engaged to independently code each of the phase 
one transcripts. The second coder possesses a Master of Public Health and substantial experience in 
qualitative coding in public health research. She had no prior experience in the fields of health insurance, 
Medicare Advantage or health care quality measurement, and, consequently, she was able to code without 
issue-related bias. Phase one coding results were reviewed individually by code to ensure inter-rater 
reliability.  
The questionnaire used in the phase one key informant interviews was reviewed and approved by 
the dissertation chair prior to use. The draft and final codebooks were developed collaboratively with the 
second coder and were presented for the review and approval of the dissertation chair prior to use. To 
ensure a diversity of perspectives, key informants were selected by organizational affiliation based input 
received from the dissertation committee.  
Phase 2 sought to provide a quantitative analysis of health plan filings in order to determine 
whether the end of the quality bonus demonstration program has resulted the addition or deletion of 
benefits and product designs associated with quality performance and positive or negative risk selection 
as identified in the literature and via the key informant interviews conducted in phase 1. This phase 
sought to examine whether those changes differed based on each plan’s proportion of low-income 
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membership and the demographic attributes of the counties in the plan’s service delivery area. Because I 
am not a statistician, an independent research team was engaged. The analysis was conducted using 
publicly available plan benefit package and membership data available on the CMS Web site which I 
provided to the research team. We collaboratively developed the statistical model. Once defined, the 
model was submitted to and approved by the dissertation chair and the quantitative methodologist who 
served on the dissertation committee. The statistical analysis was conducted utilizing SAS (v.9.4) (Cary, 
NC). The results were analyzed by both the independent research team and myself and conclusions were 
collectively agreed on. 
Phase 3 participants were selected from each of the key informant types included in phase 1 to 
ensure diverse perspectives. Phase 3 participants were selected based on the extent of  their knowledge 
about the details of the stars methodology that they displayed in the phase 1 interviews as well as their 
availability. The questionnaire used for the phase three interviews was presented for the review and 
approval of the committee. The phase 3 survey was administered online using Survey Monkey. I 
conducted each of the follow up interviews solely to review and validate the online survey results.   
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Table 3. Research aims, methods, and data sources 
Research aim Methods Data sources 
To conduct key informant interviews to provide 
a qualitative analysis of the impact of SES 
characteristics on quality measure performance, 
what can be done to off-set the impact, and 
what, if any, changes to the measure set and/or 
methodology are needed to effectively address 
the methodological impact of these SES 
differences on quality measure performance; 
Semistructured key 
informant interviews 
Thirty key 
informants 
representing five 
different stakeholder 
types 
To conduct a statistical analysis of plan benefit 
packages to examine the difference, if any, in 
benefit design among plans with varying 
proportions of low-income subsidy eligible 
members and members residing in more 
deprived service areas. 
Multivariate analysis of 
plan benefit package filings 
for 2014 and 2015 
examining the presence or 
absence of certain benefits 
and design features for 
which there are literature 
and key informant opinions 
indicating that the provision 
of that the benefit or design 
feature may improve some 
measure of quality included 
in the stars measure set.  
Publicly available 
Medicare data files 
 
 
To carry out a policy analysis of strategies to 
enhance any positive consequences and 
ameliorate any negative consequences of 
beneficiary SES factors on performance under 
the MA Stars program identified in aims 1 and 2 
Semistructured key 
informant Interviews 
 
Five follow-up key 
informants, one 
from each of the five 
stakeholder types 
To develop a plan for change to improve MA 
quality and access based on data gathered in 
aims 1-3, if any 
Leverage the Kotter model 
for managing change and 
the agenda building, and 
evidence-based strategy for 
policy development to 
develop a plan for change 
focused on implementing 
the findings of phases 1-3  
Data gathered in 
phases 1-3 
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CHAPTER 8: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS IN PHASE ONE 
Section 8.1 Methods 
In phase 1 of the study, 30 key informant interviews were conducted. With the guidance of the 
dissertation committee, a list of key informants was developed with the goal of interviewing 19 
respondents representing academics and consultants active in the area of Medicare and MA (“Thought 
leaders”), regulators, policy makers, and quality officials (“Regulators”), providers (“Provider 
representatives”), health plans (“Plan representatives”), and consumers (“Consumer representatives”). To 
offset concerns regarding sufficient participation because, at the time of the interviews I was employed by 
an MA plan sponsor, 61 potential key informants were identified and contacted. Each potential key 
informant who agreed to participate was included. This process resulted in an increased sample size of 30. 
One of the 30 interviews included 2 representatives from the same organization. Because they concurred 
on each answer, their results are reported as a single key informant.  
Thought leaders included academics whose research appears in the literature review, policy 
analysts published in the areas of Medicare or MA quality measurement and consultants with significant 
experience assisting and evaluating MA plans. Regulators included staff from the state and federal 
government agencies with oversight and advisory roles with the Medicare and Medicaid programs 
including dual special needs plans and staff from organizations which promulgate and endorse quality 
measures used in the stars measure set. Key informants representing providers included staff both from 
trade associations representing providers and individual provider organizations. Plan representatives 
similarly included staff from trade associations representing health plans and leadership from individual 
plans. Consumer representatives included individuals from organizations representing all Medicare 
consumers, all health plan consumers and health care consumers with specific health needs. After review 
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by the Institutional Review Board of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the study was found 
to be exempt. 
Study participants were approached via U.S. Mail and email. Each initial outreach was followed 
with follow-up via email and a telephone call. Participants were identified utilizing literature in the field, 
membership or affiliation with an identified entity, and professional affiliation. A copy of the letter of 
solicitation is included in Appendix K. I interviewed each willing key informant. Informed consent was 
obtained verbally. Each of the key informants was interviewed using a uniform interview guide. 
Interviews took between thirty minutes and one hour to complete. Interviews were conducted between 
December 1, 2015 and March 31, 2016. A copy of the key informant interview guide including the 
consent request is included in Appendix A. Each interview was audiorecorded. Twenty-nine interviews 
were conducted via phone and one was conducted in person. A list of participants by stakeholder type is 
included in Table 4. 
Table 4. Stakeholder types and potential sources of key informants 
Stakeholder type Proposed number of 
interviews 
No. of 
interviews 
conducted 
Consumers 3 4 
Regulators/Policy makers/ Measurement officials (Regulators) 5 9 
Academics/Thought leaders (Thought leaders) 3 7 
Providers 3 4 
Plans 5 6 
 Three interviews were recorded using a Sony ICD-PX333 digital recorder and 27 were recorded 
using the TapeACall smartphone app. Each was transcribed using a professional transcription service (2 
using Professional Transcriber Inc., 28 using the Rev application for iPhone).  
Each interview began with the key informant describing their professional role and their role, if 
any, in quality measurement and improvement. Each key informant was asked a series of twelve 
questions, several with subparts. Key informants were asked a series of questions regarding the general 
use of quality measurement in Medicare Advantage, the benefits and burdens of the current stars 
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methodology, the impact of SES characteristics on plan and provider performance on quality measures 
and how, if at all, the stars methodology might be improved to address any barriers they identified.  
Initially, the research methodology included three supplemental questions to be asked only of 
individuals with significant experience in plan and provider practices defined as Regulators and Plan and 
Provider representatives. These questions related to whether health plan tactics and strategies have 
changed in light of changes to the MA stars program and, if so, how. Specifically, key informants were 
asked to identify methods, if any, plans are using to tailor their practices to the needs of low SES 
beneficiaries. After the first 4 interviews, it became clear that the type of key informant did not 
necessarily determine whether or not they had information of this sort. As a result, beginning with 
interview 5, each key informant was offered the opportunity to answer the supplemental questions. In all, 
six key informants (four Thought leaders and two Consumer representatives) did not answer those three 
supplemental questions.  
Section 8.2 Data Analysis Process  
Each transcript was given an identity code. I reviewed each transcript for accuracy and stored 
each of them in a locked Google drive folder. A second coder was engaged to mitigate any potential for 
bias on my part. The transcripts were imported into Atlas.ti for analysis. Utilizing the first several 
interview transcripts, the second coder and I collaboratively developed a coding dictionary and the codes 
input into Atlas.ti. Emergent codes were added to the coding dictionary as they were identified. The 
second coder and I each individually coded all 30 transcripts. Once complete, a code co-occurrence 
comparison was done to ensure interrater reliability. The second coder and I collaboratively reviewed the 
co-occurrence table and identified each code on which we lacked agreement (21 of 76 codes). For each of 
those codes, a report was generated listing each quote assigned that code by either me or the second 
coder. Those reports were exported to Google docs and collaboratively, each quote was reviewed by both 
second coder and I until concurrence was achieved for each code.  
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Section 8.3 Results 
Section 8.3.1 Overview 
Each interview began with a series of general questions regarding key informants’ views on the 
use of quality measurement in Medicare Advantage, the feasibility of achieving equivalent quality care in 
all SES strata and their opinion regarding the current Medicare Advantage stars quality measurement 
program. Next, key informants were asked specific questions regarding SES factors, if any, that they 
believe form barriers to quality care for low SES populations, the impact of the MA stars program on care 
quality for low SES beneficiaries, and efforts plans, providers, and CMS can take to offset SES factors 
that form barriers to achievement on measures of quality. They were then asked for their opinion 
regarding the appropriateness of accounting for SES factors in quality measurement separately from 
accounting for underlying health status. In addition, they were asked for recommendations, if any, for 
improving the MA program and, specifically, the stars methodology, in order to improve the quality of 
care for low SES beneficiaries. Finally, they were asked whether plans should tailor their practices to 
meet the needs of low SES beneficiaries, whether they are doing so today and, if so, best practices the 
respondent had identified in delivering high-quality care to low SES beneficiaries.  
Section 8.3.2 Use of Quality Measurement in Medicare 
Nearly all of the key informants expressed support for quality measurement in MA. Across key 
informant types, common reasons given for supporting the use of quality measurement in MA include 
creating an incentive for improvement, improving the quality of care, increasing transparency and 
accountability in health plan performance, informing consumer choice, assuring that the Medicare 
program is purchasing services based on value rather than volume, and improving the patient/beneficiary 
experience of care. The most commonly cited reasons were: creating an incentive for improvement and 
improving quality of care, were widely supported by most key informant types. Regulators were more 
likely to support quality measurement for accountability purposes, whereas other types of key informants 
were more likely to identify transparency as a reason to support quality measurement in MA.  
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Section 8.3.3 Is Equivalent Care Possible? 
The majority of key informants said that in light of known health, economic, educational and 
environmental disparities, a health plan or provider cannot ensure equivalent care quality. However, 
several respondents made a distinction between equivalence in care delivery and equivalence in 
outcomes, expressing the belief that equivalence in outcomes could not be achieved, but equivalence in 
care delivery could. Among the key informants who said that equivalence could be achieved, each noted 
the greater level of effort that would be required to achieve it. For example, a Regulator said, 
I would say yes, but you have to work at it. For example, certain providers, as a health plan, if 
you know you're going to have a mix of certain populations, then you need to have providers and 
other staff that are able to handle those populations, which is kind of like why you have the 
special needs plans. …. You need specialized tactics in a way to deal with these populations. Yes, 
I think it can be done but it is a very intensive process. 
None of the Provider representatives and only one of the Plan representatives thought that 
equivalence could be ensured.  
Section 8.3.4 SES Factors that Form Barriers to Plan and Provider Performance on Quality Measures  
Key informants were asked whether they believed that patient SES characteristics impact plan 
and provider performance on quality measures and, if so, whether there were specific SES factors that 
have more or less impact. Twenty-nine of the 30 key informants answered this question. Among those 
who responded, most believed that SES factors do impact plan and provider performance on quality 
measures. Several respondents said that the impact of SES factors plan and provider performance varied 
by quality measure. Only one person said that SES characteristics did not impact plan or provider 
performance on quality measures. Most of the key informants in each key informant category identified 
income, poverty, or wealth as impacting plan performance on quality measures. In addition, many of the 
Plan and Provider representatives and Regulators identified transportation as a barrier to performance on 
quality measures. Some key informants also identified beneficiaries’ educational attainment, health 
literacy, housing status (or homelessness), lack of social supports, and food access (nutritional status) as 
barriers that adversely impacted quality performance. A few respondents also replied that a person’s 
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location (rural areas, poor or unsafe neighborhoods) and access to providers and pharmacies formed 
barriers to quality care. 
Key informants also identified an array of non-SES barriers that they characterize as associated 
with SES. The most commonly mentioned of these barriers were community norms and ethnic/cultural 
norms. Community/peer group norms including peer group risk behaviors were identified by Regulators 
and Plan representatives. For example, a Regulator described the influence of peer behaviors on smoking 
as follows: 
I think your peer group has a lot of impact on the behavior that you describe or you 
employ for yourself. For example, if there’s a maybe a neighborhood where a peer group 
a lot of smoking is happening then smoking may not seem to be as big as a deal for you 
as an individual your doctor may say hey you need to quit smoking but if everyone on 
your street does it, it’s not going to seem maybe as bad. So, I think that does have some 
impact. 
Several of the key informants, including almost all of the Plan representatives, said that 
beneficiary/patient cultural norms sometimes create barriers for plans and providers in achieving high 
quality scores. For example, a Plan representative described the impact as follows: 
There are cultural issues that we've heard repeatedly with certain communities. Their 
income may not be as much of an issue. Whether it’s health literacy, language issues, 
those sorts of barriers or just really cultural barriers to getting things like preventative 
medicines. 
However, one of the Consumer representatives opined that disparities in quality performance 
among plans serving diverse cultural groups resulted not from barriers created by culture but from plans 
and providers delivering poorer quality care to diverse communities. Specifically, that key informant said, 
One thing that's been pointed to, is that certain communities seem to rate plan 
performance lower across the board. Certain ethnic communities and linguistic 
communities. Is that because… the plans seem to be quick to say that's because those 
communities have a cultural and linguistic bias. That's always going to result in low 
scores. But we ask whether it might be that those communities are getting less and poorer 
service from health plans and therefore, are reflecting that in the survey responses that 
they provide.  
A few key informants identified race and/or ethnicity as associated with or a predictor of poorer 
quality care. Each of the key informants who identified race and/or ethnicity as a predictor of poorer 
quality also said that it would be inappropriate to modify the measurement methodology to, in effect, 
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accept racial or ethnic disparities. Further, several key informants remarked that the quality measurement 
system would be improved if it made racial and ethnic disparities more transparent to plans, regulators 
and consumers.  
Many key informants discussed the higher prevalence of disabilities, behavioral health conditions 
and substance use disorders among low SES beneficiaries. For example, a Plan representative discussed 
the barriers that individuals in the DSNP plan he administers experience in obtaining care and adhering to 
treatment recommendations saying, 
55% of our members have a mental health or behavioral health condition to go along with 
everything else that's wrong with them physically and to the extent that a successful 
treatment plan requires the patient to be a partner in care delivery there is a more likely 
chance that [they] will not partner up correctly or consistently to the same extent as 
regular Medicare Advantage plans. 
 
Section 8.3.5 Impact of SES Characteristics by Type of Quality Measures 
Key informants were asked whether they believed that patient/beneficiary characteristics had a 
greater impact on plan or provider performance on specific types of quality measures (such as process, 
intermediary outcome, or outcome measures). Several of the key informants’ replies fell into more than 
one category meaning that they either identified more than one measure type (but not all measure types) 
or they identified a specific measure type and also commented that the impact was dependent on the 
specific measure.  
The majority of all key informants, representing each key informant type, agreed that SES 
characteristics have a differential impact depending on the type of measure. This sentiment was reflected 
not only by a majority of all respondents but also by a majority of the Regulators, Plan representatives, 
and Thought leaders. For example, one of the Thought leaders described the various measure types as 
forming a continuum through which SES factors have a differential level of impact saying, 
They have more of an impact on measures that are interactions between patients and the 
healthcare system and on outcomes and relatively less association with straightforward 
process measures that are completely under the control of a provider. An example of that 
kind of a measure would be whether a lab test was checked. A more complex measure 
like was cholesterol controlled? There are a lot of different steps that need to be taken on 
both the part of the provider and the patient in order to achieve control and those are the 
types of measures where we observe greater disparities because in that type of a measure 
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a provider would need to recognize that a lab value is out of a desirable range, have a 
discussion with the patient, initiate or intensify therapy. There are questions of adherence 
and being able to afford medications. Those are measures that require a number of steps, 
are usually the ones that have larger gaps according to race/ethnicity or socioeconomic 
status. 
Key informants often had difficulty distinguishing between intermediate outcome and outcome 
measures, frequently identifying “outcome” measures as those which CMS categorizes as “intermediate 
outcome” measures such as medication adherence. While outcome measures alone were identified as 
being impacted by beneficiary/patient SES characteristics by a majority of key informants, including a 
majority of Provider representatives, Thought leaders, and Regulators, collapsing the two categories 
together, a substantial majority of key informants shared the opinion that SES characteristics have a 
greater impact on outcome/intermediate outcome measures than on other types of measures. A Plan 
representative described the impact this way: 
I think it probably affects both, but certainly as far as outcome, because with outcomes 
you're looking at control of your disease state, whether it's high blood pressure, diabetes, 
cholesterol or whatever. Then you've got to go way beyond process to understanding 
culturally. How do the members think? What are their values? What's their diet like? 
What are their beliefs? All that goes into quote "control", if you would, or like diabetes 
and high blood pressure, which is some of the heavily weighted star measures.  
 
Section 8.3.6 Opinions Regarding the Current MA Stars Methodology 
Twenty-five of the 30 key informants offered opinions regarding the current MA stars 
methodology. Nearly all expressed some level of support for the current methodology. However, only a 
few offered unqualified support for the program. The most commonly identified reasons for supporting 
the current methodology were that it creates incentives to improve quality and that it has resulted in 
efforts by plans and providers to assist beneficiaries/patients to receive appropriate care and to adhere to 
prescribed treatment. Similarly, some key informants noted that the stars system has resulted in improved 
plan performance over time. Several key informants expressed the view that the measures included in the 
methodology provide a broad overview of appropriate measures of quality. In addition, some the key 
informants argued that that the star ratings system makes it easier for consumers to understand differences 
in quality of care provided by different plans. 
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While only a small minority of key informants opposed the current stars methodology, a 
substantial majority expressed concerns about it. The primary reason for concern was that some of the 
metrics included in the stars methodology are beyond the control of the plans and providers being 
measured (described more fully in the section on SES). This concern was identified by at least half of 
every key informant type, except Regulators. Similarly, many key informants (including half of Plan and 
Provider representatives) expressed concern about the utility of the stars program when comparing the 
performance of plans that do not serve like populations. Many respondents were also concerned about the 
accuracy of the current measurement system. Some were afraid that the methodology incentivizes plans to 
focus their efforts on improving their performance on the metrics measured in the stars program rather 
than on improving overall quality of care (e.g., “teaching to the test”). Several respondents also noted the 
number and complexity of the measures and that the measures were not always in alignment with other 
CMS quality measurement programs creating abrasion between providers and plans regarding 
prioritization of quality measurement efforts. Finally, and in contrast to those supporting the stars 
program, several respondents opined that the stars methodology fails to produce meaningful data.  
Section 8.3.7 Impact of MA Stars on Plan and Provider Willingness to Serve Low SES 
Beneficiaries/Patients 
Key informants were asked whether payment incentives created by the MA stars methodology 
might encourage plans and providers to shy away from serving people with more SES risk factors. The 
majority of key informants, including a substantial majority of Plan, Consumer, and Regulator 
representatives and a majority of Thought leaders agreed that this was a valid concern. Reasons for this 
view varied. They included the difficulty of improving quality among low SES populations, the 
challenges of getting providers to agree to serve low SES populations and plan profit motives. In fact, 
some of the Plan representatives who agreed that this was a valid concern stated a belief that plans had 
already made changes in their service areas and product offering to avoid low SES beneficiaries. For 
example, a Plan representative said,  
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I think if you were to do a study of DSNP closing, shrinking their service area in the past 
few years, and compared that to the number of DSNPs that have come on the scene and 
their geographies, you would come to the conclusion that certain zip codes have been 
unable to sustain a plan and the new ones have selectively chosen where to go. I think 
you could probably see patterns there if you went back and pulled CMS data on service 
area shut downs, service area expansions. You probably would have the evidence that yes 
these plans are very sensitive to location and zip code.  
A few key informants expressed the viewpoint that avoidance of low SES beneficiaries was a 
potential concern, but not one that has been evidenced as yet. Some of the key informants, including a 
substantial majority of Provider representatives, believed that this was not a valid concern. Providers who 
felt this was not a concern argued both that providers have an obligation to serve their communities and 
that market dynamics would ultimately require that providers serve all beneficiaries regardless of SES.   
Section 8.3.8 MA Stars Methodology and Improvement of Care Quality for Individuals in All SES Strata  
Key informants were asked whether they believe that the current MA stars methodology 
improves the delivery of quality care to beneficiaries in all SES strata. Twenty-six of the 30 key 
informants responded to the question. None of the answers (yes/no/unsure) garnered the support of a 
majority of key informants. However, many of the key informants either said that the current MA stars 
methodology does improve quality in all SES strata or that they were unsure of the impact of the stars 
methodology across SES strata.  
Thought leaders were the dominant key informant type among those who were unsure, largely 
stating that the data were not yet available to answer the question. For example, one Thought leader put it 
this way: 
There's a concern, as I said, we don't really have clear data on the impact of the Stars 
rating scale on those with low SES. The concern is that we know that enrollees with low 
SES are concentrated among a relatively small number of plans. If those plans are then 
penalized for their performance it would divert resources away from plans, or financially 
penalize plans, that have an important role in serving racial and ethnic minority 
beneficiaries or those with low SES. My concern, and I think concerns of policy makers, 
are that the Stars rating system might exacerbate disparities in care. 
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Section 8.3.9 Addressing SES-Factors that Create Barriers to Quality Measure Performance 
Key informant opinions regarding whether plans and providers can effectively address or offset 
the SES factors fell into five categories:  
1. Plans and providers can impact SES factors that create barriers to quality measure 
performance (e.g., unqualified support for the notion that plans and providers can address the 
underlying SES factors that create barriers); 
2. Plans and providers can and are taking steps to impact SES factors that create barriers to 
quality measure performance but they cannot completely ameliorate those barriers; 
3. Plans and providers can impact SES factors that create barriers to quality measure 
performance but their success is dependent on the resources they have available to address 
those factors; 
4. Plans and providers can impact SES factors that create barriers to quality measure 
performance but need to do more than they are doing today if they are to be successful; and 
5. Plans and providers cannot impact SES factors that create barriers to quality measure 
performance absent changes in quality expectations and additional resources.  
The largest group of key informants said that while plans and providers can impact SES factors 
that create barriers to quality measure performance, plans and providers cannot completely offset them. 
This position was taken by representatives of four of the five key informant types. Only one key 
informant, a Plan representative, commented that plans and providers cannot offset barriers created by 
SES factors articulating the challenge as follows: 
The question is can plans and providers fix the problem? The answer is not without the 
resources. Just as the public school system cannot fix the problem that special education 
students present without the resources … No. See, you want health care to fix poverty. 
Why not instead expect health care to fix world peace and eliminate terrorism? Why not 
make that the goal of health care then if you think it's got that kind of capacity? I'm just 
saying again that we need to be reasonable in our expectations. Health care cannot fix 
poverty any more than the public school system can. 
Some key informants remarked that plans’ and providers’ ability to offset SES related barriers to 
quality care is dependent on the resources available to those plans and providers. Additionally, while 
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some key informants, including many Consumer representatives, offered an unqualified yes to the 
question of whether plans and providers could offset SES factors, none of the Plan or Provider 
representatives responded with an unqualified yes.  
Section 8.4 Strategies Plans and Providers Could Leverage to Offset SES Barriers to Quality Care 
Consistent with the perspective voiced by nearly all of the key informants that plans and 
providers can impact, if not completely offset, SES-related barriers to care, key informants identified a 
number of strategies plans could use to address SES barriers. The most commonly identified strategies 
include refining care management techniques and processes, leveraging actionable data, addressing access 
barriers, and removing social barriers. In addition, respondents noted strategies that providers could 
undertake to address SES barriers. Each of those strategies is described in greater detail below.   
Section 8.4.1 Refining Care Management Strategies  
The vast majority of key informants, including a majority of each key informant type and all of 
the Provider and Plan representatives, recommended that plans and providers enhance their care 
management strategies. These recommendations include refining and enhancing care coordination and 
care management techniques, utilizing specialized tactics, such as community health workers or peer 
support, and increasing provider and staff training to ensure they understand the unique needs of low SES 
beneficiaries/patients. A Plan representative who recommended refining care management strategies to 
meet the needs of low SES beneficiaries described it this way: 
If I were to just try to generalize it, it's finding your member. Finding them, knowing 
them. Some enrollees, even amongst the full duals, some very low SES, some people are 
healthy enough and are in a safe enough environment, you don't need a face-to-face 
intervention. You can … do a quarterly or somewhat regularly telephonic intervention. 
You could be checking up with their doctor. You don't always need a super intensive 
intervention, but I think it's finding them, knowing who they are, so doing that care 
assessment, … it helps if it's usually in the house…Not necessarily that you need to 
always be face to face, but having it hands-on in the sense that you know your member 
and you know the community and you know what resources are available to them. Then 
the plan knows what interventions they have available to them. That's going to differ. 
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Section 8.4.2 Leveraging Actionable Data  
More than half of the key informants identified the ability to leverage actionable data as 
important to effectively addressing SES-related barriers. Most of the Thought leaders, all of the Provider 
representatives, and a majority of Plan representatives discussed the importance of using data to 
effectively identify and intervene to offset barriers created by SES factors and to offset disparities in care. 
One Thought leader described it as follows: 
I think it's all about information and being able to drill down into that information, 
because if you don't know who to target you might know your overall rate is worse for 
this population, but that's a vastly complex population with different characteristics and 
profiles. You need to know which profiles of members are doing worse on which 
outcome measures so that you can really build intervention programs around that specific 
population if you're going to impact that high level rate and overall outcomes for that 
population. I'm a data person, so I’m a little biased, but it's all about having the right 
information at the right time. 
 
In addition, some key informants, including most of the Provider representatives recommended 
that plans and providers refine their quality improvement techniques to address the needs of low 
SES beneficiaries. Specifically, they identified the need to segment and stratify data as a key 
component of refining those quality improvement techniques. A Provider representative 
described it this way: 
So from the provider perspective, I think just having a team lead or physician champion 
to really kind of be the lead on all quality improvement efforts within a practice. Having 
a good team that uses data in a way to really drive change. So they have a process in 
place, where they are frequently looking at performance outcomes and information from 
patients, patient experience outcomes, and using that to really look at where gaps are, 
where they're doing well, and then putting a plan in place. This is just kind of basic 
quality improvement methodology. I think those that are serving patients with lower 
socioeconomic status, they may fine tune their quality measures that they're looking at. 
They look at things to access to care, transportation, care management. They may change 
that a little bit based on the population. 
 
Section 8.4.3 Addressing Access Barriers 
Nearly all of the key informants recommended that plans and providers address access to care. 
Within this category some key informants made a general recommendation that plans and providers 
improve access to care, others encouraged plans and providers to improve access to transportation, and 
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many suggested that plans and providers leverage telehealth and assistive devices. In addition, some 
recommended that plans and providers modify care management, network and payment rules to deliver 
care where and how beneficiaries are able to receive it, for example, by utilizing street medicine 
programs, leveraging peer support and health coaches, and allowing for reimbursement of nontraditional 
providers and services. Others encouraged plans to address barriers created by out-of-pocket costs by 
eliminating premiums and lowering co-payments and deductibles.  
Section 8.4.4 Removing Social Barriers to Care 
A substantial majority of key informants recommended that providers and plans remove social 
barriers to care. A Thought leader described removing social barriers as follows: 
I think, they have the potential to address them but they need to develop effective 
partnerships with community or social service organizations that can address some of the 
issues related to housing, or transportation, or neighborhood safety, or food security, and 
access that may be important parts of people's overall health. We don't really have a 
system in place, right now, in the Medicare program to provide financial incentives for 
those partnerships to be formed. They're deeply rooted and challenging issues that the 
healthcare system, in general, has not, traditionally, addressed.  
Common recommendations included increasing community partnerships, providing holistic services, and 
improving access to social supports. In this context, key informants described holistic services as those 
that address the full continuum of the beneficiary/patient’s care needs including their needs for physical, 
behavioral and social services. For example, in speaking to the need for plans to provide holistic services, 
a Consumer representative described plans that are working with community based organizations to 
connect low SES beneficiaries to a wide array of necessary resources including prescriptions, food and 
respite care saying, 
There's an organization … that a clinician can write a prescription for community based 
services and [the organization] will help those folks or will help the individual connect 
with the resources to fill that prescription, whether it's for food, for respite care, for all 
sorts of things. I think we can invest in those sorts of services and payment models that 
will promote a more holistic approach to health. 
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Section 8.4.5 Provider Strategies  
While each key informant recommended at least one strategy that plans can take to offset SES-
related barriers to quality care, a smaller number recommended specific actions that providers could take 
to offset SES factors that create barriers to high quality care. Those recommendations included 
encouraging providers to accept more low SES beneficiaries, refining quality improvement 
methodologies and strategies, and modifying provider care delivery models.  
Among key informants identifying these issues, several recommended enhancing provider 
networks to address the unique needs of low SES beneficiaries. Examples of recommendations in this 
category included increasing the number of language and culturally concordant providers in their 
networks and including providers with specific skills in serving unique subpopulations such as individuals 
with intellectual and developmental disabilities and individuals with behavioral health and substance 
abuse disorders. 
Section 8.5 Changes CMS Could Make to MA to Address SES-Related Barriers to Quality Care 
Section 8.5.1 Accounting for SES in Quality Measurement Separately from Accounting for Underlying 
Health Status 
Nearly all of the key informants felt that it was appropriate to account for SES characteristics in 
quality measurement separately from adjusting for underlying health status. The majority of key 
informants recommended risk adjusting individual measures of quality, stratifying the plans by 
members/beneficiary SES and demographic characteristics in order to measure like plans against one 
another, or both risk adjustment and stratification. A few recommended accounting for SES separately 
from underlying health status but did not specify a methodology. Reasons for supporting stratification 
included: assuring that disparities in care were made transparent, providing actionable data to providers 
and plans in order to improve the quality of care, and providing sufficient data to meet the competing 
goals of implementing a fair performance incentive program and supporting effective quality 
improvement for all beneficiaries. Reasons for supporting risk adjustment included: helping to remove 
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possible negative incentives, and accounting for the inability of providers and plans to impact or control 
certain measures of quality. Speaking to negative incentives, one Provider representative said, 
You know, for looking at physician performance purposes, these factors need to be taken into 
account. There can be unintended consequences if [. . .]. These particular factors are not mitigated 
or at least adjusted, then there may be an unwillingness for physicians to treat these patients. That 
would be an unfortunate side effect for this [. . .]. You want to truly reflect what a physician, what 
their performance is. When there are factors that aren't taken into account that are outside of their 
control, that doesn't accurately represent their performance. 
Speaking to provider and plan impact or control of certain measures of quality, a Provider 
representative explained, 
. . . when you're talking about outcome measures and using those outcome measures in a 
comparative way across hospitals, it's important that those measures account for all of the factors 
that are beyond the control of a provider but that might impact the outcome. For something like 
mortality, the biological truth, is that patients who are older are more likely to die. That's why 
these outcome measures have an adjustment for age. It's not because older patients should 
somehow be expected to have less quality care, it's simply because of their biology they simply 
are going to look different on certain things. Patients who have multiple chronic conditions or 
other underlying factors, you would certainly want to try to adjust for those because the patient 
would arrive under a hospital's care with those things. They wouldn't necessarily be caused by 
hospital care. We think that SES kind of functions on a similar principal… There absolutely is a 
limit to the influence that a hospital has over some of the broader socioeconomic conditions in 
their communities. So, in order to level the playing field among providers, you have to have that 
kind of adjustment. 
Among key informants supporting risk adjustment or risk adjustment together with stratification, several, 
including a substantial majority of Provider representatives, remarked that risk adjustment should be 
applied only to outcome measures, while many key informants commented that the need for risk 
adjustment should be assessed on a measure-specific basis regardless of measure type (e.g., process, 
outcome, intermediate outcome). One of the Thought leaders described the issue as follows: 
SES adjustment factors [are] probably less needed for process, but I believe they are 
needed, and I actually think that's a fruitful area for research to determine how much 
process measures can be affected by SES. I've just presented some hypotheses about how 
it might be affected with the scenario of nobody else at home so the patient can't get to 
their screening tests, but I don't know how all of these things combine in the real world... 
I think it's a very important area for research. 
Among the key informants who recommended that the application of risk adjustment be determined on a 
measure by measure basis, some referenced the NQF report’s recommendation that risk adjustment be 
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used only when there is a conceptual basis for its application and an empiric association between SES and 
the variable of interest. 
Key informants who recommended applying both risk adjustment and stratification argued that 
doing so will assist in both leveling the playing field between plans and assuring that meaningful 
comparisons can be made between plans and providers with different proportions of low SES 
membership. One Thought leader noted, 
I'm specifically talking about risk adjustment of the quality measures to level the playing field so 
that you are comparing apples to apples so that you can really gauge the true performance of 
plans. That not only includes adjusting for socioeconomic characteristics like living in a high 
poverty area, but it also means adjusting for other characteristics of disadvantaged members like 
dual-eligible members that have much higher prevalence of disability, of mental health conditions 
like alcohol, drug, substance abuse, of chronic conditions in general, compared to non-
disadvantaged or non-dual eligible members. 
A few key informants supported the use of stratification while opposing the idea of risk adjustment. Key 
informants who supported a stratification-only approach argued that stratification would improve the 
fairness of the program, and would provide greater transparency to assist consumers and regulators in 
identifying health disparities while not masking health disparities. In their view, risk adjustment would 
create a system which accepts poorer quality care for low SES populations by masking health disparities.  
The primary concern raised regarding the use of risk adjustment to account for the impact of SES 
factors on quality measure performance, raised by several key informants, was the concern that doing so 
would mask health disparities effectively resulting in an acceptance of poorer quality care for low SES 
populations. Additional research was recommended by a Consumer representative who put it this way, 
. . . I think also probably the more important concern is that we do worry about masking 
healthcare disparities. And so if you adjust the measures, I think what we have a hard 
time with is how do you ensure that you don’t effectively create two different levels of 
care? Like how do you actually ensure that the quality of the care for lower income 
individuals is the same as the quality for higher income individuals if you effectively 
adjust out that difference? . . . I think we’re comfortable with the idea of comparing plans 
by peer groupings so stratifying the different plans. So plans that disproportionately serve 
low income people, grading them against one another as opposed to plans that serve 
higher income people. So I think our feeling is if there is a true connection 
socioeconomic status and the ability of plans to achieve high quality ratings then there’s a 
variety of solutions that we should be exploring and they don’t just include risk-adjusting 
the measures that we really need to think about what are the risks of doing that. And will 
we be masking disparities and are there other ways to effectively achieve the end-goal 
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which is ensuring that plans still want to serve those populations. Because we certainly 
don’t want to kind of create weird incentives where plans want to avoid certain areas or 
avoid serving certain populations of people. 
Section 8.5.2 Recommended Changes to the Stars Methodology 
Each key informant was asked to recommend changes, if any, to the MA stars methodology that 
they believed would help to ensure the highest quality of care is delivered to low SES populations. In 
addition to the already discussed recommendations regarding accounting for SES factors in quality 
measurement, key informants recommended a wide variety of changes to the stars methodology, although 
there was little consensus on the specific recommendations. The most common suggestion was to include 
more meaningful measures, including some that focus attention on quality for specific populations 
(including those with low SES). Key informants who recommended that the stars methodology include 
more meaningful measures directly related to SES barriers suggested that the stars measure set include 
measures related to cultural competence, language access, benefit design, member connection or 
engagement, care management, chronic disease/disability and access to care. For example, a Plan 
representative made the following recommendation: 
I do think the field needs to give serious thought to what do we really value with the SES 
group? . . . I'm not sure that we have our finger on what we really value with DSNP 
programming. I think we value just a contact, a rate of contact. So many of these folks are 
difficult to contact…Just basic engagement is a value that has outcome and health care, 
population health implications and yet it's just presumed. Contact is presumed and not 
rewarded in the current system. I think you've got to start from some more basic levels. 
It's not about blood pressure control. It's about contacting the member at all and then 
maintaining contact. Those more fundamental things need to be part of the correct quality 
measurement system for a DSNP plan which are typically inner city plans. I want to go 
there. Contact, showing up for an appointment is kind of [a] fundamental quality measure 
that a plan is doing the right thing. 
Similarly, a few key informants, none of them Plan or Provider representatives, recommended 
changes be made to the stars methodology in order to focus attention on quality for specific populations 
including low SES beneficiaries as means of reducing health disparities. For example, a Thought Leader 
said, 
We certainly found some evidence that some Medicare plans provide a relatively uniform 
level of quality across their different patient subgroups, whereas others tend to have more 
differences between those in worse or better health status or those in worse or better 
 85 
 
socioeconomic status. Building in some features in the stars system that are specifically 
oriented toward identifying, measuring, and then incentivizing the solution of the 
disparities in care or disparities in outcome that are related to SES would be an "attention 
getter" towards more broadly introducing those methods and features into healthcare and 
into the way the health insurance plans operate. That would be beneficial to those groups 
that are doing badly. 
Several key informants recommended focusing more on quality improvement rather than on 
achievement of targeted benchmarks. A Thought leader expressed the issue as follows: 
Well I have a problem with the tournament notion that everybody's competing with each 
other. I would be much happier if we used an improvement method. One of my 
observations from my brief knowledge of the star rating is that a MA plan's performance 
has a high correlation with the performance of the underlying delivery systems in 
different geographic areas so that the star rating . . . I understand that some of the 
measures have to do with what's internal to the organization and so that's not a factor, but 
other measures depends on what the providers at the MA plan is contracting with or in 
some rarer cases employing. That creates in some ways an unfair competition. If you 
have a plan that's a 5 star in an area where all the other plans are 3 star, that plan strikes 
me as doing something different dramatically better or different than an area where all the 
plans are 5 star because that might mostly reflect what the providers are doing….so I'd be 
looking for either regional comparisons rather than national ones, or I would be looking 
for a pure improvement model where we even had 2 star plans get bonuses if they 
increased to 3 and 4 stars where in fact you wouldn't even use the star rating system… 
I'm willing to give up some of the use of star ratings for consumer choice in order to have 
every MA plan improve quality. 
While this recommendation was made by several Regulators and Plan representatives and a majority of 
Thought leaders, not a single Consumer or Provider recommended realigning the methodology to focus 
more on improvement than achievement.  
A few key informants, including half of Plan representatives, recommended that the penalties 
attached to the stars program be removed. These comments generally focused in two areas: the fairness of 
penalizing plans for performance issues outside of their control and, aligned with recommendations 
previously discussed, to incentivize plans to take on hard to serve populations.  
Among the other recommendations, half of Provider representatives recommended that CMS 
align measures across all Medicare quality programs to ensure that all actors in the system are 
coordinating and collaborating to improve overall quality. A few key informants (including half of Plan 
representatives) suggested that the stars methodology be applied at the plan benefit package level, rather 
than at the level of the contract between CMS and the plan sponsor, to account for significant variances in 
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contract sizes and geographies. These key informants expressed the concern that smaller and/or 
geographically limited contracts are disadvantaged under the current methodology when compared to 
larger, more diverse contracts. For example, a Plan representative said, 
When it comes time to assign 5 star scores it's to the contract not to the plan but if they 
scored the plans separately, I wonder how many then would ever be at a 4 or 5 star level? 
The reason many of them are at 4 and 5 star level is the DSNP is blended into a larger 
Medicare Advantage plan that enrolls well elderly and so the smaller DSNP members are 
actually averaged up in the contract and we're led to believe that they're performing 
maybe at a high level when in fact as a separate section of the contract they aren't but 
we'll never know. That averaging up effect is potentially distorting. If we were to take all 
the DSNPers and okay what's their 5-star score, standing on their own without being 
averaged up into the contract, we might be seeing a different picture… 
Section 8.5.3 Changes to the MA Program Outside of the Stars Methodology 
Nearly half of the key informants identified structural or policy changes to the MA program that 
they believe would assist plans and providers to address and/or offset SES factors that create barriers to 
quality care. Key informants who made these recommendations included a majority of Plan 
representatives and Providers, a substantial proportion of Thought leaders, and a few Regulators and 
Consumers. Additional structural changes recommended by more than a few key informants were 
creating positive financial incentives to encourage plans and provider to serve high risk populations, 
changing the rules regarding supplemental benefits to allow plans more flexibility to meet the unique 
needs of low SES beneficiaries, and aligning quality measures across Medicare programs. 
Section 8.6 Are Plans Tailoring Their Practices to Meet Beneficiary SES Needs? 
As discussed in the methods section, as originally designed, the key informant questionnaire 
included three supplemental questions which were to be asked only of individuals with significant 
experience in plan and provider practices. After the first 4 interviews, it became clear that key informants 
in other categories also had significant experience with plan and provider practices. As a result, beginning 
with interview 5, each key informant was offered the opportunity to answer the supplemental questions. 
In the end, 6 of 30 key informants (4 Thought leaders, and 2 Consumers) did not answer the 3 
supplemental questions. Another way of saying this is that 24 key informants (2 Consumer 
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representatives, 9 Regulators, 3 Thought leaders, 4 Provider representatives, and 6 Plan representatives) 
responded to the supplemental questions.  
Among the key informants who were asked whether plans should be tailoring their practices to 
meet the needs of low SES beneficiaries, a substantial majority said they should. Specific 
recommendations included: creating and implementing culturally specific communication strategies; 
measuring disparities within their own patient population; conducting in person assessments; care 
planning and care management; targeting high-risk, high-resource utilization patients proactively with 
multidisciplinary home visits; focusing on transitions of care using dedicated and specially trained staff; 
screening for the SES factors that impose barriers to access to care in order to identify resources to 
improve access; engaging in targeted outreach in order to establish a meaningful and longitudinal 
relationship in order to assist beneficiaries/patients to engage in healthier behaviors; and working with 
and through community organizations that have the trust of the beneficiaries/patients. Among those key 
informants who expressed concern regarding plans tailoring their practices to meet the specific needs of 
their beneficiaries/patients, the most commonly cited concern was that tailoring might be used to 
discriminate against certain types of beneficiaries.  
These key informants were also asked whether they had observed an increase in population 
tailored strategies since the implementation of the MA stars methodology. The vast majority said they 
had, but that the type of variation and extent to which plans are tailoring their practices differ greatly.  
Key informants who said that they had observed population tailored strategies were asked to 
provide examples of best practices they have observed among plans and providers in implementing 
population tailored strategies. Identified best practices often echoed recommendations made earlier in the 
interviews regarding mechanisms to overcome SES factors that form barriers to care, including partnering 
with community organizations, assuring culturally competent and language concordant care, developing 
personalized care management programs, assisting with housing issues, developing service delivery 
systems targeted to subpopulations (many of who are low SES) including beneficiaries with ID/DD and 
chronic mental illness, leveraging data and technology solutions to identify utilization patterns and target 
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gaps in care, developing incentive programs to improve patient activation and adherence, and utilizing 
health coaches. Table 5 provides examples of some of those strategies as described by the key informants. 
Table 5. Best practices in population-tailored strategies 
Strategy Informant feedback 
Working with and 
through community 
organizations that have 
the trust of the 
beneficiaries/patients 
“I know of a plan, for instance, that contracts with an organization… [that] 
is all about providing community based organization provides basically 
food as medicine. They provide meals to people with chronic conditions 
that are specifically made to meet their dietary needs. I know of a plan that 
serves dual eligibles that contracts with them so that certain of their 
members get those meals. I think housing is a really bright new area for 
people to get into. People can’t follow the protocols, their medication or 
treatment protocols unless they have a safe place to, for instance, keep their 
medication or to get the proper rest that they need. I think that there's lots of 
ways and opportunities to do better in this regard.” –Consumer 
Representative 
Provider/Patient 
language and cultural 
concordance 
“. . . the plan engaged somebody from that community who was … also a 
physician to go into the community and to call homes and other places to 
talk with people to try to break through some of those cultural barriers and 
explain how critical it is to do some of those things.” –Plan representative 
Personalized care 
management programs 
“So for those members who … have Medicaid and Medicare services in the 
same plan, they’ve assigned … a Healthcare Buddy. Healthcare Buddy is 
not a clinician. It's a member services team member. And that Healthcare 
Buddy is kind of a point person for the member. So what they've done is 
they've taken a picture of the buddy, send him a letter with a picture of their 
buddy and that's their person. So when they call for help, "Oh, where is the 
pharmacy closest to me?" They call their buddy. If they need to see a 
cardiologist, because their PCP suggested it, they just call their buddy and 
their buddy can help them. So it's truly kind of making that connection… 
That's just essentially a kind of a concierge member services person that 
really is kind of the point person for questions.” –Regulator 
Housing support 
programs 
“. . . have been using the money for a certain set of their population on 
supportive housing. What they're doing is working with their case managers 
to identify people who have been placed in long term care for a certain 
period of time and otherwise should be somewhere else but don't have 
stable housing to return to or if they've been in skilled nursing and they're 
about to lose their housing. They've hired someone to work with them that 
helps either to secure Section 8 housing or make some modifications to the 
home so the individual can return home or gets them… into a residential 
care facility for the elderly with proper case manager support. I think that 
that is an example of where both plans and providers are starting to tailor 
specific customized approaches either based on the geographic area…so 
they're right at the center of that issue.” –Regulator 
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Strategy Informant feedback 
ID/DD-specific care 
management programs 
aligned with specially 
trained provider 
“We have worked closely with organizations serving both children and 
adults with developmental disabilities. A lot of the adults are duals and that 
involves hiring specialized staff so we have a nurse case manager who 
specializes . . . who's very familiar with the population. We've hired a 
physician who does visits. Many of them live in group homes so visiting 
folks in their group homes. We've set up a [. . .] specialized mental health 
clinic because many have behavioral issues. They can't really mix with the 
general mental illness population and so they need sort of a targeted 
approach so we have a two day a week clinic focused specifically on their 
needs. It's just another example of a program tailored to a particular 
population.” –Plan representative 
Meeting non-medical-
care needs 
“I've heard stories of plans going and finding homeless members under 
bridges to give them their diabetes shots, medications. Going to their homes 
and buying a microwave for them or a refrigerator, or making sure their 
electric bill is paid. They do not get reimbursed for that. They do it because 
they obviously want to provide a high quality of care to their members, but 
they certainly also do it because they need those dollars from the star 
program and their quality ratings to reflect the care that they provide.” –
Thought Leader 
Health coaches “We are experimenting with health coaches and these guys are getting our 
resisters. Resisters to us means this lady has never been in the mammogram 
numerator for the past three years. These coaches don't do anything other 
than try to befriend the member to understand why they don't want to show 
up in the numerator ever. What's the deal? I think we're getting penetration. 
We're at least understanding what's the source of their resistance. It could 
be something silly, easily overcome…I think going into these environments 
with a spirit of discovery, no accusation, no treatment, what's the deal why 
is this happening? I just want to understand, has a way of leading to its own 
solution.” –Plan representative 
Section 8.7 Summary of Findings: Recurrent Themes 
While there was almost unanimous support for the use of quality measurement in MA that 
support did not translate into unqualified support for the Medicare stars system. The vast majority of key 
informants expressed some level of support for the current methodology but only a few offered 
unqualified support. The most commonly cited reasons for supporting the stars program were that it 
creates positive incentives to improve the quality of care and that it takes complex information and 
simplifies it in a manner that is comprehensible to consumers. The most commonly identified concerns 
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about the stars methodology are the inclusion of metrics beyond the control of plans and providers and the 
inability under the current methodology to compare the performance of plans serving like populations.  
A significant majority of key informants do not believe that health plans and providers can ensure 
equivalent care quality for all beneficiaries. Nearly all of the key informants expressed the belief that 
certain beneficiary/patient SES characteristics pose barriers to plan and provider performance on some or 
all quality measures. However, opinions regarding which SES characteristics pose barriers varied by key 
informant, and in some cases, by key informant type. Only a few key informants voiced the view that 
plans and providers can offset these barriers. Many said that while plans and providers cannot completely 
offset these factors, they can positively impact them.  
Key informant opinions were divided on the subject of the effectiveness of the stars methodology 
in improving the quality of care for beneficiaries in all SES strata. Among the 26 key informants who 
responded to the question, some believed that the stars program improves care for beneficiaries in all SES 
strata, some were unsure of its effect across all SES strata, several said that the stars methodology does 
not improve care for beneficiaries in all SES strata.   
The majority of key informants agreed that it was valid to be concerned that the stars 
methodology might encourage plans and providers to shy away from serving people with SES risk factors 
due to the potential for negative payment consequences. A few key informants believed that while a valid 
concern, it was not a phenomenon that had, as yet, been evidenced.  
Nearly all of the key informants agreed that it was appropriate to account for SES characteristics 
in quality measurement separately from accounting for underlying health status. The majority of key 
informants recommended either that the individual measures be risk adjusted or that the measures be risk 
adjusted and that plan performance on quality measures be stratified to allow for comparison of quality 
performance among plans serving like populations. Key informants suggested other changes to the stars 
methodology and the MA program rules to assist plans and providers to address and/or offset SES factors 
that create barriers to quality care.  
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While many key informants gave suggestions about how the MA stars methodology or the MA 
program rules could be changed, a substantial majority also expressed the belief that plans and providers 
should tailor their practices to the needs of the beneficiaries/patients they serve and recommended a 
variety of strategies for doing so.  
Seven themes recurred throughout the 30 interviews: fairness, control, breaking down silos 
between plans and providers, resources and/or resource limits, barriers formed by a paucity of available 
and actionable data, geographical differences in care quality and resource availability, and the role of plan 
attributes in quality performance with low SES populations. These themes (described below) cut across 
key informant types and across the questions posed to key informants.  
Section 8.7.1 Fairness/Equity 
Arguments regarding the fairness or equity of the current methodology were raised repeatedly in 
response to several of the questions and by a majority of key informants of all types. Fairness-related 
themes included the tradeoffs involved in fairly judging the quality of the care delivered by plans while 
utilizing an objective measurement system, concerns regarding creating a two-tiered system and/or 
masking disparities through the application of risk adjustment, the fairness and appropriateness of 
including measures of quality that are largely outside of the control of providers and plans, and whether 
the current system incentivizes plans to actually improve the quality of care or merely to focus on 
improving performance on the measured outcomes and processes. The majority of key informants 
expressed concern that an unfair measurement system would adversely impact plan and provider 
compensation, which would then result in fewer resources to address SES barriers. A few Plan 
representatives also remarked that the threat of diminished resources attributable to lower stars 
performance creates disincentives to plans offering DSNP plans.  
One of the most commonly articulated themes was the fairness of holding plans and providers 
accountable for things that are outside of their control. Half of key informants spoke to the issue of plans’ 
ability to control the circumstances of their patients, the providers delivering care and the communities in 
which they operate. These issues were identified by key informants representing every key informant type 
 92 
 
and at least half of Thought leaders, Provider representatives, Plan representatives, and Consumers. More 
than half of key informants also raised the issue of the fairness of holding providers responsible for things 
outside the provider control. Among those who raised the issue of provider control were the substantial 
majority of Thought leaders and Provider representatives, many Plan and Consumer representatives, and 
several Regulators.  
The context in which key informants raised the issue of control varied. Most frequently, remarks 
regarding control focused on the fairness of holding a plan or provider accountable to deliver either 
equivalent outcomes or equivalent quality. Several of the key informants raised the issue of control in the 
context of recommending changes to the stars methodology. For example, a Provider representative 
expressed the concern this way, 
I think there is some concern that [. . .] I think in general, for pay for performance 
programs [. . .]. That there's some concern that when a physician has a patient population 
that has a lower SES that there may be unintended consequences of measuring 
performance without adjusting for those factors. When a physician is compared to a peer 
that is not seeing a similar patient population, it puts that physician performance and 
compensation at risk. Also, it's not fair to compare him to someone else that's not seeing a 
similar patient population. I think that we're really concerned about not necessarily that 
the patients are receiving a different level of quality, but that there are factors that are 
largely outside of this patient's control that do impact health.  
Other key informants spoke to plan and provider control in the context of patient and provider 
autonomy. In discussing whether plans and providers can guarantee equivalent quality for beneficiaries in 
all SES strata, one provider expressed the concern that to do so, plans would have to become more 
prescriptive than is appropriate, limiting providers’ ability to address the needs of each individual patient. 
A Plan representative, discussed the conflict between plan and provider engagement and patient 
autonomy saying that equivalence was only possible in a completely patriarchal society in which the 
health plan or provider completely take over care decisions for the beneficiary.  
A corollary to the provider and plan control issue, several key informants raised the issue of the 
plan’s and provider’s role in breaking down SES barriers to care. These key informants concluded that 
while the provider clearly has a role in breaking down SES barriers, the activities required to effectively 
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break down SES barriers are shared between the provider, plan, and other community actors. A Thought 
leader put it this way: 
Let’s talk first about the provider of care, I think there's certainly things they can do to try 
to close the gap, but I think that [. . .]. As you think about broadening the range of things 
that they do, they stop acting as providers and have to start acting as advocates and 
maybe as organizers. And then it's not obvious whether the provider role has to be same. 
To try to make that a little more concrete, maybe you have a population in which there's a 
lot of diabetes, which tends to be associated with low SES. You can try to improve A1C 
testing. You can get patient … navigators … who help people to go through the process 
of getting tested and developing a dietary plan, an exercise plan, and so forth. Even that is 
getting beyond the pure sort of doctor in the office role. These are things that healthcare 
organizations can do and should do and one would hope that reimbursements would be 
made more aligned with the importance of doing those things for those populations. 
Section 8.7.2 Financial Stressors/Resource Limitations  
Another recurrent theme was the impact of financial stressors/limitations on plans’ and providers’ 
ability to offset SES characteristics identified as barriers to quality care. This theme was identified by a 
substantial majority of key informants (including each key informant type) in response to a wide variety 
of questions. Clearly of most salience to Plans, Providers, and Regulators, it was raised by all of the Plan 
and Provider representatives and a majority of Regulators. Resource constraints were identified as a 
barrier to effectively addressing health literacy challenges, improving access to care, delivering 
supplemental benefits needed by low SES beneficiaries, and improving patient activation and 
engagement. 
Section 8.8 Breaking Down Silos 
Finally, several key informants raised the issue of systematic silos and the impact of those silos 
on the ability of plans and providers to improve performance on the Medicare stars quality measures. 
These key informants focused their comments on the need for all actors in the health care system to work 
together to improve health outcomes for low SES populations. For example, a Regulator said, 
I think one of the issues we currently have in our current system of assessing provider 
and health plan performance is everything is very siloed. Somehow the idea that just the 
health plan or just the provider or just the physician or just the nurse could make a 
significant difference, is hard. I think it's got to be much more of a collective effort on the 
part of the community and the providers to make a difference. That can only really be 
done through efforts that cross the different silos and don't focus so much on what a 
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health plan can do…. if you think about the Medicare plans, for example, so much of the 
emphasis of the stars is on adherence. How much can a health plan truly do to impact 
adherence? There's a fair amount a clinician can do. If I work hard enough I can get 
somebody to be more compliant. If I'm not really engaging them where they live, where 
they work, with their family, I'm not going to make the kind of progress you really need 
to make. 
Section 8.9 Summary of Results by Key Informant Type 
Plans and providers were generally focused on the reputational and financial impact of the stars 
program, with the vast majority expressing concerns about the fairness of the program as currently 
designed. Plans and providers were more likely to state that SES barriers could be impacted, but not 
completely offset and that the ability to offset them was resource dependent. Provider representatives 
differed from other key informant types with the vast majority stating that the concern that plans and 
providers would avoid low SES beneficiaries as a result of the stars incentives was unrealistic.  
The majority of Consumer representatives expressed support for the current program and, when 
they made recommendations for improvements to the program, those recommendations generally focused 
on assuring that the measures are meaningful to beneficiaries/patients. Consumer opinions split on the 
issue of tailoring strategies to specific populations as Consumers balanced concerns about discriminatory 
practices with statements regarding individual consumer goals and values. Both Consumer representatives 
and Regulators focused on the utility of the stars program to inform consumer choice by effectively 
distilling large volumes of complex information into an understandable format. 
The majority of Regulators supported the current stars program while recommending that changes 
be made to account for SES. The majority of Regulators recommended that stratification or risk 
adjustment in combination with stratification be used to account for SES factors. Regulators often focused 
their comments on the methodological soundness of the measurement program and on its ability to 
effectively inform consumers about the quality of care being delivered by plans and providers. Several 
Regulators discussed the need to balance fairness in measurement with the goal of improving the quality 
of care for all beneficiaries. One Regulator expressed the concern that were penalties for poor quality 
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performance to be removed, the revenue earned by low performing plans would go to plan profits rather 
than to improving the quality of care.  
Thought leaders were more varied in their views. Several Thought leaders focused on the 
availability of data in order to inform opinions regarding the impact of SES on quality measure 
performance and on the use of data by plans and providers to offset barriers created by SES factors. A 
substantial majority of Thought leaders expressed the view that it was appropriate to account for SES 
factors separately from underlying health status with the majority supporting either the use of risk 
adjustment or risk adjustment in combination with stratification. Thought leaders consistently expressed 
concern regarding plans’ and providers’ ability to control the results of some or all of the metrics included 
in the stars methodology and the effect that this lack of control has on quality measure performance.  
Section 8.10 Common Policy Suggestions 
A summary of the policy changes commonly recommended by the respondents is included in 
Table 6. Several frequently recommended changes focused on improving the accuracy of the MA stars 
program in assessing the quality of care delivered by MA plans to low SES populations. They included 
accounting for SES separately from underlying health status using one of four methodologies: risk adjust 
all the measures for SES; risk adjust individual quality measures only when there is a conceptual basis for 
the application of risk adjustment and an empiric association between SES and the variable of interest (as 
recommended by the NQF special committee); stratify performance on the stars measures to compare like 
plans; or apply both risk adjustment and stratification. Additional MA stars-focused recommendations 
included: changing the MA stars measures to focus on measures within the plan or provider’s control; 
changing the MA stars methodology to align the measures with the measures applied in other Medicare 
quality measurement systems (such as hospital compare and the hospital readmissions reduction 
program); measuring performance at the benefit plan-level rather than at the contract level; focusing more 
on quality improvement than achievement of targeted benchmarks; removing penalties for low 
performance until the issue of accounting for SES in the MA stars program is fully resolved; and selecting 
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quality measures which are meaningful to low SES populations. Measures identified as meaningful to low 
SES populations included measures of cultural competence, language access, access to care and member 
engagement.  
With respect to policy changes that key informants believed would improve the quality of care 
delivered by MA plans to low SES populations, more than a few key informants recommended: 
encouraging plans to: enhance care management strategies; leverage actionable data; provide certain 
supplemental benefits such as transportation, telehealth, and meals; develop community partnerships to 
remove social barriers; implement culturally/linguistically concordant communications strategies; 
contract with specially trained providers; and implement care management strategies that focus on patient 
activation and adherence. Others recommended that plans be required to take these same steps.  
CMS focused policy recommendations largely related to improving the quality of care delivered 
to low SES beneficiaries outside of the MA stars methodology. These recommendations included 
requiring CMS to change regulations governing nondiscrimination to allow MA plans more flexibility to 
target supplemental benefits to meet unique needs of low SES beneficiaries; varying MA payment rules to 
allow more flexibility in spending to deliver services or to utilize settings that are not covered under the 
traditional Medicare program; and increasing compensation to MA plans serving low SES beneficiaries 
so as to provide sufficient resources to offset SES barriers to high-quality care.  
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Table 6. Common policy suggestions 
Improvements to the Stars 
Program 
 Accounting for SES separately from underlying health status 
using one of four methodologies  
 Risk adjusting all the measures for SES 
 Risk adjusting individual quality measures only when there is a 
conceptual basis for the application of risk adjustment and an 
empiric association between SES and the variable of interest  
 Stratify performance on the stars measures to compare like 
plans 
 Applying both risk adjustment and stratification. 
 Changing the stars measures to focus on measures within the 
plan or provider’s control 
 Changing the stars methodology to align the measures in the 
stars program with the measures applied in other Medicare 
quality measurement systems  
 Measuring performance at the benefit plan-level rather than at 
the contract level 
 Focusing more on quality improvement than achievement of 
targeted benchmarks 
 Removing penalties for low performance until the issue of 
accounting for SES in the stars program is fully resolved 
 Selecting quality measures which are meaningful to low SES 
populations.  
 
Plan Actions Recommended to 
Improve the Quality of Care for 
Low SES-Populations in MA 
 Encouraging plans to: enhance care management strategies;  
 Leveraging actionable data;  
 Providing certain supplemental benefits such as transportation 
telehealth, and meals 
 Developing community partnerships to remove social barriers 
 Implementing culturally/linguistically concordant 
communications strategies  
 Contracting with specially trained providers  
 Implementing specialized care management strategies focused 
on patient activation and adherence 
Programmatic Changes to the 
MA Program 
 Requiring CMS to change its regulations governing 
nondiscrimination to allow plans more flexibility to target 
supplemental benefits to meet unique needs of low SES beneficiaries 
 Varying MA payment rules to allow more flexibility in spending to 
deliver services or to utilize settings that are not covered under the 
traditional Medicare program 
 Increasing compensation to plans serving low SES beneficiaries so as 
to provide sufficient resources to offset SES barriers to high-quality 
care. 
  
 98 
 
Section 8.11 Notable Items Not Mentioned by Key Informants 
 Despite the large body of literature on the issue of the influence of socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics on quality performance and the substantial activity on this issue by CMS, 
ASPE, MedPAC, Congress, NAM and NQF, nearly all of the key informants expressed support for 
quality measurement in Medicare and at least some level of support for the stars methodology.  
 In addition, while many of the key informants spoke to resource limitations, none spoke directly 
to the cuts to the MA program made in ACA and ATRA. Resource constraints were described in general 
ways but without great specificity. Some key informants discussed the continued viability of MA in 
certain geographies. However, other than CMS’s risk adjustment methodology which was frequently 
mentioned, specific aspects of the way MA rates are set and plan and provider specific financial issues 
were not addressed. Also of note, while there has been an enormous amount of advocacy with CMS and 
before Congress on the issue of the caps placed on quality incentive revenue in on some historically high 
cost counties under the ACA, this issue was similarly not raised.  
Section 8.12 Limitations 
 As with any qualitative study, these results reflect the views of the 30 individual key informants 
interviewed. While these key informants were selected to represent 5 distinct key informant types, these 
results are informative but as limited in their generalizability. Each key informant’s views likely reflect 
their personal and professional experiences and biases. Plan and Provider representatives are likely 
influenced by both the reputational and financial impact (positive or negative) that the stars methodology 
has had on them or the people they represent. Thought leaders’ comments are likely influenced by their 
research and experience and the research and experience of their peers. Regulators are likely biased by the 
performance they have observed among plans and providers and by the efforts that they have undertaken 
to balance the need for improvements to the program with available financial resources and statutory and 
regulatory authorities.   
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Finally, Consumer representatives are likely biased by their desire to have the highest quality, most robust 
MA products available to consumers perhaps without regard to the attendant costs to government or the 
operational and financial impact on plans and providers. 
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CHAPTER 9: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF PLAN BENEFIT PACKAGES 
Section 9.1 Introduction  
Phase 2 of this study examined the impact of the 2014-2015 transition out of the MA stars quality 
bonus demonstration program to the full imposition of the ACA stars payment incentives on plan product 
designs. Plans may modify their service areas and benefit packages for any number of reasons including 
market strategies and financial considerations. If, consistent with the majority of phase 1 key informants, 
MA plans believe that the SES characteristics of plan participants impact plan performance on the 
measures included in the stars quality measurement program, it is possible that the substantial increase in 
the rewards and penalties associated with the MA stars program which occurred at the end of 2014 could 
have spurred changes in MA plan benefit packages. This phase of the study tested the hypothesis that 
plans with a greater proportion of low-income beneficiaries and those offered in counties with greater 
levels of deprivation would be more likely to include supplemental and enhanced benefits identified by 
phase 1 key informants and informed by a scan of the literature as likely to offset SES-related barriers to 
high-quality care. In addition, this phase of the study tested a secondary hypothesis that as plan revenue 
decreased among plans performing below four stars due to the transition out of the Medicare stars quality 
bonus demonstration program, supplemental and enhanced benefits identified by phase 1 key informants 
and informed by a scan of the literature as designed to offset SES-related barriers to high-quality care also 
would be reduced. 
MA plans must bid to provide all Medicare part A and B services. The amount of the plans’ bid 
may not exceed the benchmark set by Medicare for the county in which the plan is offered. Supplemental 
and enhanced benefits in excess of those covered in parts A and B may be offered but if the cost of those 
supplemental benefits exceeds the benchmark, the amount by which they exceed the benchmark must be 
charged to the beneficiary as a premium up to a capped allowable maximum out-of-pocket cost (Advance 
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Notice of Methodological Changes for Calendar Year (CY) 2015 for Medicare Advantage (MA) 
Capitation Rates, Part C and Part D Payment Policies and 2015 Call Letter, 2014). Many of the phase 1 
key informants discussed the negative impact of out-of-pocket costs on low SES patients’ adherence with 
prescribed care. In addition, Atherly and colleagues (Atherly, Dowd, & Feldman, 2004) estimated the 
effect of Medicare+Choice (M+C) plan premiums, benefits and individual beneficiary characteristics on 
the probability of enrollment in a Medicare+Choice plan. They found that beneficiaries were responsive 
to plan characteristics and that premiums have a significant effect on plan selection. Similarly, Reid and 
colleagues (Reid, Deb, Howell, & Shrank, 2013) separately looked at the impact of the star ratings and 
cost to the consumer (out-of-pocket cost plus premium) on beneficiary plan selection behavior, finding 
that cost to the consumer explained nearly three times the variation in plan selection behavior than was 
caused by plan star ratings. While copayments and other out-of-pocket costs are filed for each plan 
benefit package individually by covered service, the presence or absence of a premium is a binary 
variable, for example, the plan either charges a premium or they do not. As a result, the presence or 
absence of a premium was included as a dependent variable as a proxy to test the impact of the proportion 
of low SES beneficiaries and county-level deprivation on whether a plan offering included a patient out-
of-pocket cost requirement.  
In 2014 MA plans could provide the following supplemental education/health management 
program options: health education, nutritional benefits, additional smoking and tobacco use cessation, 
membership in a health club/fitness classes, nursing hotline, enhanced disease management (EDM), 
telemonitoring, and Web/phone-based technology. Many phase 1 key informants discussed the 
importance of care and case management on offsetting SES-related barriers to high quality care. While 
care management is not offered as a supplemental or enhanced benefit, enhanced disease management 
(EDM) programs are. A large body of literature exists regarding the efficacy of disease management 
programs (Greenapple, 2011; Mattke, Seid, & Ma, 2007; Rosenzweig et al., 2010). The results of these 
studies are largely mixed (Holz-Eakin, 2004). In examining the attributes of those disease management 
programs that show evidence of efficacy, Mattke and colleagues concluded that those disease 
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management programs that were efficacious focused on the use of case and disease management for high 
risk populations (Mattke et al., 2007) and were paired with other care improvement techniques 
(Greenapple, 2011; Mattke et al., 2007).  
. . . across all conditions except asthma and COPD, there is consistent evidence that 
disease management can improve processes of care (e.g., increased A1C screening for 
persons with DM). The results of the studies suggest that improved clinical care seems to 
lead to better intermediate outcomes and improved disease control (such as lower A1C 
levels in persons with DM), which was demonstrated for CHF, CAD, DM, and 
depression. (Mattke et al., 2007) 
Based on this research, as well as the recommendations of many phase 1 key informants, phase 2 
included EDM as a dependent variable.  
A large majority of phase 1 key informants spoke to issues of food insecurity and lack of access 
to fresh, healthy foods. A few key informants also spoke to the impact of ethnic dietary patterns on certain 
quality outcomes, particularly maintenance of blood pressure in people with hypertension and 
maintenance of blood sugar in diabetics. Cho and colleagues studied the impact of meals on hospital 
readmissions. They found that of clients of a single site meal delivery program reporting data at 3 months 
after discharge, 75.3% had no additional hospitalizations and 89.9% of clients had no additional 
emergency department visits. Among those clients reporting data at six months, 80.4% of clients had no 
hospitalizations and 90.2% had no emergency visits. This is less than would be expected based on the 
demographic and health conditions of those clients (Cho, Thorud, Marishak-Simon, Frawley, & Stevens, 
2015). Muscaritoli and colleagues (2016) conducted a Cochrane systematic review of the literature and 
examined whether nutritional therapy is cost-effective among patients treated both in an inpatient and 
outpatient setting. They found that nutritional therapy was consistently found to be cost effective. Based 
on the consistent identification of food and nutrition as SES-related barriers to high quality care by Phase 
1 key informants both meals and nutritional services were included as dependent variables. 
Many phase 1 key informants discussed transportation as an SES-related barrier to accessing 
high-quality care. Syed and colleagues found that transportation barriers impacted medication refills and 
pharmacy adherence. They also found that patients with a lower SES had higher rates of transportation 
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barriers to ongoing health care access than those with a higher SES (Syed, Gerber, & Sharp, 2013). 
Several phase 1 key informants also recommended the use of telehealth as mechanism to offset SES-
related barriers to accessing high-quality care. As a result, transportation and telehealth benefits were 
included as dependent variables in phase 2. 
Section 9.2 Methods 
We conducted a retrospective database analysis of supplemental benefits offered by MA plans to 
investigate the impact of individual and community-level SES on the probability that plans offered 
specific supplemental benefits and required a premium. We analyzed data and developed models to 
predict the impact of individual and community level SES, controlling for important policy-related 
variables, on the probability that a given plan offered a given supplemental benefit and required a 
premium.  
Section 9.2.1 Data Analysis Process 
 This analysis required the integration of data from publicly available files published by the Center 
for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and posted to their Web site (Update of the HHS Poverty 
Guidelines, 2014; 2014 Low Income Subsidy Enrollment by Plan, 2014; 2014 MA Landscape Source Files, 
2014; 2014 MMP Landscape Source Files, 2014; 2014 SNP Landscape Source Files, 2014; 2015 Low 
Income Subsidy Enrollment by Plan, 2015; 2015 MA Landscape Source Files, 2015; 2015 MMP 
Landscape Source Files, 2015; 2015 SNP Landscape Source Files, 2015; Blum et al., 2014; Monthly 
Enrollment by CPSC - December 2015, 2015; Monthly Enrollment by CSPC - December 2014, 2014; 
Monthly Enrollment by Plan - December 2014, 2014; Monthly Enrollment by Plan - December 2015, 
2015; PBP Benefits 2014, 2014; PBP Benefits 2015, 2015). Organizations offering MA plans are required 
to file reports that detail the benefits and geographic locations in which plans are offered. These reports 
are compiled by CMS, and available for public use.  
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Section 9.2.2 Dependent Variables  
As discussed above, based on a scan of the literature and the feedback of the committee and the 
key informants, we selected the following dependent variables: the presence of a premium and the 
presence of the following supplemental or enhanced benefits (Medicare Managed Care Manual Chapter 
4 - Benefits and Beneficiary Protections, 2016): Transportation, Meals, Nutrition, EDM, and 
Telemonitoring. Only MA plans offering Medicare Parts A, B and D (MA-PD plans) were included in the 
analysis. 
MA plans may provide transportation as a supplemental benefit to obtain nonemergent, covered 
part A and part B services if they are used exclusively for health care needs (Medicare Managed Care 
Manual Chapter 4 - Benefits and Beneficiary Protections, 2016). MA plans can offer meals as a 
supplemental benefit only if they are provided temporarily and under the order of a physician or other 
nonphysician practitioner as a part of medical treatment of an illness. They may not be provided solely to 
address social issues. Meals may be covered as a supplemental benefit under two circumstances: 
immediately following surgery or an inpatient hospital stay; or as a part of a supervised lifestyle 
modification program for a chronic condition, including, but not limited to, cardiovascular disorders, 
COPD, or diabetes (Medicare Managed Care Manual Chapter 4 - Benefits and Beneficiary Protections, 
2016). A nutritional/dietary benefit can be provided as a supplemental benefit up to the number of visits 
or time limitations established by the MA plan if those services are provided by licensed practitioners 
operating within the scope of their license (Medicare Managed Care Manual Chapter 4 - Benefits and 
Beneficiary Protections, 2016).  
EDM may be offered as a supplemental benefit only by a non-SNP plan and must be delivered by 
clinical staff with specialized knowledge of the enrollee’s specific disease or condition. EDM must be 
targeted to groups of enrollees based on a diagnosis of, or risk for, a specific disease condition and must 
fall into one of three categories: Assignment of individuals with the targeted conditions to qualified case 
managers with specialized knowledge about the disease(s) for the delivery of case management and 
monitoring services designed to improve patient education, activation and adherence; educational 
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activities provided by certified or licensed professionals designed to help enrollees with specific diseases 
to develop knowledge and self-care skills, strategies and tactics to manage their disease; and routine 
monitoring of measures, signs and symptoms of specific diseases and conditions. (Medicare Managed 
Care Manual Chapter 4 - Benefits and Beneficiary Protections, 2016).  
Finally, MA plans are authorized to offer as a supplemental benefit in-home equipment and 
telecommunication technology to monitor enrollees with specific health conditions as long as the benefit 
does not duplicate services provided in Medicare A, B, and D. In addition, in-home equipment or 
telecommunications technology must supplement, but not replace, face-to-face physician visits. Other 
specific restrictions apply to each of these benefits (Medicare Managed Care Manual Chapter 4 - 
Benefits and Beneficiary Protections, 2016). The data sources for each variable and the links to those 
sources are included in Appendix I.  
Section 9.2.3 Independent and Control Variables 
We controlled for a series of policy-relevant independent variables: contract star score, county 
star bonus caps, weighted average plan membership, and weighted average low-income subsidy eligible 
plan membership. 
Section 9.2.4 Special Needs Plans (SNP) 
General information for SNP and MA plans are provided in separate Landscape Source Files on 
the CMS Web site. If a plan was located in an SNP file, a SNP indicator variable was set to 1 (yes). If the 
plan was located in an MA file, the SNP indicator was set to 0 (no). The SNP and MA landscape data sets 
for each year were merged with the benefits data set by contract and plan ID. To be included, the research 
required that the plan ID be present in both the benefits data set and one of the landscape source files. 
Section 9.2.5 Plan Size 
Enrollment by plan data was provided on the CMS Web site by monthly enrollment. For each 
year, all 12-month data sets were merged by contract and plan ID. Annual plan enrollment was estimated 
as the average of the 12-month enrollments. An average of monthly enrollment was used rather that 
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enrollment in any single month in order to account for enrollment spikes. Utilizing average monthly 
enrollment also allowed for the inclusion of more plan offerings in the analysis.  
These data sets also included a variable indicating whether the plan offered part D benefits. Plans 
that did not offer part D benefits were excluded. Using only those plans that included part D benefits, 
annual plan enrollment estimates were then merged into the data, the included plan sizes were then ranked 
into quintiles, and indicator variables were created. Cutoffs for plan enrollment quintiles are presented in 
Table 8.   
Section 9.2.6 Part D Low-Income Subsidy Eligible Enrollment  
Part D (MA-PD) and low-income subsidy part D (LIS MA-PD) annual enrollment by plan is 
made available on the CMS Web site. A list of the data files used and links to those data files are 
contained in Appendix I. The percentage of plan members eligible for a LIS was calculated as LIS MA-
PD enrollment divided by MA-PD enrollment, multiplied by 100. Certain data are not posted by CMS 
due to small (ten or fewer members) plan size. Therefore, missing LIS MA-PD enrollment values were set 
to zero but missing MA-PD enrollment values were as left as missing. That is, if a plan had LIS MA-PD 
enrollment of ten or fewer and MAPD enrollment of 11 or more then the LIS MA-PD percent was set to 
zero. However, if a plan did not have at least 11 people MA-PD enrolled for that year then no LIS 
percentage was estimated. 
Section 9.2.7 Star Rating 
Given the impact of MA stars performance on available plan revenue and, therefore, funds 
available to spend on supplemental benefits, the analysis controlled for star score. In addition, because the 
ACA capped the percentage stars bonus that plans operating in certain counties may earn at 0%, 3.5%, 
and 5%, the methodology further controlled for the impact of county caps. Finally, to account for 
differential plan sizes, plan membership was controlled for both annually and on a monthly basis.  
Star scores are determined at the level of the contract between the sponsoring organization and 
CMS. However, under that contract, the sponsoring organization may offer any number of individual plan 
benefit packages (PBPs). In addition, a single plan benefit package may be “segmented” (CMS, 2014b). 
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A segment is, in essence, a plan within a plan. Plan sponsors use segmentation to vary benefits, premiums 
and cost sharing within a single PBP and service area. CMS requires that those variations be uniform 
within each segment (Medicare Managed Care Manual Chapter 4 - Benefits and Beneficiary Protections, 
2016). Generally, the purpose of segmentation is to offer distinct plan features within the same contract 
and plan benefit package. This provides plan sponsors with flexibility to design unique benefit or cost 
sharing packages that may be appealing in the marketplace without having to create a completely distinct 
plan benefit package.  
The benefits data were provided by CMS at the contract, plan, and segment levels. These data 
were matched to the landscape source files at the contract, plan, segment, state, and county levels. There 
were not multiple segments of a plan within any one county, and with the exception of the constructed 
premium benefit, benefits did not vary by segment within plan. Therefore, the benefit analysis was done 
at the PBP level and the premium benefit for plans composed of segments with differing premium 
benefits were set to missing.  
Section 9.2.8 ADI and County Star Bonus Caps 
Consistent with the work of Kind and colleagues (Kind et al., 2014), we used the Area 
Deprivation Index (ADI) (Health Innovation Program, 2014) as a proxy for the socioeconomic status of 
the residents of the counties in which each plan offering was made available. While ADI is calculated at 
multiple levels, because MA plans are filed at the county level, this study used county-level ADI. ADI is 
expressed as a score. Higher ADI values represent higher levels of deprivation. (For more information 
regarding ADI, see Appendix H). ADI scores were divided by quintiles with the reference for county 
measurement set at the median and regression done relative to year zero at median ADI. The cutoff points 
for the ADI quintiles are contained in Table 7. 
The University of Wisconsin’s ADI calculations are based on 2000 census data and, as a result, 
they did not vary by year. In addition, rate caps of 0%, 3.5%, and 5% were established by CMS based on 
statutory requirements and did not vary by year. County-level variables were merged by state and county 
ID into the Landscape source files. As star rating, ADI and rate caps were weighted by county plan 
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enrollment up to the plan level, the county ADI indices, weighted by county plan enrollment, produced an 
average ADI index that could be interpreted as the average ADI index of plan enrollees. The average 
ADIs were then ranked into quintiles and indicator variables were created. The quintiles for the ADI 
averages are also shown in Table 7.. The weighted average ADI was ranked into quintiles and indicator 
variables were created with the third quintiles used as the reference group.  
Table 7. ADI by quintile  
ADI quintile N Mean SD Minimum Maximum Range 
1 643 71.230409 25.6297943 -216.702 90.135 306.837 
2 644 95.8273742 2.8757572 90.18 100.242 10.062 
3 645 103.8292884 2.0519578 100.251 107.28 7.029 
4 643 110.4528849 1.8668322 107.298 113.823 6.525 
5 644 118.625646 3.6726658 113.832 136.233 22.401 
Section 9.2.9 County Plan Enrollment Weights  
Characteristics of each plan coverage area were determined by weighting county-level attributes 
by plan enrollment. Similar to total plan enrollment, county plan enrollment was given by month and 
were averaged to produce annual estimates. County weights for each plan were constructed by dividing 
the annual county enrollment estimate by the sum of all the annual county enrollment estimates. These 
weights were used to produce weighted averages for star ratings, county bonus cap (0%, 3.5%, and 5%) 
indicators and ADI. The cutoff for ADI quintiles of individual counties as well as for the quintiles of the 
weighted averages are in Tables 7 and 8, respectively.   
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Table 8. Plan enrollment by quintile  
Rank for variable N  Mean SD Minimum Maximum Range 
1 868 177.7062212 119.4690584 11 417 406 
2 870 825.8528736 259.5676568 419 1,310 891 
3 870 2023.79 507.7035288 1,311 3,040 1,729 
4 869 4991.8 1,311.46 3,043 7,719 4,676 
5 869 21,016.38 17,416.85 7,731 165,843 158,112 
Section 9.3 Analysis  
The statistical analysis was conducted under my direction by two researchers with significant 
experience conducting econometric analysis, including multivariate statistical analysis. The senior 
researcher brought to the project substantial experience in econometric research related to health 
insurance, including MA. We developed six probability models to test the hypothesis that lower SES and 
higher ADI increases the probability that plans offer the supplemental benefits/plan features included as 
dependent variables.  
The general form for all six models was 
The Probability of a given benefit = SES in a county over time + T (2014 (base) + T 2015 
(intervention) + the interaction of SES (weighted average ADI score) and time + controls 
(contract star score, contract county % LIS). 
These models estimate each of six dependent variables’ impact on the probability the plan 
includes a given supplemental benefit or requirement of a premium. To obtain estimates for these 
impacts, we employed generalized linear models (GLMs) with a binary distribution and logit link 
function. GLM is an overall approach to regression modeling that is adaptable to many different types of 
dependent variables (e.g., continuous, binary, and categorical) simply by changing the distribution and 
link function parameters. The advantage of GLM is its flexibility to accommodate many types of 
dependent variables, its relative ease of use, its ability to accommodate hierarchical data and repeated 
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measures, and its ability to use various post-estimation procedures to contextualize the impact of the 
independent variables. 
The result of the modeling is the estimation of coefficients for each independent variable, or term 
in the model. These coefficients are expressed on the log scale, as the result of the use of the logit link 
function in GLM. These coefficients are easily converted to odds ratios (ORs), which offer a more 
approachable interpretation of the impact of a given independent variable on the probability a plan offers 
a benefit or premium. A statistically significant OR (p>0.05) greater than one is accretive to the 
probability, and less than one is referred to as protective, or decreases the probability of the inclusion of 
the dependent variable. A similar result could be obtained by using logistic regression, but the GLM 
approach allows more flexibility to accommodate the challenges presented by these data, and also offers 
more post-estimation options.  
These data pose two primary econometric challenges: first, the nesting of plans within geography 
and second, contracts, and repeated observations of plans across time and geography. To accommodate 
these issues, specifically the violation of independence assumption, generalized estimating equations 
(GEEs) were used to estimate empirical standard errors to adjust for the correlation in plan measured 
repeatedly from 2014 to 2015.  
All continuous covariates were centered and third quintiles were chosen as the reference groups 
due to their inclusion of the mean. Because the covariates were centered, the exponent of the intercept 
represents the baseline odds of a plan’s inclusion of a benefit in the reference groups and at the mean of 
all other the variables. The exponent of the coefficients for variables not involved in any interactions can 
be interpreted as ORs. Odds ratios for all pairwise combinations of categorical variable were found by 
taking the exponent of the differences of linear combinations of the regression coefficients of the 
categorical variables.  
ORs are notoriously difficult to interpret, as they are relative measures of contribution/detraction 
from probabilities, based on the underlying the probability of an event. In addition, odds ratios are relative 
measures which have been criticized for exaggerating individualized effects (Stegenga, 2015).  To 
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contextualize OR results and provide an interpretation on the probability scale, we computed a variety of 
post-estimation results to deliver estimates on the probability scale, specifically the change in the 
underlying probability associated with an independent variable. All models were fit using the “proc 
genmod” function in SAS (v.9.4) (Cary, NC). The model expresses the resultant coefficients for each of 
the regression term (independent variables) as an odds ratios, which can be difficult to interpret (Katz, 
2006). To aid in the interpretation of these results, we performed two post-estimation analyses to assess 
the policy relevance of the independent variables, calcuating risk differences (RD) for the main effect of 
SES over the two observation years, and marginal effects (ME) for the balance of the control variables. 
Both the RD and the ME are denomonated in probability terms, which allows a direct interpretation as to 
the change in the probability of a supplemental benefit or premium associated with a change in that 
specific variable, controling for all others in the model. 
For continuous and dichotomous variables, we computed Marginal Effects (ME) for each 
independent variable, representing the change in the probability of a given benefit, associated with a one-
unit change in the independent variable. For categorical variables, these odds ratios were converted to risk 
differences and risk ratios. These estimates are the contrasts between each group and the referent, on the 
probability scale (e.g., a 2% increase in the probability of a given benefit being included between a given 
quintile and the mean for a given variable). 
Section 9.4 Results 
Organized in this manner, 34,970 unique plan offerings, by county, were observed in 2014 and 
33,510 in 2015. Among them, in 2014, 8,041 SNP plan offerings were observed and in 2015, 8,766 SNP 
plan offerings were observed. These observations represent repeated observations of plans in each county 
in which they are offered. Counts of unique plans and repeated observations across geography are detailed 
in Table 9. Appendix K provides the descriptive statistics of the analytical sample by benefit and by year 
in a table.  
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Table 9. Observations by plan type and monthly average enrollment  
  2014 2015 Total Variables included 
Plan offerings, all plans 34,970 33,510 68,480 Contract plan segment 
state county 
Plan offerings, SNP only 8,041 8,766 16,807 Contract plan segment 
state county 
Monthly average enrollment 
for all plan offerings 
2,531,764 2,386,388 4,918,152 Contract plan state county 
(monthly averaged) 
We then examined the proportion of plan offerings, which included one of the dependent 
variables. The units of measurement were all MA-PD plans (all plans), SNP MA-PD plans (SNP plans), 
MA-PD plans that are not SNP plans (non-SNP plans), all MA-PD Plans weighted by county-level 
enrollment, all MA-PD plans weighted by the proportion of enrollees who are eligible for a low-income 
subsidy under Medicare part D (all plans, weighted by LIS MA-PD annual enrollment), and all MA-PD 
plans weighted by both county-level enrollment and LIS MA-PD enrollment. Those results are included 
in Tables 10 to 15.  
In summary, the proportion of plan offerings that included telemonitoring or required a premium 
remained virtually stable (a 1% or less change) from 2014 to 2015. The proportion of non-SNP plan 
offerings which included an EDM benefit was also relatively stable (1% increase) but SNP plans were 
precluded from offering the benefit in 2015, resulting in a year-over-year decrease of 8% of plan offerings 
including EDM. The proportion of plan offerings which included a transportation benefit remained stable 
among non-SNP plans (19%) but decreased among SNP plans by 3%. The proportion of plan offerings 
that included a meals benefit decreased among SNP plans but increased among non-SNP plans (3% each) 
from 2014 to 2015. The number that included a nutrition benefit dropped substantially (48% to 18% 
among SNP plans and 15% to 11% among non-SNP plans).   
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Table 10. Proportion of plan offerings including a transportation benefit  
  Transportation benefit 
  No Yes 
Unit 2014 2015 2014 2015 
SNP plans 148 (26%) 159 (29%) 414 (74%) 380 (71%) 
Non-SNP plans 1,360 (81%) 1,332(81%) 314(19%) 308 (19%) 
All plans 1,508 (67%) 1,491(68%) 728(33%) 688 (32%) 
All plans, weighted by 
number of counties 
offered 
24,827 (74%) 25,115 (74%) 8,898 (26%) 8,625 (26%) 
All plans, weighted by 
LIS MAPD annual 
enrollment 
1,635,032 (53%) 1,689,547 (51%) 1,429,990 (47%) 1,631,278 (49%) 
All plans, weighted by 
MAPD annual enrollment 
8,749,120 (72%) 9,090,117 (71%) 3,392,751 (28%) 3,768,138 (29%) 
All plans, weighted by 
LIS, further weighted 
average monthly 
enrollment 
8,824,794 (72%) 9,136,260 (71%) 3,469,366 (28%) 3,804,127 (29%) 
 
Table 11. Proportion of plan offerings requiring the payment of a premium  
 Presence or absence of a premium  
  No (a premium was not charged) Yes (a premium was charged) 
Unit 2014 2015 2014 2015 
SNP plans 532 (95%) 514 (95%) 30 (5%) 25 (5%) 
Non-SNP plans 775 (46%) 764 (47%) 893 (54%) 865 (53%) 
All plans 1,307 (59%) 1,278 (59%) 923 (41%) 890 (41%) 
All plans, weighted by 
number of counties 
offered 
15,963 (47%) 15,585 (46%) 17,655 (53%) 17,940 (54%) 
All plans, weighted by 
LIS MAPD annual 
enrollment 
2,518,628 (83%) 2,647,674 (81%) 533,100 (17%) 630,957 (19%) 
All plans, weighted by 
MAPD annual 
enrollment 
7,885,193 (65%) 7,937,171 (63%) 4,167,347 (35%) 4,690,231 (37%) 
All plans, weighted by 
LIS, further weighted 
average monthly 
enrollment 
8,029,487 (66%) 8,003,303 (63%) 4,175,053 (34%) 4,704,455 (37%) 
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Table 12. Proportion of plan offerings including a telemonitoring benefit 
  Telemonitoring benefit 
  No Yes 
Unit 2014 2015 2014 2015 
SNP plans 418 (90%) 386 (89%) 47 (10%) 47 (11%) 
Non-SNP plans 1,435 (90%) 1,399 (88%) 151 (10%) 185 (12%) 
All plans 1,853 (90%) 1,785 (88%) 198 (10%) 232 (12%) 
All plans, weighted 
by number of 
counties offered 
29,416 (95%) 28,971 (93%) 1,649 (5%) 2,297 (7%) 
All plans, weighted 
by LIS MAPD 
annual enrollment 
2,669,798 (94%) 2,855,617 (94%) 176,620 (6%) 188,364 (6%) 
All plans, weighted 
by MAPD annual 
enrollment 
10,938,924 (94%) 11,672,598 (94%) 719,610 (6%) 798,427 (6%) 
All plans, weighted 
by LIS, further 
weighted average 
monthly enrollment 
11,073,068 (94%) 11,746,111 (94%) 727,151 (6%) 802,526 (6%) 
 
Table 13. Proportion of plan offerings that include a meals benefit 
  Meal benefit 
  No Yes 
Unit 2014 2015 2014 2015 
SNP plans 378 (67%) 376 (70%) 184 (33%) 163 (30%) 
Non-SNP plans 1,392 (83%) 1,273 (78%) 282 (17%) 367 (22%) 
All plans 1,770 (79%) 1,649 (76%) 466 (21%) 530 (24%) 
All plans, weighted 
by number of 
counties offered 
27,087 (80%) 26,002 (77%) 6,638 (20%) 7,738 (23%) 
All plans, weighted 
by LIS MAPD 
annual enrollment 
2,615,209 (85%) 2,624,377 (79%) 449,813 (15%) 696,448 (21%) 
All plans, weighted 
by MAPD annual 
enrollment 
10,586,601 (87%) 10,282,972 (80%) 1,555,270 (13%) 2,575,283 (20%) 
All plans, weighted 
by LIS, further 
weighted average 
monthly enrollment 
10,705,169 (87%) 10,343,248 (80%) 1,588,991 (13%) 2,597,139 (20%) 
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Table 14. Proportion of plan offerings that include a nutritional benefit 
  Nutritional benefit 
  No Yes 
Unit 2014 2015 2014 2015 
SNP plans 244 (52%) 357 (82%) 221 (48%) 76 (18%) 
Non-SNP plans 1,353 (85%) 1,406 (89%) 233 (15%) 178 (11%) 
All plans 1,597 (78%) 1,763 (87%) 454 (22%) 254 (13%) 
All plans, weighted 
by number of 
counties offered 
27,137 (87%) 28,953 (93%) 3,928 (13%) 2,315 (7%) 
All plans, weighted 
by LIS MAPD 
annual enrollment 
2,223,514 (78%) 2,520,138 (83%) 622,904 (22%) 523,843 (17%) 
All plans, weighted 
by MAPD annual 
enrollment 
9,522,498 (82%) 10,600,412 (85%) 2,136,036 (18%) 1,870,613 (15%) 
All plans, weighted 
by LIS, further 
weighted average 
monthly enrollment 
9,615,970 (81%) 10,664,920 (85%) 2,184,249 (19%) 1,883,717 (15%) 
 
Table 15. Proportion of plan offerings including an EDM benefit 
  EDM 
  No Yes 
Unit 2014 2015 2014 2015 
SNP plans 427 (92%) 433 (100%) 38 (8%) – (–) 
Non-SNP plans 1,486 (94%) 1,479 (93%) 100 (6%) 105 (7%) 
All plans 1,913 (93%) 1,912 (95%) 138 (7%) 105 (5%) 
All plans, weighted by 
number of counties 
offered 
29,369 (95%) 30,200 (97%) 1,696 (5%) 1,068 (3%) 
All plans, weighted by 
LIS MAPD annual 
enrollment 
2,725,913 (96%) 2,960,768 (97%) 120,505 (4%) 83,213 (3%) 
All plans, weighted by 
MAPD annual 
enrollment 
10,969,232 (94%) 11,831,278 (95%) 689,302 (6%) 639,747 (5%) 
All plans, weighted by 
LIS, further weighted 
average monthly 
enrollment 
11,108,019 (94%) 11,908,946 (95%) 692,200 (6%) 639,691 (5%) 
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Section 9.4.1 Multivariate Analyses 
The purpose of the multvariate analysis and regression model was two-fold: to test the main 
hypothesis of the study and to allow for the assessment of policy relevance of the independent variables. 
Each of the five supplemental benefits and the requirement of a premium were modeled independently 
following the same general form and included the same main effect for SES and important policy-related 
control variables. The results of each of the six models are given in Appendix J. 
To ensure that the model accurately predicted the underlying data, we tested the model for 
goodness of fit. We used the Akaike information criterion (AIC) (Bozdogan, 1987) to assess model fit. 
Those results, included in Table 16, are all within the range of acceptability (Greene, 2007). 
In the context of logistic regression, goodness of fit tests are designed to determine the 
adequacy or inadequacy of the fitted logistic model in describing the relationship between 
the outcome variable and the potential risk factors. The purpose of the goodness of fit test 
is to determine whether the model fits the data, otherwise conclusions may be incorrect or 
misleading. If the model is adequate, then we may proceed. Otherwise, we need to search 
for a more suitable model, one that will be more useful in explaining the outcome 
variable. (Hallett, 1999) 
Table 16. Goodness of fit scores 
Transportation Meals Nutrition Telemonitoring EDM Premium 
3,745.71 3,861.27 2,818.75 2,264.44 1,548.25 3,651.76 
 The hypothesis test was conducted by inspecting the statistical significance (p < .05) of the main 
effect, the coefficient of the interaction term for ADI and year. The results do not support our primary 
hypothesis. Specifically, county ADI has no statistically significant effect (p > .05) on the likelihood of a 
plan offering any five of the supplemental benefits or the requirement of a premium in either 2014 or 
2015.  
However, to test our secondary hypothesis that stars related revenue impacted benefit availability, 
we compared SNP versus non SNP plans. The vast majority of SNP are designed to serve people dually 
eligible for Medicare and Medicaid (DSNPs) and, as a group, have lower stars performance (Inovalon, 
2013; Weiss & Pescatello, 2014). The results of this analysis were generally consistent with our 
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hypothesis. Specifically, we saw both a negative marginal effect of SNP designation on each benefit 
available for inclusion in 2015 and statistically significant reductions in the offering of transporation and 
supplemental nutrition benefits. EDM was eliminated entirely among SNPs as a result of a CMS policy 
change.  
Table 17. Marginal effect of SNP by year 
Parameter Transportation Meals Nutrition Telemonitoring Premium EDM 
SNP year 2015  
(2014 is referent) 
-0.0733 -0.0527 -0.1902 -0.0153 -0.0164 n/a 
Section 9.4.2 Risk Differences 
Risk differences express the absolute difference on a probability scale, that a given benefit or 
premium is offered/required, between two groups. In this study, we examined the risk difference among 
all plans of a particular benefit being included in a given plan offering in year 2014 or year 2015 and the 
risk difference of that same benefit being included in a plan offering in a county in one ADI quintile 
versus another ADI quintile. These results are included in Table 18. Statistical significance is noted by a 
series of asterisks as follows: * p=.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.001. So, for example, the top line of Table 18 
compares the risk difference between plan offerings in counties in ADI quintile 1 in 2015 as compared to 
2014, line 2 compares the risk difference in 2014 between plan offerings in ADI quintile 1 and ADI 
quintile 2.  
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Table 18. Risk differences by ADI quintile and year 
Test-
weighted 
average 
ADI 
quintile 
Referent-
weighted 
average 
ADI 
quintile 
Test 
year 
Referent 
year 
Trans-
portation 
Premium 
Tele-
monitoring 
Meals Nutrition EDM 
1 1 2015 2014 -0.037 -0.035 0.006 0.089*** 
-
0.083*** 
-0.066** 
1 2 2014 2014 -0.018 0.058 0.021 
-
0.118*** 
-0.096* 0.054* 
1 2 2015 2015 -0.027 0.053 -0.029 -0.023 -0.036 0.016 
1 3 2014 2014 -0.023 0.071* -0.017 
-
0.177*** 
-0.118** 0.012 
1 3 2015 2015 -0.014 0.052 -0.002 
-
0.124*** 
-0.016 0 
1 4 2014 2014 0.026 0.056 0.025 
-
0.162*** 
-0.073 0.056* 
1 4 2015 2015 0.03 0.074** 0.028 
-
0.138*** 
0.053* 0.018 
1 5 2014 2014 -0.056 0.057 0.068** 
-
0.196*** 
-0.132** 0.087*** 
1 5 2015 2015 -0.066 0.027 0.057* 
-
0.147*** 
0.042 0.042*** 
2 2 2015 2014 -0.028 -0.029 0.056** -0.006 
-
0.143*** 
-0.028 
2 3 2014 2014 -0.005 0.013 -0.038 -0.059 -0.023 -0.041 
2 3 2015 2015 0.013 -0.001 0.027 -0.102** 0.019 -0.016 
2 4 2014 2014 0.043 -0.002 0.004 -0.044 0.023 0.002 
2 4 2015 2015 0.057 0.021 0.056* -0.115** 0.089*** 0.002 
2 5 2014 2014 -0.038 -0.002 0.047* -0.079* -0.037 0.033* 
2 5 2015 2015 -0.039 -0.026 0.086** 
-
0.124*** 
0.078** 0.026** 
3 3 2015 2014 -0.046 -0.015 -0.009 0.037 
-
0.185*** 
-
0.053*** 
4 3 2014 2014 -0.049 0.015 -0.042 -0.015 -0.045 -0.043 
4 3 2015 2015 -0.044 -0.022 -0.029 0.013 -0.07** -0.019 
4 4 2015 2014 -0.042 -0.052 0.004 0.065* -0.21*** -0.029* 
4 5 2014 2014 -0.082 0.001 0.043* -0.034 -0.059 0.031 
4 5 2015 2015 -0.096* -0.047 0.029 -0.009 -0.011 0.024* 
5 3 2014 2014 0.033 0.015 -0.085*** 0.019 0.014 
-
0.074*** 
5 3 2015 2015 0.051 0.025 -0.059* 0.022 -0.058* 
-
0.042*** 
5 5 2015 2014 -0.028 -0.005 0.017 0.039 
-
0.258*** 
-0.021** 
Highlighting represents statistically significant results. 
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Section 9.4.3 Risk Differences of Benefit Inclusion Among All MA-PD Plans 
Appendix J displays data tables describing the risk differences by studied benefit and the presence 
or absence of a premium requirement. The extent of the risk differences varied substantially by benefit. 
For transporation, none of the comparisons was statistically significant at the p>.05 level. For 
telemonitoring and the presence of a premium, a small number of the comparisons were statistically 
significant. For meals, nutrition and EDM many of the comparisons were statistically significant. 
However, because EDM was no longer offered by SNP plans in 2015, the statistically significant risk 
differences between years likely reflect this policy change rather than a change in plan practices. 
Looking at the premium payment requirement, the only statistically significant comparison was 
the risk difference between plan offerings in ADI quintile 1 and ADI quintile 4 counties in 2015. The risk 
difference between those two quintiles of a premium being required is 7.4% meaning that with a base 
probability of 41%, plan offerings in quintile 1 were 18% more likely than those in quintile 4 to require 
the payment of a premium in 2015. Interestingly, the risk difference of a premium requirement in 2015 
between ADI quintiles 1 and 5 (the highest and lowest ADI counties) was only 2.7%, while the other 
three ADI quintile comparisons were in the mid-5% (ranging from 5.2%-5.8%) and none was statistically 
significant, calling into question any conclusions that might be drawn from the one statistically signficant 
result. 
For telemonitoring statistically significant risk differences were found between ADI quintiles 1 
and 5 in 2014, but not in 2015, between ADI quintiles 2 and 5 in 2015 and ADI quintiles 5 and 3 in 2014. 
In addition between 2014 and 2015, there was a statistically signficant risk difference in ADI quintile 2. 
Specifically, in 2014, there was a 6.8% risk difference between quintiles 1 and 5. As a result, because the 
base probability of the benefit being offered in all counties was 10%, plan offerings in ADI quintile 1 
counties in 2014 were 68% more likely to include a telemonitoring benefit than in ADI quintile 5 
counties. Interestingly, while a risk difference remained in 2015 (5.7%), it was no longer statistically 
significant.   
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The presence or absence of a meals benefit appears to tell a different story. Looking at the plan 
offerings over time, in 2015 in ADI quintile 1 (the least deprived) counties, the probability that a plan 
offering included a meals benefit was nearly 9% higher than it was in 2014. This is the only ADI quintile 
in which the year over year results were statistically significant. However, looking at the benefits within 
years and between ADI quintiles, several differences were statistically significant. In 2014, a plan 
offering in a quintile 1 ADI county was nearly 12% less likely to offer a meal benefit than a plan offering 
in a quintile 2 ADI county, nearly 18% less likely to offer a meal benefit than a plan offering in quintile 3 
ADI county, nearly 16% less likely to offer a meals benefit than a plan offering in a quintile 4 ADI county 
and nearly 20% less likely to offer a meals benefit than a plan offering in a quintile 5 county. In 2015, 
while there was no statically significant risk difference between ADI quintile 1 and 2, a plan offering in a 
quintile 1 ADI county was more than 12% less likely to offer a meal benefit than a plan offering in a 
quintile 3 ADI county, nearly 14% less likely than a plan offering in a quintile 4 ADI county and nearly 
15% less likely than a plan offering in a quintile 5 ADI county to offer a meals benefit.  
 The risk differences among plan offerings including a nutrition benefit also varied significantly in 
many of the comparisons we ran. Examining year over year differences, each ADI quintile plan offerings 
were significantly less likely to include a nutrition benefit in 2015 than in 2014 (e.g., 8.3% less likely in 
quintile 1, 14.3% less likely in quintile 2, 18.5% less likely in quintile 3, and 21% less likely in quintile 4 
and 25.8% less likely in quintile 5). Within the years, in 2014 plan offerings were 11.8% less likely to 
offer a nutrition benefit in quintile 1 than quintile 3 and 13.2% less likely to offer a nutrition benefit in 
quintile 1 than in quintile 5. Meaning, that in 2014, plans in the least deprived communities were more 
likely to offer a nutrition benefit than those in the most deprived communities. In 2015, in contrast, plans 
in quartile 2 were 8.9% more likely to offer a nutrition benefit than in quartile 4, 7.8% more likely to offer 
a nutrition benefit in quartile 2 than in quartile 5 and 7% less likely to offer a nutrition benefit in quartile 
4 than in quartile 3.  
 Looking only at the risk differences within years for EDM as a result of the policy change noted 
above, lower ADI (less deprived) counties were more likely to have plan offerings which included the 
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EDM offering than higher ADI counties in both years. In 2014, plan offerings in counties in ADI quintile 
1 were 8.7% more likely and plan offerings in counties in ADI quintile 3 were 7.4% more likely to 
include EDM than plan offerings in counties in ADI quintile 5. In 2015 plan offerings in counties in ADI 
quintile 1 were 4.2%, plan offerings in counties in ADI quintile 2 were 2.6% and plan offerings in ADI 
quintile 3 were 4.2% more likely than plan offerings in ADI quintile 5 to offer EDM. The lower 
differences between the two years are likely related to the fact that SNP plans no longer included EDM.  
Section 9.4.4 Risk Differences of Benefit Inclusion between SNP versus Non-SNP Plans 
Risk differences by benefit and premium requirement were also compared between SNP and non-
SNP MA plans over the two analysis years (2014 and 2015). The analysis could not be conducted for 
EDM because, beginning in 2015, EDM was no longer available to be offered in SNP plans.  
In examining the risk differences in the availability of transportation benefits between SNP and 
non-SNP plans, 3 of the 4 comparisons (all but the year over year comparison of non-SNP plans) were 
statistically significant. SNP plans were 54% more likely in 2014 and 45% more likely in 2015 than non-
SNP plans to offer a transportation benefit. However, even SNP plans were 8% less likely in 2015 to offer 
a transportation benefit than they were in 2014.  
In examining the availability of meals benefits, again, 3 of the 4 comparisons were statistically 
significant (all but the year over year comparisons among SNP plans). In 2014 the risk difference of a 
plan offering including a meal benefit was 17% greater in a SNP plan than in a non-SNP plan. That 
difference declined to 13% but remained statistically significant in 2015. However, even non-SNP plans 
were more likely to include a meals benefit in 2015 than in 2014. Specifically, non-SNP plans were 6.5% 
more likely in 2015 than in 2014 to include a meals benefit.  
Both SNP and non-SNP plans were less likely in 2015 to offer a nutrition benefit in 2015 than 
they were in 2014 (SNPs were 40.5% less likely and non-SNPs were 3.1% less likely). However, even 
with this substantial reduction in the likelihood of inclusion, SNP plans were 44.7% more likely to offer a 
nutrition benefit than non-SNP plans in 2014 and 7.4% more likely than non-SNP plans to offer the 
benefit in 2015.  
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The availability of telemonitoring differed much less significantly between SNP and non-SNP 
plans. The difference was statistically significant in 2014 (6.9%), but not in 2015, and non-SNP plans 
were 1.8% more likely to include telemonitoring in 2015 than in 2014. However, given the small size of 
the risk difference and the large size of the data set, while statistically significant, this year-over-year 
difference is not likely meaningful from a policy perspective.  
Not surprisingly, because the majority of SNP plans are DSNP plans and pursuant to Section 
1852(a)(7) of the Act and 43 CFR Section 422.504(g)(1) DSNPs are restricted from charging a premium 
SNP plans were significantly less likely to charge a premium than non-SNP plans in both years (29.4% in 
2014 and 28.2% in 2015). Of note, however, the risk difference of a plan offering including a premium 
between 2014 and 2015 was not significant either among SNP plans or non-SNP plans meaning that 
despite the fact that many plans that lost quality bonus eligibility 2015, plan offerings were not 
significantly more or less likely to charge a premium.  
Section 9.4.5 Marginal Effects 
The marginal effect of a dependent variable measures how the predicted probability (e.g., 
probability that a plan offers a transportation benefit) changes for each one-unit change in the underlying 
independent variable. For binary independent variables, the one-unit change is the contrast between the 
referent and alternate category. For example, in the case of the SNP indicator variable, the contrast 
between SNP plan and non-SNP plans. For categorical variables, such as quintiles of ADI and plan 
enrollment, the marginal effect describes the difference in the predicted probabilities associated with a 
one quintile change from the referent quintile, in this case quintile 3. The median quintile was chosen as 
the referent category because it contains the mean, essentially the proportion for a given binary 
independent variable. Table 17 provides estimates of the marginal effects of each independent variable on 
each dependent variable. Each row shows the change in the probability of having the given benefit or 
premium associated with a one-unit increase in the independent variable.  
The effect of ADI is less significant although the marginal effect of residence in the most 
deprived counties (ADI quintile 5) is positive for transportation, meals and nutrition. The marginal effect 
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on the presence of a premium by increasing county-level ADI is negligible. The marginal effect of the 
addition of 1% of LIS eligible membership is also negligible. While negligible, marginal effect of the 
addition of 1% of LIS eligible membership is positive for transportation and meals but negative for 
nutrition, telemonitoring, EDM, and presence of a premium.  
More substantial but directionally similar results were seen for the marginal effect of SNP 
designation. In 2014, the SNP designation more than doubled the probability of a plan offering including 
transportation and nutrition, and reduced the likelihood of a premium being applied by nearly 79%. For 
example, when looking at the probability of having transportation benefit in any plan benefit package, the 
baseline probability of the benefit being included is approximately 20%, while the marginal effect of 
being a SNP plan is approximately 39% (raising the probability of having a transportation benefit in a 
SNP plan to 59%). Similarly, the baseline probability of a plan offering a meals benefit was nearly 22%, 
but the marginal effect of the SNP designation (nearly 16%) raised the probability that a SNP plan 
offering in 2014 offered a meals benefit from 22% to 38%. In 2015, the marginal effect of the SNP 
designation declined for every benefit, except transportation. So, for example, the probability of a SNP 
plan offering including meals in 2015 dropped from 38% to 33%.  
As discussed, the marginal effect of SNP designation is not relevant for EDM because SNP plans 
were precluded from offering EDM in 2015. It is also likely not relevant a premium requirement is a 
questionable metric because, pursuant to Section 1852(a)(7) of the Act and 43 CFR Section 
422.504(g)(1), DSNPs cannot impose cost sharing requirements on specified dual eligible individuals 
(FBDEs, QMBs or any other population designated by the State) that would exceed the amounts 
permitted under the State Medicaid plan if the individual were not enrolled in the DSNP. As a result, SNP 
plans requiring the payment of a premium are likely limited to Institutional Special Needs Plan (ISNP) or 
Chronic Special Needs Plan (CSNP) plans, which, in 2015, represented only 14% of SNP plans.  
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Table 19. Estimates of marginal effects 
Parameter Transpor-
tation 
Meals Nutrition Telemon-
itoring 
Premiu
m 
EDM 
Baseline probability  0.2012 0.2171 0.1475 0.1357 0.3796 0.1019 
Marginal effect of plan being a 
SNP 
0.3923 0.1575 0.2734 0.0672 -0.2993 0.0502 
Marginal effect of plan presence 
in weighted average ADI 
quintile 1  
-0.0147 -
0.1881 
-0.072 -0.0131 0.0697 0.007 
Marginal effect of plan presence 
in weighted average ADI 
quintile 2 
-0.0034 -
0.0505 
-0.0125 -0.0321 0.0142 -0.03 
Marginal effect of plan presence 
in weighted average ADI 
quintile 4 
-0.0315 -0.012 -0.0253 -0.0365 0.0165 -0.0318 
Marginal effect of plan presence 
in weighted average ADI 
quintile 5 
0.021 0.0152 0.0074 -0.0922 0.0158 -0.0717 
Marginal effect of percent LIS 
eligible membership 
0.0003 0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0015 -0.0079 -0.0011 
Year 2015 (2014 is referent) 0.0077 0.0542 -0.03 0.0008 -0.0114 -0.0482 
Marginal effect of county-
weighted average star score 
0.034 0.1124 0.1436 -0.0094 0.0507 0.0069 
Marginal effect of stars 
incentive payments capped at 
0%  
-0.0025 0.0005 -0.0022 -0.0005 0.0041 0.0001 
Marginal effect of stars 
incentive payments capped at 
3.5%  
-0.001 0.0008 0.0029 -0.0012 0.001 0.0002 
Marginal effect of stars 
incentive payments capped at 
the full 5%  
-0.0004 -0.001 -0.0021 0.0006 0.0009 -0.0001 
Marginal effect of plan offering 
in quintile 1 of total plan size 
0.0079 0.0345 0.0024 -0.058 -0.0228 -0.0589 
Marginal effect of plan offering 
in quintile 2 of total plan size 
0.0133 0.03 0.018 0.0037 0.0216 -0.0281 
Marginal effect of plan offering 
in quintile 4 of total plan size 
-0.048 -
0.0179 
-0.0458 -0.0398 -0.0084 -0.0232 
Marginal effect of plan offering 
in quintile 5 of total plan size 
0.0138 -
0.0851 
-0.0179 -0.0787 -0.1223 -0.0194 
SNP Year 2015 (2014 is 
referent) 
-0.0733 -
0.0527 
-0.1902 -0.0153 -0.0164 . 
Marginal effect of percent LIS 
eligible membership 2015 (2014 
is referent) 
0.0006 -
0.0004 
0.0002 0 -0.0017 
 
-0.0022 
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Section 9.5 Discussion 
Section 9.5.1 Risk Differences Related to Community-Level Deprivation  
In studying risk differences between ADI quintiles in 2014 and 2015 and within ADI quintiles 
between years, overall, there were virtually no statistically significant risk differences in inclusion of 
transportation benefits or the requirement that beneficiaries pay a premium to participate in the plan. 
These comparisons yielded inconsistent risk differences for the inclusion of a telemonitoring benefit. 
Additionally, while county-level ADI yielded statistically significant risk differences for nutrition, EDM 
and meals benefits, only meals benefits followed our original assumption that they were more likely to be 
offered in high deprivation counties than in low deprivation counties. In fact, plan offerings including a 
nutrition and EDM benefits performed in the opposite manner, with plan offerings in the counties with the 
lowest levels of deprivation more likely to offer nutrition and EDM benefits than plan offerings in 
counties with the highest level of deprivation. Finally, risk differences tended to narrow between 2014 
and 2015 in all ADI quintiles for all benefits, except telemonitoring and meals.  
There are a wide array of possible reasons for these results. The year-over-year narrowing of risk 
differences for all benefits, except telemonitoring and meals, could reflect resource constraints on plans 
that occurred as the full effect of the ACA-related cuts to MA payments and the end of the quality bonus 
demonstration went into effect. However, it is also possible that because we examined a limited subset of 
benefits, that resources that had been devoted to the studied benefits were re-allocated to other benefits 
that either were viewed by plans as more attractive to potential beneficiaries or more likely to achieve 
other benefits. Examples of alternative investments might include lowering beneficiary out-of-pocket 
costs, improvements in care management techniques, acquisition or development of predictive analytic 
capabilities to identify high-need beneficiaries and payments to recruit, retain or incentivize high 
performing providers to participate in MA plan networks.  
The lack of statistically significant risk differences for premiums and transportation could reflect 
stability in the marketplace or could reflect uniformity of plan design regardless of county level of 
deprivation. That telemonitoring and nutrition benefit inclusion did not align with our original 
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assumptions could reflect an effort by plans to increase enrollment in more affluent communities; 
differential consumer behavior by level of deprivation (consumers in more deprived neighborhoods 
placing a higher value on other benefits including meals); or a difference in available plan revenue in low 
versus high deprivation counties.  
With respect to EDM, the year-over-year reduction in the inclusion of the EDM benefit was likely 
the result of limitations placed on the inclusion of EDM by SNP plans. Because 85% of SNP plans are 
dual eligible (DSNP) plans it is likely that the differences reflected by ADI quintile reflect differences in 
the number of dual eligible beneficiaries in the less deprived counties.  
Section 9.5.2 Marginal Effects of Other Policy-Relevant Independent and Control Variables 
All dually eligible beneficiaries are eligible for a LIS. As a result, the percentage of LIS eligible 
members in a plan represents both dual eligibles and low SES Medicare beneficiaries who are not eligible 
for Medicaid. The marginal effect of the addition of 1% of LIS eligible membership was positive for 
transportation and meals but negative for nutrition, telemonitoring, EDM, and presence of a premium. 
The negative marginal effect of the addition of 1% of LIS eligible membership for EDM is likely caused 
by the fact that, after 2015, EDM was not available to be offered in SNP plans. The negative marginal 
effect of the addition of 1% of LIS-eligible membership on a premium payment requirement is likely due 
to a combination of factors. First, DSNP plans face restrictions on their ability to impose premiums. 
Second, DSNPs are by far the dominant type of special needs plans. Finally, a relatively low proportion 
of LIS-eligible beneficiaries participate in plans that require the payment of a premium. While 41% of all 
plans in both years charged a premium, weighted by LIS eligible annual enrollment, only 17% of plans in 
2014 and 19% of plans in 2015 charged a premium. This makes good sense as people who are LIS 
eligible have little income to invest in an MA plan. 
It is interesting to note that the marginal effect of a county being subject to a stars revenue cap is 
nominal for all dependent variables and is consistently nominal whether the county is capped at 0%, 3.5% 
or the full 5% possible star-related incremental revenue. From a policy standpoint, the nominal effect of 
these caps raises questions regarding how meaningful the stars bonus revenue is in terms of the benefits 
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plan sponsors offer to consumers or whether stars bonus revenue is used for purposes other than benefits, 
such as quality improvement, care management, marketing or plan profits. The durability of these 
findings on additional supplemental benefits and out-of-pocket costs warrants further research.  
Section 9.5.3 Overall Impact of SNP Designation 
Because the results were either inconsistent or contrary to our original hypothesis for all benefits 
other than meals, we ran a post-hoc analysis of the impact of SNP designation. What we found, in short, 
is that SNP matters. In 2015, 210 of the 243 SNP plans offered nationwide (86%) were DSNPs 
("Medicare Advantage: Special Needs Plans (SNPs), by SNP Type," 2015). As discussed, DSNPs are 
available only to individuals who are both Medicare and Medicaid eligible. To be Medicaid eligible, a 
beneficiary must be low SES. As a result, differences between SNP and non-SNP plans reflect differences 
between plans designed for low-income beneficiaries and those designed either for higher income groups 
or without respect to the income of the enrollee population. These results make clear the importance of 
the SNP designation on the availability of plan offerings which include benefits identified by key 
informants in phase 1 as likely to break down SES-related barriers to high-quality performance. 
Removing EDM from this analysis because of the policy change which prohibited plans from offering 
EDM beginning in 2015, risk differences between SNP and non-SNP plans were significant for all 
dependent variables, except telemonitoring in 2015. The marginal effect of SNP designation was 
substantial for all of the benefits in both years, although it reduced for all benefits other than 
transportation in 2015. The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 ("Medicare Access 
and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015," 2015) (MACRA) migrated the traditional Medicare program to a 
value based payment methodology for physicians and extended the SNP program through December 31, 
2018 (Special Needs Plans, 2016). As Congress begins considering the further extension or permanent 
reauthorization of the SNP program, further research into the role that SNPs play in offering benefits 
identified by key informants as associated with reducing SES-related factors to high-quality care should 
be considered.  
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Section 9.6 Summary 
This study aimed to analyze what impact, if any, the post-ACA MA stars methodology had on the 
products and services offered by Medicare Advantage plans serving socially and economically vulnerable 
Medicare beneficiaries. In seeking to answer that question we examined the presence or absence of a 
series of supplemental and enhanced benefits in MA-PD plan offerings during 2014 and 2015, which 
represent, respectively, the last year of the quality bonus demonstration program and the first year that the 
stars bonus methodology was fully in effect. We tested the hypothesis that the larger the proportion of 
low-income beneficiaries who participated in an MA plan offering and the greater the level of deprivation 
of the county in which the plan was offered would have a positive effect on the probability that a plan 
offering included certain supplemental benefits designed to offset SES-related barriers to high-quality 
care identified by phase 1 key informants and a negative effect on the probability that a plan offering 
included a premium payment requirement.  
The analysis examined the proportion of plans offerings that included transportation, meals, 
nutrition, EDM, telemonitoring, and a premium payment requirement as well as the risk differences and 
marginal effects of the proportion of low-income members participating in the plan and the relative 
deprivation in the county in which the plan was offered on the presence of these benefits. We controlled 
for a series of policy-relevant independent variables: contract star score, county star bonus caps, weighted 
average plan membership, and weighted average low-income subsidy eligible plan membership. 
Our results found that among all MA plans, county-level deprivation (ADI) was significant both 
within and between years for the inclusion of a meals benefit. Risk differences were significant for the 
inclusion of a nutrition benefit between years but were not consistently significant between county ADI 
quintiles. Examining the EDM benefit, we found statistically significant differences by year in low, 
medium, and high ADI quintiles (quintiles 1, 3, and 5), but not in the intervening quintiles (2 and 4). Risk 
differences for the inclusion of an EDM benefit were consistently statistically significant in comparisons 
of high versus low ADI quintiles (quintiles 1, 2, and 3 when compared individually to quintile 5) in both 
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years. We found the marginal effect of the addition of 1% of low-income subsidy (LIS) eligible 
membership to be positive for transportation and meals but negative for all other dependent variables.  
We then conducted a post-hoc analysis to determine the impact, if any, of plan SNP designation 
on the presence or absence of the dependent variables. In examining the risk differences between SNP 
and non-SNP plans we found consistent, substantial and statistically significant differences for 
transportation, meals and nutrition. These differences appear to indicate that SNP plans, the vast majority 
of which are designed to serve individuals who are dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, are 
including supplemental benefits aligned with breaking down SES-related barriers to quality care 
identified by key informants in phase 1. However, while SNP plans were significantly more likely to 
include transportation and nutrition than non-SNP plans in both years studied, the risk differences of 
inclusion of those benefits for SNP plans declined significantly over time. Specifically, SNP plans were 
8% less likely to offer a transportation benefit and 40.5% less likely to offer a nutrition benefit in 2015 
than they were in 2014. 
It is difficult to draw hard conclusions from these findings. While it is clear that SNP matters in 
terms of the inclusion of the studied benefits and that the differential continued but narrowed in 2015, it is 
unclear if the declines in the proportion of SNP plans offering all of the studied benefits other than 
telemonitoring (premium inclusion was stable) were the result of some SNP plans questioning the value 
of the benefits or the attractiveness of the benefits for marketing purposes or whether the reductions were 
merely the result of a reduction in available revenue.  
The findings that the marginal effects of county-level ADI, stars bonus caps, and LIS eligible 
enrollment were nominal are surprising and warrant further research. In addition, the fact that the 
inclusion of a meals benefit in plan offerings is the only dependent variable that produced results 
consistent with our hypothesis raises a number of questions about the relationship between county-level 
ADI and plan benefit design. It is possible that the factors plan sponsors consider in developing plan 
benefit packages are less related to member-level deprivation than other plan features such as care 
management model, engagement of community based organizations, network design and provider-plan 
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collaboration and engagement. It is also possible that plans are not designing products at a county level of 
refinement. Given the limited number of dependent variables and the short time period of the study (2014 
and 2015), further research examining the inclusion or exclusion of these benefits over future years, the 
inclusion of other beneficiary cost-sharing requirements (co-payments, deductibles) and the inclusion of 
other benefits that align with SES-related barriers identified by phase 1 key informants might shed further 
light on these issues.  
Section 9.7 Limitations 
 This study has several limitations. First, all of the data used in the study was obtained from the 
CMS Web site. The data made publicly available is limited, requiring a series of assumptions to be made 
in designing the model. Those assumptions are laid out in the methods section. Specifically, because only 
low-income subsidy eligibility was available in these files, it was used as a proxy for the socioeconomic 
status of plan participants. Neither the number nor the percentage of plan members who are dually 
eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, a common proxy measure for SES are made publicly available and, 
as has been noted elsewhere, little data are available regarding the individual SES attributes of Medicare 
beneficiaries (Accounting for Socioeconomic Status in Medicare Payment Program, 2015).  
Second, this study only looked at the years 2014 and 2015. While these years represent the 
transition into the full effect of the post-ACA stars methodology, they reflect a narrow window of time 
calling into question whether they are representative of later years. In addition, because they examine past 
plan practices they cannot be viewed as prognostic. Repeating the analysis to include additional years of 
data could assist in analyzing the policy implications of these findings.  
Third, while more refined than other possible proxy measures of community SES, including the 
individual data elements included in the calculation of ADI, the use of ADI as proxy measure for 
community-level SES is not as exact. In addition, because the ADI is based on 2000 census data, it may 
not reflect current levels of deprivation. Finally, while ADI is published at more granular levels (nine-
digit ZIP codes, ZIP code tabulation area, and U.S. Census block group code), because plan filings occur 
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at the county level, in order to align the ADI and the plan offerings, county-level ADI was used in this 
study.  
Finally, this study only examined a small subset of the supplemental and enhanced benefits that a 
plan may offer. In addition, the use of the publicly available plan benefit package filings limited our 
ability to examine attributes other than benefits such as care management models, network designs and 
community partnerships that might, based on the phase 1 key informant feedback, impact the quality of 
care delivered to low SES MA participants.  
The limitations of plan benefit package filings also led to the decision to include the presence or 
absence of a premium rather than other out-of- pocket expenditure requirements such as copayments and 
deductibles as a dependent variable. The presence or absence of a premium was available as a 
dichotomous variable, while other out-of-pocket costs (deductibles and co-payments) appear in the plan 
benefit package filings individually by benefit and in some cases vary within benefit. For example, many 
plans vary consumer out-of-pocket costs related to hospitalization based on the length of the 
hospitalization. The number of out-of-pocket cost variations made the use of those data beyond the scope 
of this analysis. However, premiums and cost sharing impact low-income beneficiaries in different ways 
with premiums generally a forming a barrier to coverage and cost sharing creating a barrier to access 
(Hudman & O’Malley, 2003). Whether the results found here would differ if the analysis were conducted 
using cost sharing rather than premiums as a dependent variable may be an important area for future 
research.  
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CHAPTER 10: ANALYSIS OF POLICY PROPOSALS IN PHASE 3 
Section 10.1 Methods 
In phase 3 of the study, a subset of phase 1 key informants, 1 representing each key informant 
type, was asked to complete a survey evaluating eleven of the most frequently occurring 
recommendations made by the 30 key informants participating in phase 1. Representative key informants 
were selected based on the completeness of their understanding of the details of stars methodology as 
displayed during their phase 1 interview as well as their availability to participate. While this small 
number of key informants does not represent the views of all of the individuals included in phase 1, these 
five individuals provided a range of opinions about which of the strategies recommended in phase 1 
would be most useful in achieving the goal of improving the quality of health care delivered to low SES 
MA beneficiaries. The evaluation tool, a copy of which is included as included as Appendix L, was 
provided to each key informant via survey monkey prior and followed by an interview. Each follow-up 
interview was conducted by phone.  
The phase 3 key informants were asked to provide feedback on 11 policy proposals which were 
divided into 3 groups: changes that CMS could make to the stars methodology; incentives that CMS 
could make available to plans to improve the quality of care those plans provide to low SES beneficiaries; 
and changes that CMS could make to the MA program and payment regulations. The proposals they 
evaluated regarding changes to the stars methodology were: 
1. Stratify the results of plan performance on quality measures to reflect social and demographic 
characteristics of plan membership. 
2. Risk adjust SES-sensitive measures for SES in addition to risk adjusting for underlying health 
status. 
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3. Refine the MA stars measure set to focus on measures that are more important to low SES 
populations. 
4. Refine the MA stars measure set to focus on measures that are within the control of the 
provider or plan. 
5. Measure quality at the plan benefit package level rather than at the level of the contract 
between CMS and the plan. 
6. Refine the MA stars methodology to focus more on improvement than achievement. 
The proposals they were asked to evaluate regarding incentives that CMS could make available to MA 
plans were: 
1. Provide financial or other incentives to encourage plans to refine and enhance care 
coordination and care management techniques. 
2. Provide financial or other incentives to encourage plans to improve access to care for low 
SES populations. 
3. Provide financial or other incentives to encourage plans to improve access to social supports. 
4. Provide financial or other incentives to encourage plans to partner with community 
organizations.  
Finally, each key informant was asked to provide feedback on a proposal to change the current 
uniformity of benefit rules applicable to MA plans in order to allow more flexibility for plans to tailor 
benefit packages including supplemental benefits to the needs of low SES beneficiaries. 
The criteria against which the key informants were asked to evaluate these proposals were: 
1. The extent to which the proposal will maintain/increase plan offerings tailored to low SES 
communities. 
2. The extent to which the proposal will improve the quality of health care in disadvantaged 
communities. 
3. The extent to which the proposal will improve the accuracy of the MA stars methodology. 
4. The extent to which the change in policy represents an improvement over the status quo. 
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The evaluation scale ranged from 5, which represents a strongly positive change to 1, which 
represents a strongly negative change. O represented “I don’t know.” After completing the survey, an 
interview was conducted with each key informant regarding the reasoning for the scores they assigned. 
Section 10.2 Data Analysis Strategy 
The surveys were collected electronically and evaluated both individually and as a group. Four of 
the five phase 3 interviews were recorded using the Tape-A-Call app for IPhone and transcribed by a 
professional transcriptionist via the Rev app for IPhone. The fifth interview was not recorded. Instead, 
notes of the discussion were taken during the interview. All documentation, including each transcript, was 
uploaded to a password protected Google drive. Transcripts were catalogued in the Google drive by 
participant type. I coded each transcript using Atlas.ti. Emergent codes were identified and clustered into 
categories. Because the phase 3 interviews were used merely to validate written survey results, a second 
coder was not used in the analysis of the phase 3 results. 
Section 10.3 Proposed Changes to the Stars Measure Set 
Section 10.3.1 Stratification and Risk Adjustment 
In phase 1, nearly all of the key informants agreed that it was appropriate for CMS to measure 
quality in MA, and most expressed support for the MA stars methodology, but with some caveats. 
General support for the stars program accompanied a disagreement among key informants about whether 
the stars program actually improves the quality of care across all SES strata. In addition, nearly all of the 
phase 1 key informants thought that accounting for SES separately from underlying health status was 
appropriate. 
A majority of phase 1 key informants recommended risk adjusting appropriate individual 
measures of quality, stratifying measurement of MA plan performance based on the attributes of plan 
membership, or a combination of the two. Phase 3 key informants were asked to evaluate separately the 
impact of risk adjusting SES-sensitive measures for SES characteristics and the impact of stratifying plan 
performance by social and demographic characteristics of plan participants. Opinions were split among 
  
135 
the four phase 3 key informants who responded to the question of the impact of stratification on 
maintaining or increasing plan offerings tailored to low SES communities: two key informants felt that 
stratification would be a strongly positive change and two felt that stratification would have no impact. 
The fifth key informant, the Consumer representative, scored stratification as zero, or “I don’t know.” 
Asked why, the Consumer representative explained it this way: “Looking at stratify, yeah, so on the 
measure I just don’t know. I'm not sure if that would encourage [plans] to come into the market and serve 
this population or discourage them for fear of what their results might look like when stratifying that 
way.” 
All of the key informants evaluated stratification as somewhat or strongly positive on the 
metrics of improving the quality of health care to disadvantaged communities and improvement 
over the status quo. Nearly all of the key informants said the proposal would result in a somewhat 
positive change on these two metrics.  
Key informants were divided in their responses to the proposal to risk adjust SES-sensitive 
measures. When evaluating whether risk adjusting SES-sensitive measures would maintain or increase 
plan offerings tailored to low SES communities, the respondents representing the Thought leader and 
Provider groups both believed that risk adjustment would result in no significant change. The three 
remaining key informants thought that risk adjustment would result in a positive change in the number of 
plan offerings tailored to low SES communities. On all other evaluative metrics, the Consumer 
representative graded the risk adjustment proposal as somewhat negative. In the follow-up interview the 
Consumer representative repeated concerns voiced by all of the phase 1 Consumer representatives 
regarding the possibility that risk adjustment could result in an acceptance of a lower standard of care for 
low SES populations. The Consumer representative put it this way: “. . . risk stratification [ . . .] to me 
seems to expect a lower performance from the plans for people with low SES. It doesn’t feel comfortable 
to me to say, to the plan, well you seem to be—your score isn't as high, but it's because you're working 
with a lower SES group, so that’s okay. And so, I like the stratification more because it’s just very 
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explicit, whereas the risk adjustment, it feels like there’s—when you create the risk adjustment, you’re 
building in some value judgments at the front.” 
To the contrary, all of the other phase 3 key informants graded the risk adjustment proposal as 
either somewhat positive or strongly positive with respect to improving the accuracy of the MA stars 
methodology and as an improvement over the status quo. Evaluations of the proposal’s impact on the 
quality of care for disadvantaged communities were more mixed. 
Section 10.3.2 Focusing the Measure Set on Measures More Meaningful to Low SES Populations 
Another common policy proposal made by phase 1 key informants was to revise the measure set 
to include measures that are more meaningful to low SES populations. Examples of more meaningful 
measures identified by phase 1 key informants include measures that focus attention on quality for 
specific populations (including those with low SES); measures related to cultural competence, language 
access, member connection, or engagement; and measures related to care management, chronic 
disease/disability, and access to care.  
In phase 3, I asked key informants to evaluate the impact of refining the measure set to focus on 
issues of importance to low SES beneficiaries. Most of the phase 3 key informants thought revising the 
measure set to include measures that are more meaningful to low SES populations would result in no 
significant change to maintaining/increasing plan offerings tailored to low SES communities. Provider 
representative put it this way “Plans don't make their decisions whether to increase tailored offerings 
based on these criteria.” Similarly, the majority of respondents thought that this proposal would have no 
impact on the accuracy of the MA stars methodology. However, all of the key informants believed that 
refocusing the measure set in this way would have a positive effect on the quality of health care for 
disadvantaged communities. Most of the key informants (all but the Plan representative) expressed the 
view that it would have a positive effect over the status quo.  
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Section 10.3.3 Plan and Provider Control 
A theme commonly identified in the phase 1 interviews was the issue of measuring plan and 
provider quality based on metrics outside of the plan or provider’s control. In addition, while most of the 
phase 1 key informants thought that equivalent quality outcomes could not be ensured across SES strata, 
several key informants commented that equivalent care delivery, a factor largely within the control of the 
delivering plans and providers, was possible.  
In phase 3, I asked key informants to provide feedback on refining the stars methodology to focus 
on measures within the control of the provider or plan. Overall, this proposal scored relatively poorly, 
with an overall average across all key informants and all evaluative metrics of 3.1, or just slightly higher 
than a score of “No significant change.” The Thought leader representative said that refining the measure 
set to focus on measures within the plan or provider control would result in no significant change on any 
of the evaluation metrics and expressed concern about who should be held accountable, if not the provider 
and plan, on certain important quality metrics for which the provider or plan is a contributor to the 
measured service or outcome.  
I guess, I was neutral [. . .] because I was concerned about how well that could be defined 
[. . .]. I think for most quality measures it is not an either or. Like either they're under the 
control provider and plan or they are not. Certainly, some of the testing measures maybe 
are more clear-cut but a lot of the more outcome oriented quality measures, I think it is 
really debatable. I think, maybe also part of my thinking was if not the provider or plan 
but these things outside their control are important. Who is the relevant actor who is 
going to take responsibility?  
 
Section 10.3.4 Measuring Quality at the Level of the Plan Benefit Package (PBP) Rather than the 
Contract 
During phase 1, several key informants raised concerns about the fact that the MA stars 
methodology is applied at the level of the contract between the plan sponsor and CMS. Plan sponsors can 
offer any number of specific PBPs within a single contract. One phase 1 Plan representative shared the 
view that measuring quality at the contract level disadvantaged smaller and more local plans that are 
limited to a single geography and plans that offer a single or small number of PBPs.  
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. . . we’re a [INSERT STATE] plan. We try to cover all of [STATE] or as much as we 
can, whereas you have our competitors come in and kind of figure out where the better 
areas are [. . .]. They focus on certain targeted areas [. . .] . The other interesting thing that 
national players sometimes do, is they can take a four-star plan and they can apply that 
into [STATE] even though it’s in another state. [PLAN] can’t do that, so we don't have 
the flexibility that the national players have to get more resources, more income based on 
the plan offering. 
Phase 2 examined the variation in the availability of certain supplemental benefits and the 
requirement of a premium payment identified by phase 1 key informants and associated with offsetting 
SES-related barriers and found no consistent relationship between the number of low-income subsidy 
eligible members participating in a given PBP or the level of deprivation in the county in which the PBP 
is offered on the availability of these benefits. A possible reason for this finding is that because many 
contracts include a large number of plan benefit packages offered over a large number of geographic 
areas, during the study period, plan sponsors did not refine the individual plan benefit package to the 
specific needs of plan participants or the communities in which participants reside.  
To further explore this hypothesis, in phase 3, key informants were asked to evaluate a proposal 
to measure quality at the level of the PBP, rather than at the level of the contract between the plan sponsor 
and CMS. The Plan, Provider, Regulator, and Consumer representatives evaluated this proposal as a 
positive change on every metric. The Thought leader evaluated the proposal as resulting in no significant 
change on all metrics. In discussing why, the Thought leader expressed concerns about the specificity of 
the proposal and about whether it could be implemented.  
I guess the other concern I have about [. . .] the level of the plan benefit design package. 
For measures that can be done with administrative claims. I think, that you still have 
plenty of sample size in most cases but for things where plans to sampling and collection 
of data from patients or practitioners it would be much more challenging to sample and 
get adequate numbers at the benefit package than it is at the contract level. […] it’s just 
the effort that will be required to potentially get those more refined conclusions, could be 
very substantial for measures that don't come easily from administrative claims. 
 
Alternatively, the Regulator thought that this proposal could be implemented if the sample size 
parameters were set in a manner that allowed for data collection at the plan benefit package level.  
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Section 10.3.5 Improvement Rather than Achievement 
Many phase 1 key informants discussed the greater difficulty associated with achieving high 
quality scores among plans serving low SES beneficiaries compared with plans serving wealthier MA 
beneficiaries. A few key informants recommended that the stars methodology acknowledge the difference 
in the level of effort required to serve low SES populations by focusing more credit than is given today 
under the current stars methodology for improvement rather than on achievement. Phase 3 key informants 
were asked to grade this recommendation as a policy proposal. This was one of the few proposals scored 
by any key informant as likely to have a negative effect on the MA program. The overall average score 
for this proposal was 3.225, the second lowest of all of the proposals. While the, the Thought leader, 
Regulator, and Provider representative expressed the view that the proposal would have a somewhat 
positive effect on 3 of the 4 evaluation metrics, the Plan representative thought it represented no 
significant change and the Consumer representative opined that this proposal would have a somewhat 
negative effect on the quality of care for disadvantaged communities and a strongly negative effect on the 
accuracy of the stars methodology and the status quo.  
Section 10.4 Changes to the Uniformity of Benefit Requirements 
Many of the phase 1 key informants said that while plans and providers can impact SES barriers 
to quality care, they cannot completely offset them. A substantial majority of phase 1 key informants 
thought that plans should be tailoring their practices to meet the needs of low SES beneficiaries, and most 
key informants expressed the belief that plans were already doing so at the time of the interview.  
Phase 2 examined the impact of the increasing percentage of low-income subsidy eligible plan 
participants and county-level deprivation on whether supplemental benefits and premium requirements 
aligned with offsetting SES-related barriers to quality care were offered to plan participants. The results 
of phase 2 show that, for plans offered in 2014 and 2015, other than the inclusion of a meals benefit, the 
percentage of low-income subsidy eligible members participating in a PBP and the level of deprivation in 
the county in which the PBP was offered were not consistently associated with a higher likelihood that the 
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studied benefits would be included in a given plan benefit package. The results of phase 2 did, however, 
show that the inclusion of these benefits aligned SNP designation. Therefore, the results of phase 2 
indicate that if non-SNP MA plans are tailoring their practices to the needs of low SES populations they 
are either doing so using supplemental and enhanced benefits other than those included in phase 2 or 
using techniques other than supplemental and enhanced benefits. One of the questions raised by this 
finding is whether the uniformity of the benefit requirements placed on MA plans negatively impacts the 
ability or willingness of plans to use of supplemental benefits as a means of reducing SES barriers.  
Phase 3 key informants were asked to evaluate changing the uniformity of the benefit 
requirements imposed on MA plans in order to allow plans more flexibility to tailor benefits to the needs 
of low SES beneficiaries. Each of the key informants who offered an opinion (the Consumer 
representative scored this proposal “I don’t know” on every criterion) scored it as having no impact 
(either positively or negatively) on the accuracy of the stars methodology. However, on three of the other 
metrics (maintaining or increasing offerings tailored to low SES communities, improving the quality of 
health care for disadvantaged communities, and improvement over the status quo), the four key 
informants who offered opinions each judged the proposal as positive. When asked why the proposal 
received zero scores, the Consumer representative said, 
We find in our work that we're often pushing for uniformity of benefits because that can 
sometimes be the strongest consumer protection, that everybody is entitled to a certain 
level of benefit. And that we grapple with how you do that, but then also provide 
flexibility because you often see the value and there being flexibility to do more. I guess 
that's how advocates think about it, you need to have this base that everybody is entitled 
to a certain level of benefit and then above that could be plans the options to be flexible, 
but never in a way that allows them to take something off of the table. Because our 
experience has been that often, more gets taken off than gets put on. And that once you've 
had more flexible benefits, all these pressures can start to decrease [. . .]. So [. . .] our 
concern would be that they create this concept of flexibility, but that plans use it more to 
limit access to what was the uniform package rather than to greatly expand services on 
the other side. So, there's part of me that sees a potential for it to be a real positive, and 
there's a part of me that feels like the history is-- has been a negative.  
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Section 10.5 Incentives to Improve the Quality of Care 
Finally, phase 3 key informants were asked to evaluate four proposals to create incentives CMS 
could make available to plans to improve the quality of care received by low SES MA participants. The 
majority of the phase 1 key informants thought that it was realistic to be concerned that providers would 
abandon low SES communities if the MA stars incentives did not appropriately account for SES 
differences among plan populations. In addition, many of the phase 1 key informants discussed the 
resource barriers plans and providers face in attempting to offset SES-related barriers to care. In phase 1, 
several key informants recommended that incentives be created to encourage providers to serve additional 
low SES beneficiaries.  
The phase 2 analysis found a decrease in the availability of all but one of the studied benefits 
during the study period (2014-2015). This could reflect decisions by plans to deploy their resources on 
other benefits but may also reflect the revenue reductions plans sustained during that period (discussed in 
Chapter 1) including the full implementation of the stars incentives.  
Section 10.5.1 Incentives to Refine or Enhance Care Coordination or Care Management Techniques 
When asked what plans can do to lower or remove barriers to high-quality care for low SES 
communities, phase 1 key informants frequently recommended the use of enhanced care management 
strategies, including the use of health homes, enhanced caregiver support, and revised staffing models. 
Phase 3 key informants were asked to evaluate the effect of providing incentives to encourage plans to 
refine and enhance care coordination and care management techniques. The majority of the key 
informants said that offering incentives would have a positive effect on all metrics, other than the 
accuracy of the stars methodology. However, one respondent, the Regulator, scored the proposal as 
resulting in no significant change on all metrics, other than the extent to which the proposal would 
improve the quality of health care in disadvantaged communities. She explained that, in her view, plans 
already are doing this under the current program.  
The majority of key informants said that the proposal would have a positive effect on maintaining 
or increasing plan offerings tailored to low SES communities. All of the key informants thought that 
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offering these incentives would improve the quality of health care in disadvantaged communities. Four of 
the five key informants said that offering these incentives would represent an improvement over the status 
quo. Respondents were more mixed on whether this proposal would have an impact on the accuracy of 
the stars methodology.  
Section 10.5.2 Incentives to Improve Access to Care 
Phase 1 key informants frequently cited transportation as a significant SES-related barrier to 
accessing care. Several phase 1 key informants recommended the use of telehealth and telemedicine as a 
means to improve access to care for low SES beneficiaries.  
Phase 2 examined the risk differences in the availability of both transportation and telemedicine 
by quartiles of county-level ADI finding that none of the comparisons between ADI levels were 
statistically significant at the p>.05 level for transportation, and only a small number of the comparisons 
were statistically significant for telemedicine. Phase 2 also examined the marginal effect of county-level 
ADI and the addition of 1% of low-income subsidy eligible membership on the inclusion of transportation 
and telemonitoring. In sum, phase 2 told us that while there are not consistently statistically significant 
differences in the likelihood of these benefits being included in a given PBP, when PBPs are offered in 
counties that include a higher proportion of low-income membership or which are more deprived, they are 
more likely to offer transportation, but less likely to offer telehealth. 
In phase 3, key informants were asked for their opinion on the impact of offering incentives to 
plans to encourage them to improve access to care for low SES populations. All of the key informants 
thought that offering incentives to plans to improve access to care for low SES populations would have a 
positive effect on plan willingness to maintain or increase plan offerings tailored to low SES 
communities, improve the quality of health care in disadvantaged communities and represent an 
improvement over the status quo. As with the incentives to refine and enhance care management 
techniques, respondents were mixed on whether it would improve the accuracy of the methodology, three 
said it would have a positive effect and two said it would have no effect.  
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Section 10.5.3 Incentives to Encourage Access to Social Supports 
Many of the phase 1 key informants discussed the need to leverage and align social supports, 
such as services designed to ameliorate housing and food insecurity, with health care. Phase 2 examined 
whether MA plans that serve higher proportions of low SES beneficiaries or are offered in more deprived 
counties are more likely to offer meals and nutritional counseling as a part of their plan benefit packages. 
For meals, in both 2014 and 2015, the risk difference of the inclusion of a meals benefit increased by 
quintile of deprivation, meaning the higher the level of deprivation in the county, the more likely the PBP 
was to include a meals benefit. However, the opposite was true for the nutrition benefit. The PBPs offered 
in the least deprived communities were more likely to offer a nutrition benefit than those in the most 
deprived communities.  
Phase 3 key informants were asked to evaluate a proposal to offer plans financial or other 
incentives to improve access to social supports. All five phase 3 key informants agreed that providing 
plans with financial or other incentives to improve access to social supports would have a positive effect 
on the quality of health care in disadvantaged communities and would represent an improvement over the 
status quo. The key informants differed in their opinions about whether incentivizing access to social 
supports would maintain or increase plan offerings tailored to low SES communities, with four thinking 
that incentivizing access to social supports would be positive and one scoring the proposal as likely to 
result in no significant change. This proposal was viewed as particularly impactful by the Plan and 
Provider representatives, with the Plan representative scoring it as a strongly positive change across the 
board and the Provider representative scoring it as a strongly positive change on all metrics, other than 
improving the accuracy of the stars methodology. In describing the high score, the Plan representative 
said “The price of ignoring the social service community is the healthcare community is under performing 
and it's less efficient than it could be. We need to get past this HIPAA stuff and find a way to integrate the 
medical social continuum so the information highway is part of that.”  
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As with the two previous incentive proposals, respondents varied on whether providing 
incentives to improve access to social supports would impact the accuracy of the stars 
methodology.  
Section 10.5.4 Incentives to Partner with Community Organizations 
The final incentive evaluated by key informants was the idea of providing financial or other 
incentives to encourage plans to partner with community organizations. Phase 1 key informants 
frequently identified the resources available through community organizations as a critical component in 
lowering or removing SES-related barriers to high-quality care. In phase 3 each of the key informants 
agreed that providing incentives to partner with community organizations would be an improvement over 
the status quo, would improve the quality of care to disadvantaged communities, and would not have an 
impact on the accuracy of the stars methodology. There was disagreement on the impact this proposal 
would have on maintaining/increasing plan offerings tailored to low SES populations. Three key 
informants thought that it would have a strongly positive impact but two reported either that it would 
result in no change or that they did not know the impact. In describing the value of increasing the 
involvement of community organizations, the Plan representative said, 
There’s so many dimensions to this but the medical community, and I'll include plans in 
that, insurance plans, have really not given community based organizations a seat at the 
table. They typically aren’t funded by the medical funding stream for their services 
and so they're second class citizens if you will, but yet they have a great influence. [. . .] 
They're the ones who provide daycare services, they're the group homes that probably 
know if somebody has got an appointment with the doctor or not and so on. I think to the 
extent that they're engaged in the information highway, so they have access if I'm a group 
home member I can go to a portal and find out what meds my resident is on. And I will 
pay attention to whether they’re adherent to their medication and I do want to be pinged 
when they have a doctor’s appointment so I can make sure that I arrange for 
transportation to the doctor's appointment and so on. I can be very helpful as a group 
home parent in making sure my residents healthcare needs are taken care of. I can be an 
active participant on the care team if I'm part of that information highway. And even 
more so, if my reimbursement is also tied to performance measures to healthcare 
performance measures. 
Finally, none of the key informants expressed the view that creating incentives to 
encourage plans to partner with community organizations would improve the accuracy of the 
stars methodology.  
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Section 10.5.5 Overall Evaluations of the Incentive Proposals 
Looking at the feedback on the incentive proposals by respondent type, the Provider and Plan 
representatives rated the incentive proposals as somewhat or strongly positive across the board on every 
metric, except for the impact on the accuracy of the stars program. On the other evaluative metrics, the 
Regulator scored three of the four proposals positively. However, the Regulator did not think incentives 
to refine and enhance care coordination and care management techniques would yield a significant 
change. The Consumer representative and Thought Leader also were positive about the four incentive 
proposals on the criteria of the extent to which the proposal will improve the quality of health care in 
disadvantaged communities and improvement over the status quo rating, but were less positive about the 
proposal to provide incentives to partner with community organizations with respect to the extent to 
which the proposal would maintain or increase plans tailored to low SES communities.  
Section 10.6 Weighing the Options 
Each of the policy proposals presented to the phase 3 key informants was positively evaluated on 
some or all of the evaluative metrics and by more than one of the key respondents. Table 19 presents the 
overall average scores by proposal. The average was calculated by weighting each evaluative metric 
equally and removing rankings of zero or “I don’t know” from the calculation. Proposals highlighted in 
blue are those that achieved an overall average score of 4 or more, meaning that, on average, the proposal 
was viewed by all key informants as a somewhat positive change.  
As discussed previously, the results of this phase of the research reflect a convenience sample of 
five key informants selected to represent each of the key informant types included in phase 1. Each key 
informant was selected to participate in phase 1 based on their previous engagement on the issue and their 
knowledge of the MA stars program and to participate in phase 3 based on the detailed knowledge of the 
MA stars program that they displayed in their phase 1 interview and their availability to participate. As a 
result, their opinions provide useful insight to inform this policy analysis. However, given the small 
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sample size and the qualitative nature of the research, these results should not be viewed as generalizable 
to other interested stakeholders. 
Table 20. Overall average scores 
Proposal 
Overall average 
score on all factors 
(zeros removed) 
Stars methodology   
Stratify quality results based on characteristics of plan participants 4.1 
Risk adjust SES-sensitive quality measures 3.8 
Refine methodology to focus on measures important to low SES populations 3.8 
Refine the stars measure set to focus on measures within the control of the 
provider or plan  3.1 
Measure quality at the plan benefit package level, rather than at the level of the 
contract between CMS and the plan  4.15 
Refine the measure set to focus more on improvement than achievement 3.225 
Incentives   
Provide financial or other incentives to encourage plans to refine and enhance 
care coordination and care management techniques (e.g., health homes, staffing 
models, caregiver support) 3.85 
Provide financial or other incentives to encourage plans to improve access to care 
for low SES populations 4.05 
Provide financial or other incentives to encourage plans to improve access to 
social support 4.15 
Provide financial or other incentives to encourage plans to partner with 
community organizations 3.9125 
Medicare policy   
Change the uniformity of benefit rules 4.125 
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Table 21 also provides the average score for each proposal by evaluative metric. Scores were calculated 
in the same manner, removing from the averages any zero or “I don’t know” score.  
Table 21. Averages by evaluation criteria 
 Extent to which 
the proposal will 
maintain/increase 
plan offerings 
tailored to low 
SES communities 
Extent to which 
the proposal will 
improve the 
quality of health 
care in 
disadvantaged 
communities 
Extent to which 
the proposal 
improves the 
accuracy of the 
MA stars 
methodology 
Extent to which 
the change in 
policy 
represents an 
improvement 
over the status 
quo 
Stars methodology      
Stratify the results of plan 
performance on quality measures 
to reflect social and demographic 
characteristics of plan 
membership. 
4 4.2 4 4.2 
Risk adjust SES sensitive 
measures for SES in addition to 
risk adjusting for underlying 
health status 
3.8 3.4 4 4 
Refine the measure set to focus 
on measures that are more 
important to low SES 
populations 
3.4 4.6 3.2 4 
Refine the measure set to focus 
on measures that are within the 
control of the provider or plan 
3.4 3 3 3 
Measure quality at the plan 
benefit package level, rather than 
at the level of the contract 
between CMS and the plan 
4 4.2 4.2 4.2 
Refine the measure set to focus 
more on improvement than 
achievement 
3.5 3.2 3 3.2 
Incentives      
Provide financial or other 
incentives to encourage plans to 
refine and enhance care 
coordination and care 
management techniques 
3.8 4.2 3.4 4 
Provide financial or other 
incentives to encourage plans to 
improve access to care for low 
SES populations 
4.2 4.4 3.4 4.2 
Provide financial or other 
incentives to encourage plans to 
improve access to social supports 
4.2 4.4 3.6 4.4 
Provide financial or other 
incentives to encourage plans to 
partner with community 
organizations 
4.25 4.4 3 4 
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 Extent to which 
the proposal will 
maintain/increase 
plan offerings 
tailored to low 
SES communities 
Extent to which 
the proposal will 
improve the 
quality of health 
care in 
disadvantaged 
communities 
Extent to which 
the proposal 
improves the 
accuracy of the 
MA stars 
methodology 
Extent to which 
the change in 
policy 
represents an 
improvement 
over the status 
quo 
Medicare policy     
Changing the current uniformity 
of benefit rules applicable to MA 
plans in order to allow more 
flexibility for plans to tailor 
benefit packages including 
supplemental benefits to the 
needs of low SES beneficiaries. 
4.5 4.5 3 4.5 
 
Figure 4 presents the results from a different perspective; it shows how each of the options was 
scored by key informant type. Each triangle represents the average score across all of the evaluation 
criteria. The triangles represent key informants, and overlapping triangles represent that key informants 
graded the proposal with the same average score. The absence of a triangle for a key informant means that 
the respondent graded the proposal with all zeros. 
Figure 4. Proposals as scored by phase 3 key informants 
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Community Orgs. 
Uniformity 
 
 
 
As these tables and figures show, with the exception of 4 proposals which were evaluated by one 
or more key informants as either likely to be detrimental or to not result in an improvement over the status 
quo, the other proposals garnered significant support and were tightly clustered between 3.8 and 4.2. 
Given this clustering, distinctions between the level of support for the individual proposals that did not 
have significant opposition are difficult to make. Further research would be required to prioritize from 
amongst these proposals. 
The proposals that were viewed by at least 1 key informant as likely to be detrimental were risk 
adjustment, revising the stars measures set to focus on measures within the control of the plan or provider, 
and emphasizing improvement over achievement. The proposal to change the uniformity of benefits 
requirement is the only proposal that was voted on by only 4 of the 5 phase 3 key informants. This 
occurred because the Consumer representative graded the proposal with zeros, or “I don’t know,” across 
all evaluative metrics. During the follow-up interview, the Consumer representative explained the grading 
choice by expressing significant concerns about whether the proposal would reduce benefits currently 
available to consumers. While this only reflects the opinion of one Consumer leader, this person was 
selected to participate in both phases 1 and 3 because he is a recognized leader in the community of MA 
1  2  3  4  5 
Figure 5. Proposals as scored by phase 3 key informants 
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consumer advocates. Thus, based on these concerns, it is possible that a policy platform that includes a 
proposal revising the uniformity of benefit requirements could, at least in the short-term, garner 
significant opposition from the Consumer community.  
Four other proposals received an average overall score of 4 (a somewhat positive change) from 
the phase 3 key informants. Two of the incentive proposals: providing incentives to improve access and 
providing incentives to improve connections to social services each received an average score of 4.4 and 
two proposals focused on improvements to the stars methodology: stratifying results based on plan 
member characteristics and measuring quality at the PBP level, rather than the contract level, each 
received an average score of 4.2. 
Section 10.6.1 Limitations 
 The views of the five key informants included in phase 3 are limited to the opinions of those 
individuals. As discussed, the phase 3 key informants represent a subset of phase 1 key informants all of 
whom were selected as a result of their active engagement on MA and their research, policy statements, 
and/or advocacy engagement on the issue of SES and quality measurement in Medicare or MA. In 
addition, phase 3 key informants were each selected as a result of the detailed knowledge of the stars 
methodology they evidenced during the phase 1 interviews. However, it is possible that the perspectives 
voiced in phase 3 may not accurately reflect the view of the broader stakeholder community which each 
phase 3 key informant was chosen to represent. In addition, while there may have been consensus among 
the five phase 3 key informants regarding a particular proposal or proposals, that does not mean that all 
stakeholders or organizations would concur in their views.  
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CHAPTER 11: PLAN FOR CHANGE 
 As discussed in Chapter 7, when I commenced this research I was employed by an MA health 
plan sponsor. My role at that plan sponsor included state and federal advocacy. As a result, I originally 
intended to create an advocacy-based plan for change focused at the federal level. During the course of 
this research I accepted a new position as the Chief of Long Term Services and Supports for MassHealth, 
the Massachusetts Medicaid program. As a result, my plan for change has been revised to focus on efforts 
my team and I are currently spearheading in Massachusetts. These efforts include the development of a 
quality benchmarking, measurement, and reporting program to be implemented in both the state’s fully 
integrated DSNP program, Senior Care Options (SCO), and the Commonwealth’s other long term 
services and support programs all of which serve large numbers of dually eligible beneficiaries.   
This revised plan for change leverages the Kotter model of leading change (Kotter, 1996) to 
support internal changes in the MassHealth program for dual eligible members, and the agenda building 
and public education model of policy practice  (Jansson, 2013).  It build on the recommendations 
identified in phases 1-3 of this research as well as the recent work of the NAM and ASPE. 
Kotter identified 8 steps to leading change: establishing a sense of urgency; creating a guiding 
coalition; developing vision and strategy; communicating the change vision; empowering employees to 
take broad-based action; generating short term wins; consolidating gains and producing more change; and 
anchoring new approaches in culture. (Kotter, 1996)  Jansson and colleagues describe eight models of 
policy practice that can be used individually or in combination (Jansson, 2013). The agenda building and 
public education advocacy model they describe is similar to the first two steps of the Kotter model. It 
requires analysis and understanding of the policy landscape, creating a sense of urgency, and activating 
support via a policy entrepreneur and guiding coalition. (Jansson, 2013) 
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Section 11.1 Background/Understanding the Policy Landscape 
The MassHealth Office of Long Term Services and Supports (OLTSS) which I lead administers 
the Senior Care Options (SCO) program. SCO is the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’ fully integrated 
DSNP program. In order for an MA plan to offer a DSNP in the Commonwealth that plan must be 
selected as a SCO by OLTSS. SCO plans offer the full package of Medicare Part A, B and D as well as 
supplemental MassHealth covered services including long term services and supports. The quality of the 
care delivered by SCO plans is judged under the MA stars program. For the year 2017, there are 6 plans 
participating in SCO.  Unlike most DSNP plans nationally, SCO plans perform well under the MA stars 
program. Of the 6 plans, one is a 5 star plan, 3 are 4.5 stars, 1 is 3.5 stars and one is too small and too new 
to be measured.  
In addition to the SCO program, MassHealth and CMS jointly administer the One Care program 
which is a fully integrated demonstration program for non-elderly disabled dual eligible individuals. 
While One Care imposes supplemental measures of quality on the One Care participating plans which are 
aligned with the care coordination, community integration and long term services and supports goals of 
the program, SCO does not today include supplemental measures.  
Additionally, MassHealth is currently in the midst of a wholesale restructuring of the entire 
program. As a part of that restructuring over the next 4 years MassHealth is planning to leverage the SCO 
and One Care models to implement a fully integrated acute and long term care program modeled on SCO 
and One Care for people eligible for MassHealth but not eligible for Medicare.  
In order to improve the quality of care delivered through the existing SCO and fee for service 
programs and to ready the provider community for the planned fully integrated program, OLTSS is 
currently developing quality measures to be applied as supplemental quality measures in SCO and to each 
of the long term services and supports programs funded by MassHealth. MassHealth plans to initiate 
these measurement programs in 2018 and anticipates that these measurement programs will become a 
base for the development of a post-acute quality methodology to be used in the fully integrated program 
which is set to begin in 2019 or 2020. 
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Section 11.2 Establishing a Sense of Urgency 
The activity described above is creating an external sense of urgency around the need to address 
the equity of the quality measurement programs used for value based payment in MassHealth. 
Additionally, MassHealth is currently in the midst of procuring the services of a third party administrator 
(TPA) for long term services and supports which will, among other things, implement provider-specific 
quality and utilization benchmarks and scorecards. Finally, OLTSS is currently updating each of the 
regulations governing MassHealth’s long term services and supports portfolio. These efforts together 
have created a high level of urgency around the implementation of quality measurement in this portfolio 
of programs and a compelling need to assure that the measurement programs are fair, equitable and 
effective in improving the quality of care for the beneficiaries we serve.  
Section 11.3 Establishing a Guiding Coalition 
Both Kotter and Jansson described the importance of coalition building in driving 
change.(Jansson, 2013; Kotter, 1996) In order to effectively address the issue of care quality for low-SES 
Medicare beneficiaries participating in MassHealth, the guiding coalition will be formed in Massachusetts 
but will seek to include national stakeholders in order to inform those stakeholders’ advocacy efforts on 
the federal level.  
Internal and external stakeholders will be engaged and asked to participate.  Key informants who 
participated in this study, academics and researchers whose work is referenced in the review of the 
literature, members of the NAM Committee on Accounting for Socioeconomic Status in Medicare 
Payment Programs, SCO beneficiaries, SCO plans, MassHealth providers and other relevant stakeholders 
will be asked to participate in the coalition. Appendix O outlines the various groups of stakeholders who 
have expressed an interest in the issue of the impact of SES-related characteristics on performance under 
the stars program or who are actively engaged on the related issue of the impact of SES-related 
characteristics on performance under the other Medicare quality measurement programs. Each 
stakeholder’s likely level of interest in the initiative, what might inspire each of them to participate in the 
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coalition, and the level of influence they are likely to bring to bear are also described in Appendix O. 
Organizations representing each of the listed nongovernmental stakeholder types will be engaged as 
potential coalition partners.  
Identified stakeholders will be invited to participate in an organizational meeting of the coalition. 
In advance of that meeting, a short summary of the research contained in the preceding chapters of this 
study (no more than ten pages), a second short summary describing the results of the review of the 
literature, and links to the recent ASPE and NAM studies will be circulated to meeting participants in 
order to prepare them for the initial dialogue.  
Section 11.4 Developing a Vision and Strategy  
The initial meeting of the coalition will focus on developing a shared vision for a quality 
measurement system that improves quality across all socioeconomic strata. The initial agenda will focus 
on the conceptual model outlined by the NAM Committee on Accounting for Socioeconomic Status in 
Medicare Payment Programs report on Systems Practice for the Care of Socially at Risk Populations and 
the recommendations included in the ASPE which appears below.  
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Figure 6. Systems practices for the care of socially at risk populations 
 
(National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016b, 2016; Report to Congress: 
Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 2016) 
After presenting and explaining this framework and listening to feedback, over the course of a 
series of follow up meetings, Coalition members will be guided through a review of the recommendations 
contained in the ASPE and NAM studies as well as in phases 1 and 3 of this research and asked to 
provide recommendations to OLTSS regarding methods that we could employ to account for and offset 
SES-related barriers to high quality performance under the SCO supplemental measures and the other 
planned measures.  
OLTSS is currently in the midst of a technical assistance grant from CMS through which we are 
receiving coaching and support to develop domains of measurement and a draft set of measures 
individually for each long term service and support program offered by MassHealth and supplemental 
measures for the SCO program. Coalition partners will be asked to review and provide feedback on the 
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draft measure sets and to collaborate on mechanisms to account for SES-related and other risk factors that 
have been shown to impact performance on any included quality measures.  Consistent with the results of 
this study and the work by NAM and ASPE, mechanisms to account for SES-related and other risk 
factors could include the mechanisms of measurement (including but not limited to inclusion and 
exclusion criteria, risk adjustment, stratification and benchmarking improvement as opposed to or in 
combination with achievement), payment policies such as differential or incentive payment, or the 
provision of technical assistance to providers serving beneficiaries with specific risk factors. OLTSS has 
recently submitted an additional request to CMS for assistance with modeling the effect the draft 
measures. Should we receive that assistance, the modeling could include stratification of the measures by 
enrollee health, social and functional attributes and, if possible, risk adjustment for certain risk attributes. 
The results of that modeling will also be shared with the Coalition to inform their deliberations.  
Section 11.5 Communicating the Change Vision  
To further the goals of this plan for change, an accompanying communications strategy will be 
developed. The communications strategy will be centered on the importance of quality measurement in 
moving MassHealth toward value based purchasing, the need to account for population differences among 
the broad populations served by SCO and the MassHealth LTSS programs based on the evidence derived 
from the literature, and the efforts MassHealth is taking to improve the quality of care for MassHealth and 
SCO beneficiaries while appropriately accounting for SES-related barriers to quality care delivery.  
As an agency of state government MassHealth’s work is public record. In order to build public 
trust in the programs MassHealth administers, descriptions of those programs and, to the extent they are 
available, outcomes data are routinely shared with the public. In order to assure that these efforts are 
effectively communicated, the MassHealht communications team will be asked to assist in describing the 
quality work that is currently under way and to assist the OLTSS staff in the development/refinement of 
fact sheets and other materials for public distribution. Communications tools will include press releases 
related to the launch of the initiative, formation of the coalition and implementation and outcomes of the 
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program, updates on the SCO and OLTSS Web pages, and social media outlets as deemed appropriate by 
MassHealth communications staff.    
Once a conceptual model and mechanisms to account for SES-related barriers to quality 
performance has been agreed to by the coalition, a whitepaper describing the planned measurement 
strategy will be communicated at the state level to interested stakeholders including those described in 
Appendix O.  In addition, the information will be shared with the experts providing us technical 
assistance through the CMS Medicaid Innovation Accelerator Program, states engaged in similar efforts 
and organizations representing state Medicaid, aging and disability agencies such as the National 
Association of Medicaid Directors, National Association of State Units on Aging and Disability and 
National Governors Association to inform the debate more broadly.   
A resource library will be created (if approved, on the OLTSS website) which includes the 
literature referenced in the review, this study, the NAM and ASPE studies and additional materials 
offered by coalition partners. Each coalition partner will be requested to identify an external 
communicator to speak to the coalition’s efforts. Engagement with media outlets on behalf of MassHealth 
will be conducted by MassHealth communications.  
Section 11.6 Empowering Employees to Take Broad-Based Action 
  As discussed, implementation of supplemental measures for the SCO program is planned for 
2018 and for the MassHealth LTSS programs will begin in 2018.  Once the conceptual model and 
mechanisms to appropriately address SES-related barriers is defined by the coalition and agreed to by 
MassHealth, each of the employees leading the SCO and LTSS programs will be empowered to lead 
subcommittees of coalition members in the development of program-specific measures.  
These program-specific efforts will be supported by the selected TPA who will be charged with 
quality measurement benchmarking and analytics and will be informed by the technical assistance we are 
receiving from CMS. As soon as the TPA is engaged, an analytics plan will be developed which includes 
reporting of an initial set of performance metrics which can be evaluated using administrative data on a 
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quarterly basis. As the quality measures sets are established, they will be reported annually. Program 
managers will be empowered to work with providers to help them to understand their performance 
relative both to their peers and the Commonwealth’s highest performers. 
Section 11.7 Generating Short Term Wins  
As each of the landmarks of this project are met: alignment on a conceptual model, identification 
of mechanisms to account for SES-related barriers to quality measurement, identification of measures to 
be tested by program, commencement of measurement, etc. those “wins” will be communicated internally 
to the team and externally to and through the guiding coalition. As discussed, benchmarks will be 
developed and performance will be tracked over time. 
Section 11.8 Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change 
Short term wins will reported on an annual basis and will be shared internally and externally. 
Briefings will be held to share the results with coalition partners, with key stakeholders, with colleagues 
at CMS, and with national organizations that represent states and relevant state agencies. In addition, the 
work in Massachusetts may help inform the national dialogue on this issue.  There is a potential “policy 
window” opening that may occur at the national level to incorporate enrollee SES characteristics into the 
MA program.  Both NAM and ASPE have made recommendations on addressing social risk factors in 
MA.  In addition, with Republicans controlling both Congress and the Executive branch, the political 
climate may be more supportive of making changes needed to further support Medicare Advantage plans.  
One example of Congressional leadership support for legislation to reform MA that is in line with this 
dissertation can be found in Speaker Ryan’s health reform plan, A Better Way. which includes several 
recommendations similar to those made by phase 1 key informants including revising the uniformity of 
benefit requirements to allow for the use of value based insurance design and risk adjustment for 
socioeconomic status or “another adjustment deemed necessary” (Ryan, 2016). Thus, with these recent 
changes at the federal level, it is possible that proposals to implement changes to the MA stars program to 
appropriately account for enrollee SES characteristics could be well received at the Federal level. The 
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MassHealth experience of designing appropriate quality measurement systems to address the needs of 
dual eligibles and other low-income adults can help inform federal efforts. 
In order to share the results of MassHealth’s efforts, the results of these efforts will be packaged 
and proposed as conference topics at those organization’s conferences with the goal of aligning similarly 
situated states and stakeholders to build support for equitable and effective quality measurement in MA 
and other federal programs.  
Section 11.9 Anchoring New Approaches in Culture 
The information gathered through this process will inform culture that focuses on equity in the 
context of quality. The measures that prove fruitful in this initial stage will inform the measures for the 
fully integrated Medicaid only program planned for 2019 or 2020.  And will inform efforts at the federal 
level to address the accounting for SES-related risk factors in Medicare quality measurement as a part of a 
broader Medicare restructuring effort.  
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CHAPTER 12: IRB AND CONFIDENTIALITY ISSUES 
 Phase 2 of this research involved the analysis of secondary data. The research is based on 
publicly available third-party data. For this reason, it was exempt by the UNC Institutional Review Board 
(UNC IRB). Phases 1 and 3 of this study relied on key informant interviews. However, each of the key 
informants was asked to participate in their professional capacity. As a result, these phases of the study 
were also exempted by the UNC IRB.  
 The primary risk to the subjects of this study was the maintenance of confidentiality. Each key 
informant was provided, in advance of participating, a letter describing the study. Verbal confirmation of 
each participant’s consent was obtained by telephone. Key informants were not identified by name, but, 
instead, by a numeric identifier known only to me. All materials related to the interviews, including notes, 
recordings, and transcripts, were identified with the numerical identifier. All interview materials were 
stored in a password-protected Google Drive using a password known only to me. Interviews took place 
in an office or other secluded space, except in one case, in which the key informant chose the location. I 
conducted the document review. The second coder was done in private settings, and any printed 
documents were shredded. 
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CHAPTER 13: LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
Phases 1 and 3 of the research included a limited number of key informant interviews. While the 
research was designed to identify key stakeholders to serve as key informants, this research was not 
designed to obtain input from every individual or group with a perspective on quality measurement in 
Medicare or MA. Additionally, because these interviews represent opinions of the interviewed 
individuals, they cannot be viewed as conclusive or causative. Rather, their purpose was to gain an 
assessment of what the perceived barriers were and whether there was any consensus among key 
informant groups on solutions to the identified barriers. This, in turn, helped to inform the advocacy 
strategy described in the plan for change. 
Phase 2 of this research was limited to evaluating the presence or absence of a limited subset of 
benefits and plan design features. It examined only the years 2014 and 2015. While these years represent 
the transition into the full effect of the post-ACA stars methodology, they reflect a narrow window of 
time calling into question whether they are representative of later years. In addition, because they 
examine past plan practices they cannot be viewed as prognostic. Repeating the analysis to include 
additional years of data could assist in analysis of the policy implications of these findings. In addition, 
this study compared the effect of a limited number of attributes of the plans and the locations in which 
they are offered. As such, the results of this analysis cannot be viewed as a complete analysis of all 
possible benefit designs, plan types, or geographic attributes. In addition, while the analysis began with 
all MA plan contracts and benefit packages, some contracts were eliminated to make the analysis possible 
(as described in the phase 2 methods section). Third, because of the limitations of the information made 
publicly available by CMS, certain methodological assumptions were necessary to make analysis 
possible. Those assumptions are described in detail in the phase 2 methods section. Fourth, while more 
refined than other possible proxy measures of community SES, including the individual data elements 
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included in the calculation of ADI, the use of ADI as proxy measure for community-level SES is not as 
exact. In addition, because the ADI is based on 2000 census data may not reflect current levels of 
deprivation. Finally, while ADI is published at more granular levels (nine-digit ZIP codes, ZIP code 
tabulation area, and U.S. Census block group code), because plan filings occur at the county level, in 
order to align the ADI and the plan offerings, county-level ADI was used in this study. Finally, the study 
included the presence or absence of a premium, a dichotomous variable, as a measure of cost to the 
beneficiary. Premiums impact low-income beneficiaries in different ways than other cost-sharing 
obligations with premiums generally forming a barrier to coverage and cost sharing creating a barrier to 
access (Hudman & O’Malley, 2003). Whether the results found here would differ if the analysis were 
conducted using cost sharing rather than premiums as a dependent variable may be an important area for 
future research.  
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APPENDIX A: KEY INFORMANT QUESTIONNAIRE 
Introduction 
Thank you for your willingness to participate in this interview. As you know, the Medicare stars 
program is designed to improve the quality of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in the 
Medicare Advantage program. It does this by assigning summary rating scores of between one and five 
stars based on certain performance measures. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) changed the Medicare 
stars program incorporating the stars methodology into the plan payment methodology. In addition, CMS 
continues to have discretionary authority to terminate plans with low star scores. As a result, today, plans 
with fewer than three stars for 3 years in either Medicare parts C or D may be subject to program 
termination while those with four or more stars receive incentive payments.  
My research is looking into the potential impact of the Medicare stars quality and payment 
system on health plan performance, particularly as it relates to individuals and communities with lower 
socioeconomic (SES) status. Specifically, the purpose of this study is to understand whether Medicare 
Advantage plans that serve high proportions of individuals with low SES status have or intend to modify 
their policies and practices in light of the changes to the Medicare stars program, and if so, to explore the 
policy implications of any identified changes. You have been asked to participate in this study because 
you are [an advocate for Medicare recipients, an expert in Medicare, an expert in quality measurement].  
I am conducting this interview as a part of my dissertation for the Doctorate of Public Health 
program at the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill. The results of this study will be used to make 
recommendations to health plans and policy makers to effectively address the needs of Medicare 
beneficiaries who have SES characteristics associated with poorer health outcomes. 
As a (insert appropriate stakeholder group), your participation is a critical component of in 
gaining a complete understanding of the implications of the stars methodology on plans serving large 
proportions of members with lower SES and the efforts, if any, plans have taken to address those the 
unique needs of low SES beneficiaries. The content of this interview will be kept confidential. Your 
answers will be presented in summary form and will not be attributed to you or your organization. This 
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interview is completely voluntary. You many decline to participate at any time, end an interview in 
progress or request that your replies not be used after the interview has been completed. I would like to 
audio record this interview. May I have your permission to record it? 
Before I proceed, do you have any questions? 
Impact of SES Characteristics on Quality Measurement  
 I’d like to ask you a few questions about the impact of low SES status on the Medicare stars 
rating system. When I refer to people with low SES status, I am using the Agency for Healthcare Quality 
and Research’s definition of SES as “…a multidimensional concept. Among the dimensions typically 
associated with SES are occupational status, educational achievement, income, poverty, and 
wealth.”(Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2012)  
Background Information 
1. Can you provide me with some background information on your involvement with the Medicare 
Advantage program? For example, are you a plan administrator, regulator, advocate, provider, 
etc.? 
2. What is your role, if any, in quality measurement or quality improvement?  
Medicare Stars 
1. Do you support the use of quality measurement in the Medicare program? Why or why not? 
2. Do you support the current Medicare stars methodology? Why or why not? 
3. Do you think that the current Medicare stars methodology improves the delivery of quality care to 
beneficiaries in all SES strata? 
a. Why or why not?  
b. What impact do you think the current Medicare stars methodology has on people with 
lower SES status? 
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Impact of SES Characteristics on Provider and Plan Performance 
1. Do you think that patient SES characteristics impact plan and provider performance on quality 
measures? (If not, skip to question 6) 
a. If so, in what way? 
b. Are there specific SES characteristics that you believe to have more or less impact on 
plan or provider quality performance?  
c. Do you think that health plans and providers can effectively address these factors?  
i. If so, how? Examples might include the provision of certain supplemental 
benefits, offering a culturally competent care management program or provider 
network, increasing resources to respond to patient’s social risk, cultural stigma?  
ii. If not, why not?   
2. Do you think that SES characteristics have a greater impact on plan or provider performance on 
specific types of quality measures? By this I mean do SES characteristics have a greater or lesser 
impact on plan or provider performance on process, intermediate outcome, outcome, and/or 
patient experience of care measures? (I’m glad to define these terms if you would like). 
a. If yes, what types of measure are most impacted? 
3. In light of known health, economic, educational and environmental disparities— can a health plan 
or provider ensure equivalent care quality for all beneficiaries? Why or why not? 
4. In general, do you think that it is appropriate to account for SES characteristics in quality 
measurement separately from adjusting for underlying health status?  
a. Why or why not?  
b. Would your answer differ if the measure of quality is a process of care measure or an 
outcome measure? 
c. If no, are there any circumstances when you believe modifying the measurement 
methodology would be appropriate?  
i. If yes, what are those? 
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5. If you think it is not appropriate to adjust quality measures for SES characteristics, should CMS 
include other strategies to address potential disparities in quality measures based on the SES of 
the plan’s patient population. For example: 
a. Exclude measures that are sensitive to these characteristics? 
b. Weight sensitive measures differently? 
c. Provide additional payments to plans serving large proportions of people with low 
SES to pay for services and programs to address disparities caused by SES 
characteristics? 
d. Stratify the measurement system at the plan level to compare plans with similar 
proportions of low SES membership against one another? 
e. Are there other strategies regulators could employ to normalize for these factors 
without adjusting, weighting or excluding individual measures? 
6. Some commentators believe that plans and providers will ultimately shy away from serving 
people with more SES risk factors because of the Medicare stars payment incentives. Do you 
think that this is a valid concern? 
a. If yes, what can be done to ameliorate that concern? 
b. If not, why not? 
7. In summary, are there any changes needed in the Medicare Advantage stars methodology to 
ensure the highest quality of care is delivered to low SES communities? If yes, please explain. 
Questions only to be asked of key informants who have knowledge of plan practices (likely 
regulators, representatives of plans and providers and their trade association): 
How Health Plans Are Responding to the Changes to the Medicare Stars Program 
1. Are there barriers you have identified to effectively improving quality among plans serving high 
proportions of members with SES challenges?  
a. If yes, what are they and how, in your opinion, might those barriers be overcome? 
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2. Have you observed an increase or a decrease in these population-tailored strategies in the last 3 
years? Are health plans varying their service areas, networks, customer service, provider 
relations, care management, product offerings, covered services, and/or marketing strategies 
based on SES makeup of the plan's membership or service area? 
a. If yes, in what ways? 
i. What are the specific changes you have observed in terms of changes to service 
areas, networks, customer services, provider relations, care management, product 
offering, covered services, and/or marketing strategies?  
ii. Are these changes for the purpose of addressing SES barriers or for other 
reasons?  
1. If other reasons, what are they?   
b. If no,  
i. What changes in overall plan practices have you observed? For example, are 
plans narrowing networks in all communities regardless of SES characteristics? 
Expanding or contracting the communities served under a single health plan 
contract? 
c. Should plans tailor their practices to meet the needs of enrollees with specific SES 
challenges such as low income and low educational attainment? If so, how? Why? What 
opportunities and barriers have you observed or do you anticipate facing plans seeking to 
tailor their practices in this way? 
3. Are there any specific strategies or tactics employed by plans or their providers that you have 
observed to be particularly effective at improving quality of care among plans serving high 
proportions of members with SES challenges? What are they and how have they been effective? 
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APPENDIX B: MAJOR CONCEPTS 
Area Deprivation Index (ADI): The area deprivation index is a geographic area-based measure of 
the socioeconomic deprivation. A higher ADI score represents a higher level of deprivation. Generated by 
the Health Innovation Program at the University of Wisconsin it includes 17 variables related to the 
population age, employment, income, home value, housing cost, poverty level, single-parent households 
with children under 18 years of age, households without a telephone, households without complete 
plumbing and households with more than one person per room in a given geography (Health Innovation 
Program, 2014). 
Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers & Systems (CAHPS): The CAHPS surveys assess 
patient access to and experiences with care. There are CAHPS surveys for a wide array of health care 
provider settings. There has been a CAHPS survey of Medicare Advantage and Medicare Prescription 
Drug Plans since 1998. Survey participants represent a sample of health plan members who have 
participated in the plan for six months or longer. The results are publicly reported and are one of the data 
sources on which the MA stars methodology is based (Agency for Healthcare Quality Research, 2014) . 
Disease-modifying antirheuimatic drugs (DMARDs): “agents that apparently alter the course and 
progression of rheumatoid arthritis, as opposed to more rapidly acting substances that suppress 
inflammation and decrease pain, but do not prevent cartilage or bone erosion or progressive disability” 
(Stedman's Medical Dictionary, 2008).  
Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS): HEDIS is a set of health quality 
measures. It is developed and administered by the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA). 
According to NCQA, HEDIS is used by more than 90% of U.S. health plans. The full HEDIS 
measurement set includes 80 measures. (National Committee for Quality Assurance) 35 HEDIS measures 
are included in the MA stars methodology in 2016 (Medicare 2016 Part C & D Star Rating Technical 
Notes, 2016). 
Health Outcomes Survey (HOS): The Medicare Health Outcomes Survey (HOS) is a survey of 
patient experiences in in Medicare Advantage. Survey participants are chosen based on a random sample 
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of individuals enrolled in each Medicare Advantage plan. HOS is conducted every biennially. The version 
now in use (v.2.5) has been in place since 2013 (Health Services Advisory Group, 2014). 
Medicaid: Medicaid is a public health insurance program for individuals who are poor and individuals 
who are both poor and disabled. It is administered jointly by the federal and state governments. The laws 
governing the Medicaid program appear at title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. 
(Social Security Administration).   
Medicare: Medicare is an insurance program for older and disabled Americans. Medicare has four 
parts: part A covers hospitalization; part B covers nonhospital health services other than outpatient 
pharmacy; part C, also called Medicare Advantage, is defined below; and part D covers prescription drugs 
(Social Security Act: Title XVIII-Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled, 1965). 
Medicare Advantage: Medicare Advantage, also referred to as Medicare part C, is a health 
insurance program that provides Medicare covered benefits using private health plans. Medicare 
Advantage plans can cover either all of the services covered under Medicare parts A and B or all of the 
services covered under Medicare parts A, B, and D. Medicare Advantage plans come in many types 
including health maintenance organizations, preferred provider organizations and private fee-for-service 
plans (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services).  
Medicare Special Needs Plans (SNPs): Authorized under the Medicare Modernization Act of 
2003 and reauthorized subsequently, SNPs are Medicare Advantage plans designed to provide specialized 
care to Medicare beneficiaries who are either institutionalized, dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid 
or who have certain severe or disabling chronic conditions. SNPs were first offered in 2006 and are 
currently authorized to operate through 2017 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services).  
Medicare Duals Special Needs Plans (DSNPs): DSNPs are Medicare Advantage Special Needs 
Plans that exclusively serve beneficiaries who are enrolled in both Medicare and Medicaid.79  
Medicare Hospital Value Based Purchasing Program: Section 1886(o) of the Affordable Care Act created 
the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program. This program provides incentive payments to hospitals 
that meet specific quality standards. (Duals Special Needs Plans (DSNPs), 2014). 
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Medicare stars measurement system: This program rates health plans on a scale of one to five 
Medicare stars based on a series of metrics designed to judge health plan performance on keeping their 
members healthy, management of chronic conditions, the members’ experience of care while in the plan, 
health plan customer service, access to care and health plan performance improvement. The stars program 
services two purposes. First, it is designed to assist consumers and regulators in determining the quality of 
care delivered to Medicare beneficiaries. Second, since 2012 it has been used as a component of the 
methodology used to compensate health plans (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2013).  
Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS): PQRS is a quality measurement program in the 
Medicare program which judges the quality of care delivered by Medicare participating providers. Until 
2015, PQRS was a voluntary program that provided incentives to eligible providers who reported quality 
information to CMS. Beginning in 2015, Medicare providers will be penalized if they fail to participate in 
PQRS (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2014e).  
Poverty: Poverty is a measure of an individual’s income. Poverty is calculated by the U.S. Census 
Bureau based on a combination of income and household size (U. S. Census Bureau).  
Social Determinants of Health: The CDC defines the social determinants of health as “The 
complex, integrated, and overlapping social structures and economic systems that are responsible for most 
health inequities. These social structures and economic systems include the social environment, physical 
environment, health services, and structural and societal factors. Social determinants of health are shaped 
by the distribution of money, power, and resources throughout local communities, nations, and the world” 
(Centers for Disease Control, 2014b). 
Sociodemographic Factors: Factors that describe an individual’s economic, social and 
demographic characteristics including economic attributes such as income and educational attainment, 
social attributes such as residence in a high crime area, an area with poor schools, or an area of nutritional 
deprivation (e.g., a food desert) and demographic factors, such as age, race, and ethnicity (National 
Quality Forum, 2014b).  
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Socioeconomic Status (SES): In developing an index of socioeconomic status the Agency for 
Healthcare Quality and Research defined SES as “. . . a multidimensional concept. Among the dimensions 
typically associated with SES are occupational status, educational achievement, income, poverty, and 
wealth” (Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research, 2012).  
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APPENDIX C: MEASURES BY STUDY BY TYPE 
Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Aranda 
Readmission 6-9 months 
following an initial heart 
failure admission 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Arbaje 
Nonelective readmission 
within 6 months of discharge 
No No Yes Yes No 
No 
ASPE 
Hospital readmissions under 
the hospital readmissions 
reduction program 
No No Yes Yes No 
No 
ASPE Breast Cancer Screening Yes No No No No 
No 
ASPE Colorectal Cancer Screening Yes No No No No 
No 
ASPE Annual Flu Vaccine Yes No No No No 
Yes 
ASPE 
Improving or Maintaining 
Physical Health 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Yes 
ASPE 
Improving or Maintaining 
Mental Health 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Yes 
ASPE Monitoring Physical Activity Yes No No No No 
Yes 
ASPE Adult BMI Assessment Yes No No No No 
Yes 
ASPE 
Osteoporosis Management in 
Women who had fracture 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
ASPE Diabetes – Eye Exam Yes No No No No 
No 
ASPE 
Diabetes – Kidney Disease 
Monitoring 
Yes No No No No 
No 
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Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
ASPE 
Diabetes – Blood Sugar 
Controlled 
No Yes No No No 
No 
ASPE Controlling Blood Pressure No Yes No No No 
No 
ASPE 
Rheumatoid Arthritis 
Management 
Yes No No No No 
No 
ASPE Reducing the risk of falling Yes No No No No 
Yes 
ASPE Plan all-cause readmission No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
ASPE High Risk Medication No Yes No No No 
Yes 
ASPE 
Medication Adherence for 
Diabetes Medication 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
ASPE 
Medication Adherence for 
Hypertension 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
ASPE 
Medication Adherence for 
Cholesterol  
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Ayanian 
(2013) 
Breast Cancer Screening: 
Screening mammogram 
Yes No No No No 
No 
Ayanian 
(2013) 
Breast Cancer Screening: 
Diagnostic Mammogram 
Yes No No No No 
No 
Ayanian 
(2014) 
Cardiovascular disease: 
Blood-pressure control  
No Yes No No No 
No 
Ayanian 
(2014) 
Cardiovascular disease: LDL 
cholesterol testing and 
control  
No Yes No No No 
No 
Ayanian 
(2014) 
Diabetes care: LDL testing 
and control  
No Yes No No No 
No 
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Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Barnett 
Hospital readmissions under 
the hospital readmissions 
reduction program 
No No Yes Yes No 
No 
Bernheim 
Risk standardized 
readmission rates for AMI, 
Heart Failure and Pneumonia 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Bird 
Cardiovascular Care: Beta 
blockers after Myocardial 
Infarction 
Yes No No No No 
No 
Bird 
Cardiovascular Care: ACE 
inhibitors for patients with 
congestive heart failure 
No No Yes No No 
No 
Bird 
Diabetes Care: Blood Sugar 
screening 
Yes No No No No 
No 
Bird Diabetes Care -Eye exams Yes No No No No 
No 
Bird 
Diabetes Care – Kidney 
Disease Monitoring k  
Yes No No No No 
No 
Bird 
Cardiovascular Care: LDL-C 
control after AMI 
No Yes No No No 
No 
Bird 
Cardiovascular Care: BP 
control in hypertensives 
No Yes No No No 
No 
Bird 
Diabetes Care: Blood Sugar 
Controlled 
No Yes No No No 
No 
Bird Diabetes Care: LDL Control No Yes No No No 
No 
Blum 
30 day readmission for 
congestive heart failure 
No No Yes Yes No 
No 
  
1
7
5
 
Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Brennan 
Annual receipt of appropriate 
blood tests for patients on 
persistent medications 
Yes No No No No 
No 
Brennan 
Antidepressant medication 
management 
No Yes No No No 
No  
Brennan 
Taking antidepressants 
continuously during 12-week 
acute phase of new 
depression episode 
No Yes No No No 
No  
Brennan 
Receipt of a disease-
modifying Antirheuimatic 
drug for patients rheumatoid 
arthritis 
Yes No No No No 
No 
Brennan 
Cardiovascular Care: 
Persistence of beta-blockers 
for AMI 
Yes No No No No 
No 
Brennan 
Cardiovascular Disease: Beta 
blockers after heart attack 
Yes No No No No 
No 
Brennan 
Cardiovascular Care: LDL 
Screening 
Yes No No No No 
No 
Brennan Diabetes Care: eye exams  Yes No No No No 
No 
Brennan 
Diabetes Care: blood sugar 
screening 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
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Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Brennan 
Diabetes Care: blood sugar 
control 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Brennan Diabetes Care: nephropathy Yes No No No No 
No 
Cahow Breast Cancer Screening Yes No No No No 
No 
Cahow Colorectal Cancer Screening  Yes No No No No 
No 
Cahow 
Cardiovascular Care: LDL 
Screening 
Yes No No No No 
No 
Cahow Glaucoma Testing  Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Cahow 
Monitoring of Patients 
Taking Long-term 
Medications 
Yes No No No No 
No 
Cahow Annual Flu Vaccine  Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Cahow Pneumonia Vaccine  Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Cahow 
Improving or Maintaining 
Physical Health  
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Yes 
Cahow 
Improving or Maintaining 
Mental Health  
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Yes 
Cahow Osteoporosis Testing  Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Cahow Monitoring Physical Activity  Yes No No No No 
Yes 
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Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Cahow 
At Least One Primary Care 
Doctor Visit in the Last Year  
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Cahow Osteoporosis Management  Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Cahow 
Providing Certain Kinds of 
Care that Help Plan Members 
with Diabetes Stay Healthy  
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Cahow 
Cardiovascular Care: BP 
control in hypertensives 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Cahow 
Receipt of a disease-
modifying Antirheuimatic 
drug for patients rheumatoid 
arthritis 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Cahow 
Testing to Confirm Chronic 
Obstructive Pulmonary 
Disorder  
Yes No No No No 
No 
Cahow Improving Bladder Control  Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Cahow Reducing the Risk of Falling  Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Cahow 
Ease of Getting Needed Care 
and Seeing Specialists 
Yes No No Yes Yes 
Yes 
Cahow 
Doctors Who Communicate 
Well  
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Cahow 
Getting Appointments and 
Care Quickly 
Yes No No Yes Yes 
Yes 
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Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Cahow Customer Service  Yes No No Yes Yes 
Yes 
Cahow 
Overall Rating of Health 
Care Quality  
Yes No No Yes Yes 
Yes 
Cahow Overall Rating of Plan Yes No No Yes Yes 
Yes 
Cahow 
Complaints about the Health 
Plan 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Cahow 
Health Plan Makes Timely 
Decisions about Appeals  
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Cahow 
Fairness of Health Plan’s 
Denials to a Member’s 
Appeal 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Cahow 
Members Choosing to Leave 
the Health Plan 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Cahow 
Seriousness of Problems 
Medicare Found During an 
Audit of the Health Plan 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Cahow 
Time on Hold When 
Customer Calls Health Plan 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Cahow 
Accuracy of Information 
Members Get When They 
Call the Health Plan  
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Cahow 
Availability of TTY/TDD 
Services and of Foreign 
Language Interpretation 
When Members 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
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Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Carey 
Risk standardized 
readmission rates for AMI, 
Heart Failure and Pneumonia 
under the Hospital 
readmissions reduction 
program 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Cavillo-
King 
Readmission for Pneumonia 
and Heart Failure 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Chou 
2007a 
Diabetes Care: Blood Sugar 
screening 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Chou 
2007a 
Diabetes Care: Blood Sugar 
control 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Chou 
2007a 
Cardiovascular Care: LDL 
control after AMI 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Chou 
2007a 
Cardiovascular Care: LDL 
screening after AMI 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Chou 
2007a 
Diabetes Care: nephropathy Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Chou & 
2007b 
Diabetes Care: Blood Sugar 
screening 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Chou & 
2007b 
Diabetes Care: Blood Sugar 
control 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Chou & 
2007b 
Cardiovascular Care: LDL 
control after AMI 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Chou & 
2007b 
Cardiovascular Care: LDL 
screening after AMI 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Chou & 
2007b 
Diabetes Care: nephropathy Yes No No No No 
Yes 
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Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Chou & 
2007b 
Diabetes Care: Eye exams Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Couto 
Medication Adherence for 
Cholesterol (Statins) 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Couto 
Medication Adherence for 
Oral Diabetes Medications 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Couto 
Medication Adherence for 
Hypertension 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Damiani 
Readmission for Heart 
Failure and Acute 
Myocardial Infarction 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Eapen 
30 days all cause 
readmissions among patients 
with heart failure 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Figueroa 
Hospital performance on the 
3 hospital quality 
measurement programs under 
Medicare. Hospital 
readmissions under the 
hospital readmissions 
reduction program is the 
measure relevant to this study 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Fischer Hospital Readmissions No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Fremont 
Diabetes Care: Blood Sugar 
screening 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Fremont 
Diabetes Care: LDL 
Screening 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
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Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Fremont 
Diabetes Care: Urine protein 
level screening 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Fremont Diabetes Care: Eye Exam Yes No No No No 
yes 
Fremont 
Cardiovascular Care: Beta 
blockers after Myocardial 
Infarction 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Fremont 
Cardiovascular Care: LDL-C 
screening after AMI 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Fremont 
Cardiovascular Care: LDL 
control after cardiac event 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Fremont 
Cardiovascular Care: BP 
control in hypertensives 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Fremont 
Diabetes Care: Blood Sugar 
control 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Fremont Diabetes Care: LDL control No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Greysen 30 day all cause readmission  No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
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Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Gu 
30 Day Readmission rates 
among Medicare 
beneficiaries admitted with 
an index admission of: acute 
myocardial infarction, 
pneumonia, heart failure, 
chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (COPD), 
coronary artery bypass 
grafting (CABG), 
percutaneous transluminal 
cardio angioplasty (PTCA), 
and other vascular conditions  
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Harman 
Improving or Maintaining 
Physical Health  
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Yes 
Harman 
Improving or Maintaining 
Mental Health  
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Yes 
Harman 
Diabetes Care: Blood Sugar 
testing 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Harman Diabetes Care: Eye exams Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Harman 
Diabetes Care: LDL 
screening 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Harman Diabetes Care: nephropathy Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Harman 
Diabetes Care: Blood Sugar 
control  
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Harman Diabetes Care: LDL control  No Yes No No No 
Yes 
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Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Herrin 
Risk standardized 
readmission rates for AMI, 
Heart Failure and Pneumonia 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Holmes 
Potentially inappropriate 
medication prescribing 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Hu 
30 day readmissions using 
the CMS all-cause unplanned 
readmission measure 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2013 
Rheumatoid Arthritis 
Management 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2013 
Breast Cancer Screening: 
Screening mammogram 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2013 
Glaucoma Testing Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2013 
Osteoporosis Management in 
Women who had a Fracture 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2013 
Plan All Cause Readmissions  No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2013 
Diabetes Treatment  No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2013 
High Risk Medication  No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2013 
Medication Adherence for 
Cholesterol (Statins) 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2013 
Medication Adherence for 
Oral Diabetes Medications 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2013 
Rheumatoid Arthritis 
Management 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2013 
Medication Adherence for 
Hypertension 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
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Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Inovalon 
2014 
Rheumatoid Arthritis 
Management 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2014 
Diabetes Treatment No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2014 
High Risk Medication No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2014 
Medication Adherence for 
Cholesterol (Statins) 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2014 
Medication Adherence for 
Diabetes Medications 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2014 
Medication Adherence for 
Hypertension (RAS 
Antagonists) 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2014 
Osteoporosis Management in 
Women who had a Fracture 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2014 
Plan All-Cause Readmissions No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2015 
Plan All-Cause Readmissions No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2015 
Medication Adherence for 
Hypertension 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2015 
Medication Adherence for 
Diabetes 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2015 
Medication Adherence for 
Cholesterol 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2015 
Access to Primary Care 
Doctor Visits 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2015 
Antidepressant Medication 
Management 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
  
1
8
5
 
Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Inovalon 
2015 
Rheumatoid Arthritis 
Management 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2015 
Osteoporosis Management in 
Women who had a Fracture 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2015 
High-Risk Medication No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2015 
Diabetes Treatment No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2015 
Breast Cancer Screening Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2015` 
Drug-Drug Interaction No No Yes No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2015` 
Engagement of Alcohol or 
Other Drug Dependence 
Treatment 
No No Yes No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2015` 
Initiation of Alcohol or Other 
Drug Dependence Treatment 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2015` 
Continuous Beta-Blocker 
Treatment 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2015` 
Pharmacotherapy 
Management of COPD 
Exacerbation-Bronchodilator 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2015` 
Pharmacotherapy 
Management of COPD 
Exacerbation-Systemic 
Corticosteroid 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Inovalon 
2015 
Testing to Confirm COPD Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Jung Reducing risk of falling Yes No No Yes 
Yes, for 
education 
Yes 
  
1
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Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
Patient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Jung Improving bladder control Yes No No Yes 
Yes, for 
education 
Yes 
Jung Monitoring physical activity Yes No No Yes 
Yes, for 
education 
Yes 
Joynt 2011 
Risk adjusted 30 day 
readmissions rates among 
patients with AMI, CHF or 
pneumonia 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Joynt 2013 
Risk standardized 
readmissions under the 
HRRP 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Kahn 
Hospital performance on the 
3 hospital quality 
measurement programs under 
Medicare. Hospital 
readmissions under the 
hospital readmissions 
reduction program is the 
measure relevant to this study 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Kind 
30-day rehospitalizations for 
patients discharged with 
congestive heart failure, 
pneumonia, or acute 
myocardial infarction 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
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Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Krumholz 
1997 
Hospital readmission within 
6 months of discharge and 
readmission or death within 6 
months of discharge among 
patients with an index 
admission of congestive heart 
failure 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Krumholz 
2000 
All-cause readmission within 
6 months after discharge 
among patients with a 
principal discharge diagnosis 
of heart failure  
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Lindenaur 
Risk of death within 30 days 
of admission or 
rehospitalization for any 
cause within 30 days of 
discharge among patients 
acute myocardial infarction, 
heart failure, or pneumonia 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Mahmoudi Diabetic foot exam Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Mahmoudi 
Cholesterol check for 
diabetics 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Mahmoudi Flu vaccine Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Mahmoudi Eye exam for diabetics Yes No No No No 
Yes 
McBean 
Diabetes Care: Blood Sugar 
control  
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
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Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
McHugh 
30-day all cause 
readmissions for Medicare 
traditional patients 
discharged from a short-term 
acute care hospital with a 
principal diagnosis of heart 
failure, AMI, or pneumonia 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Nagasako 
All cause readmissions 
among patients with an index 
admission of myocardial 
infarction, heart failure or 
pneumonia 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Priest 
The percentage of patients 
with asthma who had at least 
4 prescription fills for short-
acting beta-agonist rescue 
medication  
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Priest 
The percentages of patients 
with a level II exacerbation 
or level III exacerbation of 
COPD 
No No Yes No No 
Yes 
Priest 
Coronary Artery Disease -- 
fills, persistence and 
compliance among patients 
who filled a 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Priest 
Diabetes Care: Blood Sugar 
screening 
Yes No No No No Yes 
Priest 
Diabetes Care: LDL 
screening 
Yes No No No No Yes 
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Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Priest Diabetes Care: Eye Exam Yes No No No No Yes 
Priest 
Heart Failure - fills, 
persistence and compliance 
among patients who filled a 
prescription for ‘‘any 
acceptable therapy,’’ defined 
according to disease-specific 
national treatment guidelines 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Priest 
Hyperlipidemia - - fills, 
persistence and compliance 
among patients who filled a 
prescription for ‘‘any 
acceptable therapy,’’ defined 
according to disease-specific 
national treatment guidelines  
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Priest 
Hypertension - - fills, 
persistence and compliance 
among patients who filled a 
prescription for ‘‘any 
acceptable therapy,’’ defined 
according to disease-specific 
national treatment guidelines 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Priest 
The percentage of new 
episode depression patients 
with any antidepressant 
medication fill within 90 
days of diagnosis. 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
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Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Qato 
Receipt of high risk 
medications 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Rathore & 
Foody 
Readmission within one year 
of discharge and mortality 
within one year of admission 
among patients with an index 
admission of heart failure 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Rathore & 
Masoudi 
Readmission within one year 
of discharge and mortality 
within 30 days or one year of 
admission among patients 
with an index admission of 
heart failure 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Rodriguez 
Readmission within 30 days 
of discharge among patients 
with an index admission of 
heart failure and acute 
myocardial infarction 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Schmajuk 
Receipt of a disease-
modifying Antirheuimatic 
drug for patients rheumatoid 
arthritis 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Schneider 
Breast Cancer Screening: 
Screening mammogram 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
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Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Schneider Diabetes Care: Eye Exams Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Schneider 
Cardiovascular Care: Beta 
blockers after Myocardial 
Infarction 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Schneider 
Follow up after 
hospitalization for mental 
illness 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Sheingold 
Risk standardized 
readmissions under the 
HRRP 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Singh 
30 day readmission rates for 
medical discharges 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Tsai 
30 day all-cause readmission 
among patients undergoing 
CABG, pulmonary 
lobectomy, endovascular 
abdominal aortic aneurism 
repair, open abdominal aortic 
aneurism repair, colectomy, 
and hip replacement 
No No Yes Yes No 
Yes 
Trivedi 
2006 
Diabetes Care: Blood Sugar 
control 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Trivedi 
2006 
Diabetes Care: LDL 
screening 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Trivedi 
2006 
Cardiovascular Care: BP 
control in hypertensives 
No yes No No No 
Yes 
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Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Trivedi 
2006 
Cardiovascular Disease: LDL 
Screening 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Trivedi 
2005 
Breast Cancer Screening: 
Screening Mammogram 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Trivedi 
2005 
Diabetes Care: Eye Exam Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Trivedi 
2005 
Diabetes Care: Blood Sugar 
screening 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Trivedi 
2005 
Diabetes Care: Blood Sugar 
control 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Trivedi 
2005 
Diabetes Care: LDL 
screening 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Trivedi 
2005 
Diabetes Care: LDL control No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Trivedi 
2005 
Cardiovascular Care: Beta 
blockers after Myocardial 
Infarction 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Trivedi 
2005 
Cardiovascular disease: LDL 
Screening after cardiac event 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Trivedi 
2005 
Cardiovascular Care: LDL 
control after cardiac event 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Virnig 
2002 
Breast Cancer Screening: 
Screening mammogram 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Virnig 
2002 
Cardiovascular Care: LDL 
control after cardiac event 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Virnig 
2002 
Diabetes Care Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Virnig 
2002 
Cardiovascular Care: BP 
control in hypertensives 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
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Author Measure 
Process/ 
administrative/p
atient 
experience of 
care 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Outcome 
Adjustments 
for existing 
health 
conditions 
SES 
adjustments 
2014 star 
measure no 
or yes 
(includes 
similar or 
successor) 
Virnig 
2007 
Breast Cancer Screening: 
Screening mammogram 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Virnig 
2007 
Diabetes Care No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Virnig 
2007 
Cardiovascular Care: Beta 
blockers after Myocardial 
Infarction 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Virnig 
2007 
Cardiovascular Care: BP 
control in hypertensives 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Virnig 
2007 
Cardiovascular Care: LDL 
control after cardiac event 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Virnig 
2007 
Follow up after 
hospitalization for mental 
illness 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Virnig 
2004 
Follow up after 
hospitalization for mental 
illness 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Virnig 
2004 
Average length of stay for 
inpatient mental health 
treatment 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Virnig 
2004 
Antidepressant medication 
management 
Yes No No No No 
Yes 
Young 
Medication Adherence for 
Cholesterol (Statins) 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Young 
Medication Adherence for 
Oral Diabetes Medications 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
Young 
Medication Adherence for 
Hypertension 
No Yes No No No 
Yes 
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APPENDIX D: SUMMARY OF INCLUDED ARTICLES 
Author Year Study design Population Data source Dependent 
variable/measure 
Analytic methods Findings Limitations 
Aranda 2009 Retrospective 
cohort 
28919 
Medicare 
patients 
discharged 
during 2003 
with an ICD-9 
code of heart 
failure who 
experience a 
readmission in 
the 2 quarters 
after the initial 
admission 
Medicare 
standard 
analytical file 
limited data set 
for the years 
2002-2004 
Readmission within 
6-9 months 
following an initial 
heart failure 
admission 
Multivariate 
logistic regression 
was used to 
identify factors 
associated with 
readmission for 
any cause within 
the 6-9 months of 
the initial 
hospitalization for 
heart failure. 
Adjusters included 
age, sex, race, US 
Census region, 
length of hospital 
stay, 
comorbidities, and 
device implant 
during initial 
hospitalization, 
previous history of 
hospitalization in 
the preceding year. 
Rehospitalization 
for patients with 
heart failure 
remains a 
significant risk. 
The risk is 
slightly higher for 
African 
Americans than 
for Caucasians 
(OR 1.05) and 
substantially 
higher for other 
nonwhite 
populations (OR 
1.17) 
Data provided 
comorbidity 
information but did 
not provide 
sufficient data for 
detailed adjustment 
analysis. The data 
did not provide an 
exact date of 
readmission 
requiring 
assumption.  
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Arbaje 2008 Retrospective 
cohort 
1,351 
community-
dwelling 
Medicare 
beneficiaries 
admitted to 
hospitals, 
discharged 
home and 
surviving at 
least one year 
after discharge  
Medicare 
current 
beneficiary 
survey and 
Medicare 
claims data for 
the years 2001 
and 2002 
Readmission 
within 6 months 
Bivariate logistic 
regression 
followed by 
multivariate 
regression and 
sensitivity testing. 
The multivariate 
analysis adjusted 
for demographics, 
health and 
functional status 
After adjustment, 
readmitted 
persons were 
more likely to 
live alone, 
lacking in self-
management 
skills, have unmet 
functional 
(IADL) needs, 
Readmitted 
persons were also 
more likely to 
have limited 
education. Low 
income did not 
demonstrate a 
statistically 
significant 
association with 
readmission. 
Participants 
baseline functional 
and SES 
characteristics 
could have 
changed over the 
study period, the 
data set left out 
individuals who 
died over the 
course of the study 
period, The SES 
results should be 
interpreted 
cautiously due to 
lack of statistical 
power 
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ASPE 2016 Retrospecti
ve cohort 
analysis 
15,282,565 
Medicare 
beneficiaries 
participating in 
MA in 2014; 
505 MA 
contracts 
subject to the 
2015 stars 
methodology 
measuring 
performance in 
2014 and 
Medicare fee-
for-service 
(FFS) claims 
from fiscal 
years (FY) 
2011-2013 
(October 2010 
–September 
2013) 
Analyses 
included all 
acute care 
hospitals paid 
under the 
Inpatient 
Prospective 
Payment 
System (IPPS). 
Medicare 
claims data 
for hospitals 
paid in the 
IPPS 
program and 
beneficiary 
and contract-
level data for 
all MA and 
MA-PD 
contracts 
eligible for 
Star Rating 
on all 
measures 
included in 
the MA Star 
Rating 
Program 
from program 
measurement 
year 2014 
(used for the 
2016 Star 
Ratings and 
2017 Quality 
Bonus 
Payments)  
Readmission 
as calculated 
for the 
Hospital 
Readmission 
Reduction 
program, the 
45 Part C & 
D measures 
used to rate 
MA-PD 
contracts in 
2016 
Regression 
analyses using 
beneficiary/patientl
evel data and 
plan/hospital level 
data with social 
risk factors as 
defined by NAM 
independent 
variables and 
performance on the 
measures in the 
HRRP and MA 
Star Rating 
Programs as the 
outcomes of 
interest. 
For hospitals dual 
eligibles had significantly 
greater odds of 
readmission without a 
hospital effect, risk 
standardization reduced 
but didn’t eliminate 
differences between 
safety-net and non-safety-
net hospitals but 
differences in penalties 
were small under the 
current program. For 
health plans: dual 
eligibles, LIS-eligibles, 
black, rural, beneficiaries 
in low-income 
neighborhoods and 
beneficiaries with 
disabilities fared more 
poorly. The differences 
were small to moderate in 
size and largely drive by 
patient rather than plan 
factors. Hispanics did 
better on most measures. 
Plan contracts with higher 
proportions of members 
with social risk factors 
fared more poorly 
although a small number 
of high dual/LIS contracts 
performed well 
For hospitals: data 
limitations impact 
the ability to 
identify all 
relevant social risk 
factors; the risk 
standardization 
technique used in 
the HRRP has 
limitiations, and 
examining past 
performance may 
not predict future 
performance. For 
health plans: the 
data were from 
2014 and may not 
represent future 
performance; 
disability was 
limited to reason 
for entitlement due 
to data limitations; 
and contract level 
data collection 
limits plan level 
analysis. 
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Ayanian  2013 Retrospective 
cohort 
495,836 
women in 
Medicare 
HMOs, 81,480 
women in 
Medicare 
PPOs between 
the ages of 65 
and 69 and 
women of the 
same ages 
from the 
Medicare FFS 
data file 
2009 
Medicare 
beneficiary 
summary file 
data 
Screening and 
Diagnostic 
mammogram 
HEDIS measures 
By cohort (HMO 
or PPO) they 
conducted a 
matched analysis 
based on the 
distribution of the 
minority 
beneficiaries 
matched by age, 
dual status and by 
region (county or 
state). They 
calculated rates of 
mammography for 
each minority 
group relative to 
matched white 
women within 
PPOs and HMOs 
to traditional 
Medicare. They 
used the HEDIS 
specifications for 
the measure which 
included inclusion 
and exclusion 
criteria but do not 
adjust for 
underlying health 
status. 
For all groups, 
before 
adjustment, 
mammography 
rates were highest 
in HMO, then 
PPO, then 
traditional. 
Relative to 
matched white 
women, 
mammography 
rates were 
statistically 
significantly 
higher for black, 
Hispanic and 
Asian women in 
HMOs. There 
were substantially 
greater disparities 
in traditional 
Medicare than in 
HMOs for black, 
Hispanic and 
Asian women 
relative to 
matched white 
women.  
The results could 
reflect matching 
by county rather 
than by state; the 
comparison could 
be impacted by 
differences 
between plan 
HEDIS reports and 
Medicare FFS 
claims data; 
limitations of the 
Hispanic and 
Asian Pacific 
identifiers that use 
surname data.  
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Ayanian 2014 Retrospective 
cohort 
Medicare 
HMO 
enrollees in 
2011: 94,171 
with 
hypertension 
112,039 with 
cardiovascular 
disease, 
105,848 with 
diabetes 
Medicare 
Beneficiary 
Summary File 
comparing 
Medicare-
Advantage 
HMO enrolled 
beneficiaries 
in 2006 and 
2011 on three 
measures of 
quality 
HEDIS 
measures of 
Blood Pressure 
Control; Blood 
Sugar Control; 
Cholesterol 
Control 
Age and sex 
adjusted 
proportions of 
enrollees with 
controlled blood 
pressure, blood 
sugar and 
cholesterol 
consistent with the 
specifications of 
the selected 
HEDIS measures 
and weighted to 
reflect the 
distribution of 
those conditions 
according to age, 
sex, race or 
ethnicity on the 
basis of disease 
prevalence within 
each stratum. Race 
was standardized 
to estimate age and 
sex adjusted 
disparities and 
stratified by 
geographic region.  
Disparities reduced 
between 2006 and 
2011. In 2011 black 
enrollees were 
substantially less 
likely than whites to 
have adequate 
control on all three 
measures in both 
years and in all 
regions, except the 
west, and then only 
in a single, large 
health plan. 
Hispanic enrollees 
were slightly less 
likely than whites to 
have adequate 
control in all 3 
measures. Asian and 
Pacific Islanders 
were more likely 
than whites to have 
adequate blood 
pressure and 
cholesterol control 
and equally likely to 
have blood sugar 
control. Between 
plan variation 
accounted for 39%-
59% of disparities. 
Because they used 
HEDIS data, plans 
with integrated 
medical records 
may have a more 
complete 
ascertainment of 
risk factor 
measures; better 
control of 
intermediate 
outcomes for 
blacks in the west 
may arise from 
unmeasured 
factors such as 
socioeconomic or 
health status, the 
researchers lacked 
data on provider 
practice behaviors 
that may have 
contributed to 
these changes, the 
researchers lacked 
data on clinical 
complications 
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Barnett 201
5 
Retrospe
ctive 
cohort 
333, 158 
Medicare 
beneficiaries  
Health 
and 
Retiremen
t Survey 
(HRS) 
responden
ts eligible 
for 
Medicare 
from 
2000-2010 
and 
matched 
with 
Medicare 
claims 
from 
2000-2012 
excluding 
patients 
who were 
not 
hospitalize
d after 
completio
n of the 
survey 
30-day 
readmission 
for MI, CAP 
and CHF 
Fitted multivariate 
regression predicting 30 
day readmission for the 
given conditions as a 
function of the 
independent variable: % 
SSI, Prescription drug 
coverage, smoking status, 
drinks daily, CCW 
conditions, HCC score, 
CES quartile, cognition 
score quartile, self-rated 
health, proxy respondent, 
difficulties with ADLs, 
difficulties with IADLs, 
difficulties with activities 
requiring mobility, 
difficulties with activities 
requiring agility, 
household residents, 
living children, living 
siblings, friends nearby, 
frequency of contact with 
friends.  
Patient characteristics 
not included in 
Medicare’s current 
risk-adjustment 
methods for assessing 
hospital readmissions 
explained 48% of the 
difference in 
readmission risk 
between high and low 
readmission hospitals.  
Because it was limited 
to HRS respondents it 
could not evaluate the 
impact on individual 
hospitals. The size of 
the HRS study limited 
the precision with 
which they could 
estimate differences in 
the probability of 
readmission between 
participants admitted 
to hospitals with high 
and low readmission 
rates. 
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Bernheim 2016 Retrosp
ective 
cohort 
526,272 AMI 
admissions to 
4,432 
hospitals, 
1,278,296 
HF 
admissions to 
4,733 
hospitals and 
1,099,230 
pneumonia 
admissions to 
4,773 
hospitals 
Medicare 
claims data 
from the 
Medicare 
inpatient 
and 
outpatient 
analytic 
files 
Risk 
standardized 
30-day 
readmission 
for MI, CAP 
and CHF 
Comparison of risk 
standardized 
readmissions among 
hospitals serving high 
and low proportions of 
low SES patients and a 
risk-standardized 
readmission rate after 
adjustment for patient 
SES.  
High and low-SES 
serving hospitals have 
similar rates of risk 
standardized 
readmissions and risk 
adjustment for SES 
changed results by 
1% resulting in 3-4% 
fewer low-SES 
serving hospitals 
being subject to 
penalty under the 
HRRP 
.Use of zipcode level 
median income as a 
proxy for patient SES. 
The authors sought to 
reduce these effects 
by calculating the 
results using dual 
eligible status and a 
composite measure of 
readmission and the 
results were 
unchanged.  
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Bird  2007 Retrosp
ective 
cohort 
200,000 
Medicare and 
2.1 million 
commercial 
enrollees in 
four 
geographic 
regions, all 
from the 
same insurer. 
Data 
provided 
by a 
single 
insurer 
for nine 
Medicare 
and ten 
commerci
al health 
plans 
Ten HEDIS 
quality 
Measures (see 
Appendix C 
for specific 
measures) 
Chi square tests were to 
compare unadjusted 
performance rates by 
gender by measure. 
Seven measures analyzed 
using claims data, four 
using HEDIS data. 
Analysis used NCQA 
HEDIS specifications 
which specify inclusion 
and exclusion criteria, 
but do not control for 
health status or co-
morbidities. Multivariate 
logistic regression was 
used to adjust for age, 
race/ethnicity, and SES. 
Race/ethnicity and SES 
were identified using 
geocoding. 
Adjusting for 
covariates, there were 
significant gender 
differences on 5 of 11 
measures with four 
favoring men. The 
largest disparity was 
LDL-C among 
diabetics. Gender 
differences were 
common and 
sometimes 
substantial. Covariate 
adjustment eliminated 
gender differences for 
lipid profile check 
among diabetic 
Medicare enrollees 
but two gender 
differences became 
significant after co-
variate adjustment. 
The authors could not 
identify the 
underlying causes of 
the disparities. 
Race/ethnicity and 
SES were geocoded 
based on ZIP code 
data rather than 
individual beneficiary 
attributes. The data 
are older. 
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Blum 2014 Retrospective 
cohort 
Medicare 
traditional 
beneficiaries 
aged 65+ 
hospitalized 
with a 
primary 
discharge 
diagnosis of 
congestive 
heart failure 
between 
12/1/06 and 
12/1/09 
Medicare 
traditional 
claims data 
and 
Medicare 
Beneficiary 
Annual 
Summary 
files 
30 day 
readmission 
for 
congestive 
heart failure 
Phase 1: Estimation of 
hospital level risk-
standardized readmission 
rates adjusting for age, 
sex and comorbid 
conditions. Phase 2: 
examined the impact of 
the inclusion of the 
AHRQ SES index score 
on the performance on 
minority-serving hospitals  
Higher SES score 
were associated with 
a lower odds ratio of 
readmission. 
Nonetheless, 
adjusting for SES 
moved the results 
for only one study 
hospital. There were 
a small number of 
hospitals overall 
who were above and 
below the mean. 
The study is limited 
to readmissions for 
heart failure and is 
limited to experience 
in New York City. 
The study is limited 
to inpatient data 
only; not ambulatory 
care experience. The 
community-level 
SES may not be an 
appropriate indicator 
of patient-level 
socioeconomic 
status. 
Brennan 2010 Retrospective 
cohort 
Medicare 
enrollees in 
traditional 
Medicare 
and 
Medicare 
health plans 
Generating 
Medicare 
Physician 
Quality 
Performance 
Measure 
Results 
(GEM) 
project 
11 quality 
measures 
(see 
Appendix C) 
Claims data were used to 
identify a subset of 
enrollees for whom a 
treatment or screening 
was clinically 
recommended following 
HEDIS specifications. 
For the traditional data, 
measures were 
aggregated at the state, 
national and ZIP code 
levels. For Medicare 
Advantage data they 
summed the numerators 
and denominators across 
plans to produce an 
accurate national picture 
of the quality provided to 
an average beneficiary. 
Medicare Advantage 
plans scores 
substantially better 
on 8 measures, 
slightly better on 2 
measures and worse 
on 1 measure. The 
results were 
adjustment for SES 
characteristics. The 
impact of 
adjustments for SES 
characteristics were 
too small to explain 
the performance 
differences.   
Measures of quality 
applied to traditional 
Medicare and 
Medicare Advantage 
are inconsistent; 
population 
differences were 
accounted for by 
matching of cohorts 
but could only truly 
be addressed via 
randomization 
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Cahow  2010 Retrospective 
cohort 
352 DSNP 
plans 
352 DSNP 
contracts 
that reported 
a 2010 
summary 
star score 
and 
enrollment 
data from 
the Dec. 
2008 MA 
monthly 
enrollment 
contract file  
Medicare 
stars 
measures 
and 
summary 
scores: 11 
HEDIS 
measures 6 
CAHPS 
measures, 8 
operational 
measures 
(see 
Appendix C) 
Regression estimation of 
the impact of each 
independent variable on 
each measure 
Enrollment in a 
DSNP plan is 
negatively 
correlated with 
health plan summary 
Medicare stars 
score/quality rating. 
Dual eligible status 
is not a perfect 
proxy for SES; 
ecological fallacy 
may be present when 
examining data at 
the plan level; 
research was 
sponsored by a 
health plan trade 
organization and 
conducted by a 
consulting group 
whose clients 
include health plans. 
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Calvillo-
King 
2012 System
atic 
review  
72 articles 
relating to 
millions of 
hospitalizatio
ns of which 
15 used 
Medicare data 
sets 
Ovid, 
PubMed 
and 
Psychinfo 
  Systematic review of the 
literature 
The authors divided 
social factors into 
higher and lower 
level. The lower level 
factors were age, 
gender and race. 
Higher level factors 
were income, 
education and 
employment. Most of 
the articles addressed 
lower level factors. 
Articles were 
inconsistent in their 
study of higher level 
factors. Generally, 
for community 
acquired pneumonia 
older age and 
nonwhite race were 
associated with worse 
outcomes and for 
heart failure 
nonwhite race was 
associated with 
higher readmissions 
but lower mortality. 
For both conditions 
the higher level 
factors were 
significantly but 
inconsistently 
associated with 
readmission and 
mortality.  
Data inconsistent so 
that no formal 
synthesis was 
possible. 
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Carey 2016 Retrosp
ective 
cohort 
Hospital level 
performance 
data  
Medicare 
Hospital 
Compare 
website 
and the 
Medicare 
Healthcar
e Cost 
Report 
Informati
on 
System 
(HCRIS) 
30-day 
readmission 
rates as 
calculated for 
the HRRP for 
2013 to 2016 
T-tests to compare safety-
net hospitals to other 
hospitals and regression 
analysis to compare 
percentage point 
reductions in readmissions 
in safety net hospitals to 
other hospitals 
Risk adjusted 
readmissions were 
higher for all 3 
conditions in safety-
net hospitals than in 
other hospitals in 
both years but safety-
net hospitals 
improved more than 
other hospitals. 
However, safety-net 
hospitals did not 
improve as fast as 
non-safety net 
hospitals with similar 
levels of readmission 
in year 2013. 
The study examines 
two points in time 
only. Adjustments 
were limited to 
hospital size, resident 
to bed ratio, 
percentage of patients 
with Medicare and 
occupancy rates. 
Variables not 
accounted for could 
explain some or all of 
the results.  
Chou  2007a Retrosp
ective 
cohort 
Member-level 
HEDIS data 
for 96,055 
members 
from 148 
Medicare 
Managed 
Care Plans in 
2004 
CMS 
enrollmen
t files 
matched 
with US 
Census 
Data 
6 measures of 
diabetes care 
(see appendix 
C for specific 
measures) 
Linear regression was 
modeled (at a 95% CI) for 
each HEDIS measure as a 
function of race, 
controlling for SES 
characteristics, enrollment 
in a plan with more than 
20% minority membership 
and region of residence at 
the first level and plan size 
at the second level. 
Women were more 
likely than men to 
receive screenings 
but less likely to have 
cholesterol control; 
racial disparities 
favored white 
patients over black 
on 5 of 6 measures, 
enrollees in managed 
care plans where 
blacks constituted 
more than 20% of the 
membership tended 
to have a lower 
likelihood of meeting 
4 measures 
The study data set 
doesn’t include 
individual 
demographic data 
including marital 
status, health status or 
utilization patterns, 
the study only 
compared white and 
African American 
beneficiaries because 
of data limitations 
related to other ethnic 
group identification 
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Chou   2007b Retrosp
ective 
cohort 
Commercial 
and Medicare 
Health Plan 
HEDIS 
results. For 
Medicare the 
data set 
included 
individual-
level data for 
participants in 
148 health 
plans 
HEDIS 
data 
submitted 
by plans, 
Medicare 
enrollmen
t file, 
census 
data by 
ZIP code 
5 measures of 
cardiovascula
r care quality. 
See appendix 
C for specific 
measures 
Tested the viability of 
gender stratified 
measurement. Identified 
the presence of gender 
disparities using paired T-
tests and Bonferroni 
adjustments. Scored the 
magnitude of gender 
disparities by computing a 
disparity score for each 
measure defined as the rate 
for men minus the rate for 
women 
Gender differences 
for Medicare 
Advantage plans 
favored men and 
were not linked to 
health plan 
performance or 
region. 
The article presents 
only unadjusted data 
at the health plan 
level, the study did 
not control for age, 
the lack of provider 
and patient-level data 
on utilization made it 
impossible to 
differentiate between 
clinical practice and 
patient adherence in 
order to explain the 
source of the 
observed disparities. 
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Couto 2014 Retrosp
ective 
cohort 
379,533 
Medicare part 
D 
beneficiaries 
Pharmacy 
claims 
data from 
a large 
commerci
al 
pharmacy 
benefit 
manager 
and a 
large 
Medicare 
part D 
prescripti
on drug 
plan 
Adherence to 
medication 
for diabetes, 
hypertension 
and 
hyperlipidemi
a 
6 separate multiple logistic 
regressions were executed 
to test for adherence 
differences by census 
region, age, gender and 
socio economic status 
defined as median 
household income and LIS 
status  
Adherence differed 
by region with New 
England being the 
most adherent region 
and the West South 
Central region being 
the least adherent 
when controlling for 
age, gender and LIS 
status. Beneficiaries 
younger than 65 and 
females were 
significantly less 
likely to be adherent. 
Beneficiaries who 
received LIS were 
significantly less 
likely than those who 
didn’t to be adherent.  
The study did not 
control for 
comorbidities as 
medical claims were 
not available. The 
LIS identifier did not 
distinguish between 
dual and nondual 
beneficiaries. Median 
income was derived 
using census data to 
the five-digit ZIP 
code, rather than 
individual-level data. 
Geography is likely a 
proxy for health 
literacy, care access, 
burden of disease, 
race and other 
variables but the 
extent of the 
relationship was not 
studied. The data 
used were from a 
single, large health 
plan.  
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Damiani 2015 Systematic 
review 
11 articles, 
all cohort 
studies, 10 
from the US, 
6 using 
Medicare 
data, 7 of 
which are 
included in 
this review 
representing 
6,104,859 
patients  
Medline Studies measuring 
the association 
between risk for 
readmission and 
one SES factor, 
marital status, and 
income among 
patients 65+ with 
HF and AMI 
Systematic 
review of 
the 
literature 
For the short term 
outcome (30-90 days) 
for HF and AMI the 
factor race/ethnicity 
and unmarried status 
were positively related 
to readmission, 
educational attainment 
had no effect. Income 
was inconclusive but 
promising. Hispanic 
and Black people were 
at increased risk 
compared to white 
people. For the long 
term outcome (6 
months- 1 year) the 
SES factor had an 
inconclusive but 
cumulative effect, 
insufficient evidence 
was found for SES and 
social network 
One database, 
differential definitions 
of socioeconomic 
factors, the variability 
of the studies, 
inclusion of only 
older populations with 
HF and AMI limits 
generalizability. 
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Eapen 2015 Retrospective 
Cohort 
48,338 
patients 
from 197 
hospitals 
Get with the 
guidelines 
clinical 
registry data 
from 1/1/05-
12/30/11 and 
2012 Area 
health 
resource files 
All Cause 
Rehospitalization 
within 30 days of 
discharge 
Multivariate 
regression 
County-level SES data 
are modestly associated 
with 30-day readmission 
outcomes among 
Medicare beneficiaries 
hospitalized with HF but 
adding county-level SES 
data (on top of patient 
characteristic data) does 
not improve risk 
adjustment models or 
change hospital rankings. 
The proportion of persons 
with at least a high school 
diploma was associated 
with lower odds of 30-
day rehospitalization. 
County-level SES data 
adjusted away the 
association between black 
race or Hispanic ethnicity 
and 30-day readmission. 
SES at least partially 
accounts for the 
relationship of race and 
ethnicity with early-post 
discharge outcomes for 
patients with HF.  
The study was 
limited to Medicare 
beneficiaries 
enrolled in Get with 
the Guidelines, 
income is an 
unreliable variable 
in a community of 
individuals who may 
be retired, the utility 
of county-level SES 
data may have been 
increased if it were 
more granular or the 
population had been 
observed over a 
longer period of 
time.  
  
  
2
1
0
 
Figueroa 2016 Retrospective 
Cohort 
3052 
hospitals 
CMS HRRP, 
VBP and 
HAC 
penalty 
reporting 
files, AHA 
annual 
hospital 
survey, CMS 
impact file 
Penalty under the 
HRRP, VBP, or 
HAC programs 
Multinomial 
logistic regression 
to calculate the 
odd of receiving 
high, medium of 
low penalties 
In 2015 large hospitals, 
major teaching and high 
DSH hospitals were far 
more likely to receive 
penalties under the 
Medicare HRRP, VBP, 
and HAC programs. 
High DSH hospitals 
were twice as likely to 
be in the most penalized 
group 
Hospital-level 
analysis, single year 
data, use of high 
DSH as a proxy for 
safety net.  
Fischer 2014 Systematic 
review 
102 articles, 
number, age 
or location 
of effected 
patients 
unstated 
Embase, 
Medline, 
OvidSP, 
Web of 
Science, 
Cochrane, 
PubMed  
Studies focused 
on the 
methodological 
aspects of 
readmission rates 
as a quality 
indicator for 
hospital care. 
Systematic review 
of the literature 
The likelihood of 
readmission is effected 
by the quality of care 
and the characteristics of 
the patient, the sickest 
and the poorest are at 
highest risk of 
readmission but the 
measure which often 
uses administrative data 
excluding detailed 
clinical data. Current 
research provides 
limited guidance on 
which case mix variables 
should be included. 
Other challenges to the 
measure: clinical setting, 
indicator definition, 
effect of competing 
outcomes, data 
reliability 
Not exclusive to 
Medicare, seniors 
or the U.S. 
Fremont  2005 Retrospective 
cohort 
9 
Medicare+ 
Choice and 
10 
commercial 
health plans 
including 
Plan-level 
HEDIS 
process of 
care measure 
and 
intermediate 
outcomes 
Process: Diabetics 
annually checked 
for Blood Sugar, 
LDL and urine 
protein levels and 
annual eye exam. 
Beta blocker 
Χ2 tests were used 
to compare the % 
of eligible patients 
in each 
racial/ethnic and 
SES group that 
met each process 
Racial and SES 
disparities were present 
for the majority of 
process measures. 
Results were essentially 
the same for individual 
and geocoded 
Race/ethnicity data 
were geocoded 
rather than 
individually 
identified. 
However, in 
validation, the 
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195,116 
Medicare 
enrollees in 
4 regional 
data, Census 
block data 
and CMS 
individual-
level race 
data  
prescription post-
MI, LDL check in 
patients after 
cardiac event; 
Intermediate 
outcome: 
adequate LDL 
control after a 
cardiac event, 
blood pressure 
control in 
hypertensives, 
Blood Sugar and 
LDL control in 
diabetics 
measure. 
Multivariate 
logistic regression 
was used to 
compare the 
adjusted 
probability 
meeting the 
quality measure in 
each subgroup by 
plan type. Tests 
were repeated at 
the plan and 
individual levels 
for the diabetes 
measures. 
Adjusted and 
unadjusted 
racial/ethnic and 
SES disparities 
were examined 
for intermediate 
outcome 
measures.  
performance. Additional 
adjustments for 
sociodemographic 
factors reduced but did 
not eliminate the size of 
the disparities based on 
gender and age). 
Significant racial 
disparities existed for all 
but one intermediate 
outcome measure and 
SES disparities were 
present for all four. On 
several measures race 
and SES exert 
independent effects. 
results were similar 
between geocoded 
and individual data. 
Geocoding allowed 
only a comparison 
of black and other 
races.  
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Greysen 2015 Retrospective 
cohort 
7854 
community 
dwelling 
seniors 
representing 
22,289 
Medicare 
hospitalizati
on from 
2000 to 
2010 
admissions 
not patients 
were the unit 
of analysis 
The national 
health and 
retirement 
study (HRS) 
and 
Medicare 
claims data 
Functional 
Impairment 
Logistic 
regression 
with robust 
variance 
estimation to 
adjust for 
clustering of 
admissions 
within 
individuals. 
They 
additionally 
performed a 
sub-analysis 
restricted to 
MI, CAP and 
HF. 
Admissions with a 
readmission within 30 days 
were substantially higher for 
patients with a nonwhite 
race/ethnicity, lower annual 
income, lower net wealth, less 
than a high school diploma, 
fair or poor self-rated care, a 
higher Elixhauser comorbidity 
score and a previous 
hospitalization within 1 year 
of the index admission. In the 
multivariate analysis they 
found a progressive increase in 
the risk adjusted risk of 
readmission as the degree of 
functional impairment 
increased. A similar trend was 
found when limiting the 
readmissions to MI, CAP, and 
HF  
Given the 
manner in which 
the HRS is 
conducted, 
measurement of 
functional 
impairment and 
hospitalization 
were not uniform 
among survey 
participants, the 
study is limited 
to data before 
2010, the authors 
did not use the 
same 
readmission 
adjustment 
procedures used 
by CMS in 
calculating 
readmission 
rates including 
SES factors 
which may be 
over adjusted the 
readmission 
rates and 
therefore be 
conservative.  
Gu  2014 Retrospective 
cohort 
 Readmissio
ns among 
patients with 
the 
following 
index 
admissions: 
142122 
index 
admissions 
100% 
Medicare 
traditional 
inpatient 
claims data 
for 2009 to 
identify 
short-term 
acute care 
hospital 
Risk-
standardized 
readmission 
rates 
Regression 
analysis and 
projections. 
Medicare cost 
reports were 
used to 
identify 
hospital 
population 
characteristics: 
Patient dual eligible status and 
hospital dual eligible share 
have a positive impact on risk-
adjusted hospital readmission 
rates. High dual hospitals are 
likely to have excess 
readmissions when compared 
to low dual hospitals. Risk 
standardized readmission rates 
for heart attack, pneumonia 
CMS uses 3 
years of data to 
calculate 
readmission 
measures while 
this study used 
only one year of 
data; the study 
uses only 
inpatient claims; 
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for acute 
myocardial 
infarction; 
264815 
index 
admissions 
for 
pneumonia; 
350, 590 
index 
admissions 
for heart 
failure 
admissions 
for 7 
conditions, 
applied the 
inclusion 
and 
exclusion 
criteria for 
the Medicare 
HRRP 
measure.  
% duals, profit 
margin and 
characteristics; 
could not, 
based on data 
accessible, use 
the HCC 
model so 
instead 
adjusted for 
comorbidities 
using the 
Elixhauser 
model from 
AHRQ 
and heart failure were higher 
for dual eligibles even after 
controlling for age, gender and 
comorbidity. Dual eligibles 
were more likely to be female 
and African American.  
Dual status is not 
a perfect proxy 
for examining 
the relationship 
between SES 
and 
readmissions. 
Authors are 
consultants and 
staff of the 
American 
Association of 
Medical 
Colleges.  
Harman  2010 Retrospective 
cohort 
8184 
Medicare 
plan 
enrollees; 
noninstitutio
nalized, 
nonproxy 
respondents 
aged 65+ 
Medicare 
HOS 2001-
2003 and 
Medicare 
HEDIS 2002 
2 year 
changes in 
enrollee 
physical and 
mental health 
based on 6 
plan-level 
performance 
measures 
correspondin
g to diabetes 
process and 
intermediate 
outcome 
measures 
Hierarchical 
linear models 
were used to 
estimate the 
relationship 
between plan 
HEDIS 
performance 
on diabetes 
process and 
outcome 
measures and 
2-year changes 
in enrollee 
Health 
Outcome 
Survey (HOS) 
physical and 
mental health 
scores. 
Health plan process of care 
composite scores were not 
associated with improvements 
in the individual physical 
component score (PCS) but 
intermediate outcome scores 
were significantly associated 
with changes in PCS score. 
The process of care composite 
and intermediate outcome 
composite were both 
significantly associated with 
changes in the mental 
component score (MCS). The 
enrollee’s characteristics 
impacted the plans’ PCS score 
and the PCS impacted the 
MCS. 
Plan attrition, 
beneficiary 
attrition, self-
reported disease 
status, and the 
fact that HEDIS 
quality measures 
do not capture 
all aspects of 
plan services that 
may influence 
patient 
outcomes. 
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Herrin 2015 Retrospective 
Cohort 
4,073 
Hospitals in 
2,254 
counties 
Readmission 
rates 
reported via 
CMS 
Hospital 
Compare 
website, 
AHA 
Annual 
Survey, 
HRSA Area 
Resource 
File, CMS 
Nursing 
Home 
Compare, 
Nielsen 
Popfacts, 
CDC NCHS 
Urban-Rural 
Classificatio
n Scheme 
for Counties 
HLMs were 
used to 
determine 
variance 
between risk 
standardized 
readmissions 
by hospital.  
Multivariate 
analysis of 
the impact of 
county level 
characteristics 
on hospital 
readmissions 
58% of national variation in 
hospital readmissions was 
explained by county 
characteristics, the strongest of 
which was access to care, 
socioeconomic status, 
physician mix, and nursing 
home quality. 
This is an 
observational 
study so 
causality cannot 
be found. The 
number of 
studied 
conditions is 
limited to 3, data 
examined were 
at the county 
level, the AHA 
survey may 
include as a 
single hospital 
multi-hospital 
systems.   
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Holmes  2013 Retrospective 
cohort  
677,580 
patients 
receiving 
prescriptions 
through 
Medicare 
part D in 
2008 
2007 & 2008 
Medicare 
part D event 
files and part 
B claims 
data for 
100% 
sample of 
Texas 
traditional 
Medicare 
beneficiaries
. MDS data 
to identify 
nursing 
home stays. 
Medicare 
denominator 
file was used 
for 
demographic 
data.  
Receipt of at 
least one PIM 
defined as 
being 
contained in 
the 48 
medications 
or medication 
classes 
included in 
the 2003 
Beers list 
Multivariate 
analysis of the 
odds of PIM 
receipt at the 
level of 
primary care 
prescriber 
controlling for 
patient 
characteristics 
31.9% of Medicare part D 
beneficiaries studied received 
a PIM. Sex, ethnicity, low-
income subsidy eligibility and 
hospitalization were associated 
with PIM use. The strongest 
association with PIM 
prescribing was increasing 
number of prescribers and 
medications. Black 
beneficiaries had a higher odds 
ratio of PIM receipt than 
white, Hispanic, Asian and 
other. LIS subsidy eligibles 
had a higher odds ratio of 
receiving a PIM than 
nonsubsidy eligibles.  
Geographic and 
plan enrollment 
limitations limit 
the 
generalizability 
of the findings.  
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Hu 2014 Retrospective 
cohort 
Medicare 
traditional 
beneficiaries 
ages 65+ 
discharged 
from an 
urban safety-
net hospital 
in 2010 
Corporate 
data store 
Henry Ford 
Hospital 
30 day 
readmission 
Multivariate 
logistic 
regression was 
used to 
examine the 
association 
between 30-
day 
readmissions 
and patient and 
neighborhood 
characteristics.  
Male, black and currently 
unmarried patients were more 
likely to have at least one 
readmission than female, 
nonblack and currently 
married patients. A larger 
proportion of patients residing 
in neighborhoods with low 
education, high poverty and 
low household income had at 
least 1 readmission, compared 
to those living in other 
neighborhoods. Comorbidities 
were higher among those with 
a readmission than among 
those without. Across the 3 
socioeconomic factors, older 
and male patients were 
significantly more likely to be 
readmitted within 30 days than 
younger and female patients. 
Currently married patients 
were significantly less likely 
to be readmitted that patients 
who were unmarried. The 3 
SES variables were all 
significantly associated with 
patients' having at least one 
30-day readmission.  
Data from a 
single hospital, 
one year's 
historical 
inpatient 
diagnoses which 
might 
underestimate 
the severity of 
the patients' 
illnesses, lack of 
data re: post-
discharge 
clinical care; 
community 
support used 
marital status as 
a proxy for 
community 
support.  
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Inovalon 
2013 
2013 Retrospective 
cohort 
1,335,709 
enrollees in 
2011 and 
1,605,644 
enrollees in 
2012; 520 
Medicare 
advantage 
contracts 
CMS 
published 
data and the 
Inovalon 
"MORE" 
Registry 
10 quality 
measures 
included in 
the Medicare 
stars 
methodology 
(see appendix 
c for list of 
measures) 
Using logistic 
regression, 
stratified rates 
were 
calculated for 
10 star 
measures. 
Individual 
beneficiaries 
were stratified 
based on 
Medicaid 
eligibility, age, 
gender, race, 
region, 
original reason 
for Medicare 
entitlement, 
and 
comorbidity.  
Dual eligibles perform worse 
than nonduals on 8 of 10 
measures after adjusting for 
other factors. Duals had 
significantly worse treatment 
rates for arthritis and 
osteoporosis. Duals have 
significantly worse preventive 
screening rates for breast 
cancer and glaucoma. Sicker 
members do better on 
mammography than well 
members. Duals are more 
likely than nonduals to be 
readmitted after a hospital 
stay. Duals have higher use of 
high-risk medications; 
adherence rates are lower for 
duals on all 3-adherence 
measures.  
Individual-level 
analysis 
conducted using 
a data set limited 
to consulting 
group client 
base; ecological 
fallacy may be 
present when 
examining data 
at the plan level; 
research 
conducted by a 
consulting group 
whose clients 
include health 
plans. 
Inovalon 
2014 
2014 Retrospective 
cohort  
2,319,457 
Medicare 
Advantage 
members in 
81 contracts 
and 436 
individual 
plan benefit 
packages in 
2013  
Data from 
six Medicare 
Advantage 
health plans 
and the 
Inovalon 
"MORE" 
Registry 
18 measures 
of quality, 8 
2014 star 
measures and 
10 display 
HEDIS 
measures 
Member-level 
analysis of the 
impact of 
demographic, 
clinical, SES 
and 
community 
resource 
factors on 
performance 
differentials 
between dual 
and nondual 
beneficiaries 
Dual members performed 
significantly worse on 10 of 18 
measures, including 6 of the 8 
star measures. Dual members 
performed significantly better 
on 5 of 18 measures, 3 of 
which are related to drug 
treatment and 2 of which are 
related to substance use/abuse. 
Dual members performed 
similar to nonduals on three 
measures including access to 
primary care visits implying 
that differential performance is 
not due to access to primary 
care. 
Data set limited 
to 6 self-selected 
plans and 
consulting group 
database; 
research 
sponsored by 
health plans and 
conducted by a 
consulting group 
whose clients 
include health 
plans. 
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Inovalon 
2015 
2015 Retrospective 
cohort 
2,207,940 
Medicare 
Advantage 
members 
from 81 MA 
contract with 
364 
individual 
plan benefit 
packages 
Health plan 
data, 
Inovalon’s 
MORE2 
registry, 
CMS 
monthly 
membership 
reports, 
Acxiom’s 
market 
indices ACS 
data, the 
Area Health 
Resource 
File 
The effect of 
dual status on 
measure 
performance 
with and 
without 
adjusting for 
specific 
individual 
and plan 
factors 
Three types of 
linear mixed 
models 
The effect of dual status was 
significant and negative for 8 
measures after controlling both 
for plan and for the percent of 
dual eligibles served by the 
plan. Differences in clinical, 
SES and community resource 
characteristics between dual 
eligible and nondual eligible 
members accounted for 70% 
or more of the performance 
gap observed in the seven star 
measures analyzed. SES 
characteristics were 
consistently the main 
contributor accounting for at 
least 30% of the observed 
disparities. 
Study conducted 
for an 
organization that 
provides 
consulting 
services to health 
plans. Study 
partially 
underwritten by 
health plans. 
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Joynt  2011 Retrospective 
cohort 
3,163,011 
Medicare 
discharges 
for 
myocardial 
infarction, 
congestive 
heart failure 
and 
pneumonia 
among 
beneficiaries 
aged 65+ in 
the 50 US 
States 
Medicare 
Provider 
Analysis 
Review files 
from 1/1/06-
11/30/08 
Risk adjusted 
odds of 
readmission 
Comparison of 
black and 
white patients 
for each 
condition 
using 
Wilcoxon tests 
for continuous 
data and Χ2 
tests for 
categorical 
data; 
multivariate 
logistic 
regression to 
determine risk-
adjusted odds 
ratio of 
readmission.  
White patients at nonminority 
serving hospitals had the 
lowest odds of readmission, 
black patients at minority 
serving hospitals had the 
highest. Patients discharged 
from minority serving 
hospitals had a 23% higher 
odds ratio of readmission than 
those discharged from a 
nonminority serving hospital. 
Among patients with acute MI, 
black patients had 13% higher 
odds of readmission regardless 
of site of care but 22% higher 
odds of readmission at a 
minority-serving hospital. 
There was no significant 
interaction between race and 
site of care.  
Use of 
administrative 
data, lack of data 
on medication 
and 
nonprocedural 
treatments, lack 
of data on 
transitions of 
care and 
outpatient care, 
age restricted 
study population 
limits 
applicability of 
findings to 
younger patients.  
Joynt 2013 Retrospective 
cohort 
3282 
hospitals 
subject to 
the Medicare 
HRRP 
program 
HRRP 
Supple-
mental Data 
File; AHA 
2011 annual 
survey of 
hospitals 
Adjusted and 
unadjusted 
odds ratios 
Multinomial 
Logistic 
regression to 
calculate the 
odds of 
receiving an 
HRRP penalty 
or a high or a 
low penalty, 
Multivariate 
analysis to 
calculate an 
adjusted odds 
ratio.  
66.7% of hospitals were 
penalized under the HRRP in 
2013. Large hospitals, 
teaching hospitals and safety 
net hospitals (defined as high 
DSH hospitals) have higher 
odds of receiving a penalty. 
Using an adjusted odds ratios 
safety net hospitals were the 
most likely to be highly 
penalized. 
Study at the 
hospital level, no 
agreed on 
method to 
identify safety 
net hospitals, 
one year 
performance 
snapshot. 
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Jung 2016 Retrospective 
Cohort 
149,773 
assessed for 
risk of fall, 
113,650 
assessed for 
bladder 
control 
intervention, 
383,207 
assessed for 
physician 
monitoring 
of physical 
activity 
Medicare 
Health 
Outcomes 
Survey 
results for 
2010 and 
2013 
Plan 
performance 
on 3 
measures 
included in 
the HOS 
Multivariable 
logistic 
regression 
stratified by 
health plan 
adjusted for 
plan level 
characteristics 
Similar results were found for 
differences in receipt of the 
three studied services 
examined by black/white race, 
Asian/white race and 
Hispanic/white ethnicity. After 
the introduction of pay for 
performance the gaps 
decreased between Hispanics 
and whites for 2 measures and 
black and white beneficiaries 
for one measure.   
Self-reported 
measures of 
quality, 
measures of 
chronic 
condition did not 
include level of 
severity, study 
was not able to 
account for 
provider-patient 
language 
concordance.  
Kahn 2015 Descriptive 
statistics 
Adult, 
nonfederal 
acute care 
hospitals 
paid under 
the Medicare 
Inpatient 
Payment 
System 
CMS IPPS 
final rule 
impact file 
Penalty under 
the VBBP, 
Hospital VBP 
or HAC 
programs 
Logistic 
regression to 
assess the odds 
ratio of a 
hospital 
receiving a 
penalty based 
on hospital 
characteristics 
(DSH 
percentage, 
teaching, 
number of 
beds, type of 
ownership, 
geographic 
location) 
Teaching status and bed size 
significantly increase the odds 
of receiving a penalty. Major 
teaching hospitals are 1.60, 
2.58, and 4.04 times more 
likely than nonteaching 
hospitals to receive a penalty 
in the Hospital VBP, the 
HRRP, and the HAC 
Reduction Program, 
respectively. Hospitals with 
51-65% DSH percentage (not 
the highest percentage of 65+) 
fare most poorly under the 
three programs 2.39, 1.20 and 
1.51 times more likely than 
hospitals with 0-25% DSH to 
receive a penalty in the 
Hospital VBP, the HRRP, and 
the HAC Reduction Program, 
respectively. 
Hospital-level 
analysis, DSH as 
a proxy for 
safety net status 
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Kind 2014 Retrospective 
cohort 
Medicare 
traditional 
patients 
discharged 
with 
congestive 
heart failure, 
pneumonia, 
or 
myocardial 
infarction 
between 
2004 and 
2009 
Random 5% 
national 
sample from 
the Medicare 
chronic 
conditions 
data 
warehouse; 
255,744 
patients 
30-day 
rehospitalizati
on 
Logistic 
regression of 
the 
relationship 
between ADI 
grouping and 
30-day 
rehospitalizati
on 
30-day rehospitalization rates 
did not vary significantly 
across the least disadvantaged 
85% of neighborhoods but 
within the most disadvantaged 
15% rehospitalization rates 
increased from 22 to 27% with 
increasing deprivation. This 
relationship persisted after full 
adjustment for SES 
characteristics, comorbidities, 
severity of illness 
Using ZIP code 
data, the results 
may not apply to 
beneficiaries 
without 
permanent 
addresses; 
census data may 
not reflect 
detailed 
neighborhood 
and individual 
characteristics; 
any 
nonindividual 
measure 
including ADI 
can introduce 
ecological 
fallacy; the 
quality of care in 
hospitals serving 
high ADI 
communities 
could have 
influenced the 
findings 
Krumholz 
& Parent  
1997 Retrospective 
cohort 
Medicare 
traditional 
beneficiaries 
in 
Connecticut 
over age 65 
who were 
hospitalized 
with a 
diagnosis 
code of 
congestive 
heart failure 
CT 
MedPAR 
file  
Readmissions 
for congestive 
heart failure 
within 6 
months of 
discharge and 
readmission 
or death 
within 6 
months of 
discharge 
Bivariate and 
multivariate 
logistic 
regression 
analysis to 
identify the 
association 
between 
patient age, 
sex and 
clinical data 
and 
readmission 
Increasing age was positively 
associated with mortality and 
negatively associated with 
readmission. Male sex 
combined with a prior 
admission and a co-morbidity 
score of >1 was a significant 
predictor of readmission. 
Patients 85+ had a higher 
likelihood of readmission than 
patients between 65-74 but age 
was not a significantly 
associated with readmission. 
Limited data set, 
lack of clinical 
data, and limited 
geographic 
sample all limit 
the 
generalizability 
of the findings to 
other regions.  
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and survived 
the index 
admission 
within 6 
months after 
discharge to 
determine the 
spectrum of 
diagnoses 
responsible for 
readmission 
for patients 
with 
congestive 
heart failure. 
White race and male gender 
were independent predictors of 
readmission.  
Krumholz 
& Chen  
2000 Retrospective 
cohort 
Medicare 
traditional 
beneficiaries 
in 
Connecticut 
over age 65 
who were 
admitted to 
any of 18 
hospitals 
with a 
diagnosis 
code of heart 
failure and 
survived the 
index 
admission in 
1994-95 
MEDPAR 
data applied 
to 9 CT 
hospitals and 
12 hospitals 
in an initial 
sample and 
then a 
validation 
sample. 3 
hospitals but 
no patients 
appeared in 
both 
samples.  
Readmission 
for heart 
failure within 
6 months of 
an index 
admission 
Bivariate and 
multivariate 
logistic 
regression 
analysis to 
identify the 
association 
between 
patient age, 
sex and 
clinical data 
and 
readmission 
within 6 
months after 
discharge to 
determine the 
factors 
significantly 
associated 
with 
readmission. 
Of 32 patient and clinical 
factors, only 4 were found to 
be significantly associated 
with readmission: prior 
admission within 1 year, prior 
heart failure, diabetes, and 
creatinine level >2.5 mg/dl. 
Among all individuals with an 
index admission of heart 
failure more than 25% were 
readmitted. Demographic 
factors examined were not 
significantly associated with 
readmission (age, gender, and 
race). 
The study relied 
on 
administrative 
data and 
retrospective 
medical record 
so possible 
misclassification
. Limited to age 
65+ so possibly 
not generalizable 
to a younger 
population. The 
study was 
limited to 
hospitals in CT 
so limited 
geographic 
generalizability. 
No information 
about outpatient 
management. No 
information on 
other important 
variables such as 
quality of life.  
  
  
2
2
3
 
Lindenauer  2013  Retrospective 
cohort 
Medicare 
patients aged 
+65 
hospitalized 
in 2006-08 
with a 
principle 
diagnosis of 
myocardial 
infarction, 
heart failure 
or 
pneumonia; 
555,962 
admissions 
for 
myocardial 
infarction, 
1,092,285 
for heart 
failure and 
1,146,414 
for 
pneumonia 
Medicare Data 
file, American 
Community 
Survey, Kaiser 
Family 
Foundation, 
individual 
patient HCC 
scores 
Readmission 
and mortality 
For each 
condition they 
fit a series of 
three-level 
hierarchical 
regression 
models that 
incorporated 
patient, hospital 
and state 
effects, In each 
model the gini 
coefficient 
(measured at 
the state level) 
served as the 
primary 
predictor 
Models that adjusted 
for patient-level 
estimates of SES 
continued to show a 
significant association 
between income 
inequality and 
readmission for all 3 
conditions. The 
authors estimate that 
nearly 39,000 
readmissions are 
associated with 
residence in states in 
the three highest 
quarters of income 
inequality compared 
with the states in the 
lowest quarter. More 
than 66% of patients 
were cared for in 
hospitals located in 
states with the 2 
highest quarters of 
inequality. 
Associations we 
attenuated by but 
remained significant 
after adjustments for 
patient, state and 
hospital 
characteristics 
including adjustment 
for individual 
estimates of income 
and education.  
The analysis included 
only Medicare 
beneficiaries with 3 
conditions. Age, 
diagnosis and 
insurance status could 
modify the 
relationship between 
inequality and 
outcome, the 
regression analysis 
controlled for some, 
but not all, possible 
confounders so there 
could be residual 
bias, the time of the 
study does not take 
into account the 
differential timing 
between exposure to 
inequality and 
outcome; income 
levels were estimated 
using ZIP code rather 
than individual data; 
inequality was 
measured at the state 
level; analysis did not 
account for 
competing risks of 
death. 
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Mahmoudi 2016 Restrospective 
Cohort 
3735 
Medicare 
beneficiaries, 
1235 
participating 
in MA and 
2500 in 
Traditional 
Medicare 
2006 and 2011 
Household 
component of 
the MEPS 
survey 
Diabetic 
foot checks, 
diabetic eye 
exam, 
cholesterol 
check 
among 
diabetics, 
flu 
vaccination 
among 
diabetics 
Propensity 
score weighting 
between MA 
and traditional 
Medicare, 
Application of 
the IOM’s 
framework for 
measuring 
disparities, 
multivariable 
differences in 
differences 
models for 
each outcome 
variable and 
logistic 
regression for 
dichotomous 
variables 
There were differences 
within racial and ethnic 
groups between MA and 
traditionalMedicare but 
there was not a selection 
bias. For African Americans 
disparities grew in two of 
the four measures and 
shrunk in the other 2 in MA. 
For Hispanics disparities 
decreased significantly in 3 
of the 4 quality measures.  
No information 
regarding 
differences in 
MA plans or 
their pentration. 
No ability to 
control for 
individual 
preferences in 
diabetes 
management.  
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McBean 2003 Retrospective 
cohort 
293 of the 
301 managed 
care plans 
that provided 
data to 
Medicare in 
1999 
representing 
individual-
level data on 
157,394 
enrollees 
Individual-
level data from 
the 1999 
Medicare 
denominator 
file and the 
group health 
plan master file 
Poor Blood 
Sugar 
control 
among 
diabetics 
Bivariate and 
multivariate 
analysis 
In 1999 32.7% of older 
Medicare health plan 
members had not had a 
glycemic test or had poor 
glycemic control. Asians 
had the lowest age and sex 
adjusted rates of poor 
glycemic control. The age 
and sex adjusted rates for 
blacks and Hispanics were 
statistically significantly 
higher than they were for 
whites. Hispanics on 
Medicaid had rates of 
control similar to whites on 
Medicaid. Covariates 
associated with increased 
risk of poor glycemic 
control were younger age 
group, Medicaid-
administered program, for-
profit plan, independent 
practice association model 
plan, smaller plan, >3% 
minority rate plan, location 
of plan in the south or 
northeast, not receiving each 
service included in the 
diabetes care measure.  
Data limited to 
the HEDIS 
specifications 
which limit the 
study population 
and assume a 
definition of 
glycemic control 
that might be 
viewed as 
liberal. Because 
the study was 
done on 1999 
data which was 
the first year 
plans reported 
the glycemic 
control measure, 
they found 
reporting 
inconsistencies 
and error 
limiting the 
number of plans 
included in the 
study. 
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McHugh  2010 Retrospective 
cohort 
 239,953 
index 
admissions 
for heart 
failure (HF); 
193,421 
index 
admissions 
for acute 
myocardial 
infarction 
(AMI); 
350,740 
index 
admissions 
for 
pneumonia  
2008 Medicare 
provider 
analysis and 
review 
(MEDPAR) 
file and the 
American 
Hospital 
Association 
Annual Survey 
of Hospitals 
 30-day all 
cause 
readmission 
Generalized 
estimating 
equation 
models to 
determine an 
odds ratio of 30 
day all cause 
readmission 
Purpose was to examine the 
baseline risk of readmission 
by race following a 
hospitalization for AMI, HF 
or pneumonia. In all 
instances black and 
Hispanic patients, we 
readmitted more frequently 
than white patients. All 
differences were statistically 
significant, except the 
difference between white 
and Hispanic beneficiaries 
for pneumonia and HF. 
Black patients had a 9%, 
13% and 21% higher odds 
of readmission than whites 
from HF, AMI and 
pneumonia respectively. 
Hispanics had a 20% higher 
odds ratio than whites for 
readmission after AMI. 
Disparities remained 
consistent after controlling 
for comorbidities and 
hospital characteristics.  
Used Elixhauser 
comorbidity 
indicators and 
indicators from 
the CMS chronic 
conditions 
warehouse as 
they did not 
have patient-
specific 
comorbidity data  
Nagasako 2014  111,329 
unique 
patients with 
AMI, 25,729 
unique 
patients with 
pneumonia 
and 22,433 
unique 
patients with 
HF all 
readmitted to 
hospitals in 
Missouri 
Administrative 
data from the 
Missouri 
Hospital 
Association, 
census data 
from Truven 
Health 
Analytics and 
Nielsen Pop-
facts 
30 day 
readmission 
for AMI, 
HF and 
Pneumonia 
Backward 
selection 
stepwise 
regression on a 
group of SES 
variables 
interacted with 
race and 
discharge home 
following index 
admission. 
Calculated risk-
standardized 
readmissions 
Although the average risk-
standardized readmissions 
rate did not change 
significantly for any of the 
cohorts, the overall range of 
hospital performance in 
each of the measures was 
substantially narrower, 
declining from 6.5 % to 
1.8% for AMI, 14.0% to 
7.4% for heart failure, and 
7.4 to 3.7 % for pneumonia. 
Risk-standardized 
readmission rates calculated 
Use of census 
data as a proxy 
for individual 
social factors, 
Missouri only 
data which 
limits 
generalizability, 
exclusion of 
discharges 
without a patient 
residence. 
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between 
6/1/09 and 
5/31/12 
using the 
Medicare 
HRRP 
methodology 
using both the 
baseline and 
socioeconomic 
factor-enriched 
models  
using the socioeconomic-
factor-enriched models 
increased regression toward 
the mean for both high and 
low penalty hospitals  
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Priest  2012 Retrospective 
Cross 
sectional 
analysis 
183,213 
individuals age 
65+ in 2006 
continuously 
enrolled in a 
Medicare 
Advantage plan 
through 2007 
with at least one 
condition of 
interest in the 
2006 calendar 
year and met 
specific clinical 
criteria 
A single 
large 
national 
plan 
sponsor 
offering 
MAPD 
plans which 
provide part 
D benefits 
Disease 
specific 
measures for 
asthma, COPD, 
depression and 
diabetes 
Multivariate 
analysis of 
disease specific 
quality measures 
by LIS status; 
patients were 
assigned to 
condition-specific 
cohorts 
Differences in quality 
of care, cost, 
adherence and 
resource use were 
seen by condition and 
by subsidy status. 
Findings on quality 
measures were higher 
for nonsubsidy 
patients than subsidy 
patients but 
medication use and 
adherence we higher 
for subsidy eligibles 
than nonsubsidy 
eligibles.  
The study was 
conducted using 
claims data. 
However just 
because a 
prescription was 
filled doesn't mean 
it was taken. In 
addition, because 
retrospective there 
is a possibility for 
confounding, bias 
and 
misclassification of 
patients. 
Qato  2012 Retrospective 
cohort 
6,204,824 
enrollees aged 
65 and up in 415 
Medicare 
advantage plans 
in 2009 
Individual-
level 
Medicare 
HEDIS data 
for 2009 
obtained 
from CMS 
Receipt or 
nonreceipt of 
one or two high 
risk 
medications 
Fitted generalized 
linear regression 
models to model 
outcomes on a 
risk difference 
scale 
Wide geographic 
variation in 
prescribing patterns 
not explained by SES 
characteristics. Female 
gender, white race, a 
low score on the 
AHRQ SES index and 
low personal income 
predicted receipt of 
HRMs. 
No information on 
whether propensity 
of obtaining mental 
health services 
impacts the 
prescribing 
differential by race. 
No information on 
the number of 
prescriptions, 
diagnoses, clinical 
information, and the 
impact of comorbid 
conditions. 
Rathore  2003 Retrospective 
cohort 
analysis  
29,732 
Medicare 
traditional 
beneficiaries 
hospitalized for 
heart failure in 
1998 and 1999 
Medicare 
beneficiary 
medical 
records 
obtained 
through the 
National 
Heart 
Failure 
Project, the 
Readmission 
within one year 
of discharge 
and mortality 
within one year 
admission 
Multilevel logistic 
regression models 
adjusted for age, 
sex and medical 
history, Χ2 tests 
were used to 
evaluate racial 
differences. 
Logistic 
regression also 
Black patients had 
higher crude one-year 
readmission rates than 
white patients. Racial 
differences were 
highest among 
patients age 85+. 
Racial differences in 
readmission varied by 
geographic region and 
Findings may not be 
applicable to 
nonhospitalized 
patients in the 
ambulatory setting. 
They may not be 
applicable to 
conditions other 
than heart failure. 
The data do not 
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AHA 
Annual 
Survey of 
Hospitals, 
the AMA 
Physician 
Masterfile 
adjusted for 
physician, 
hospital and 
geographic 
characteristics. 
by hospital. Mortality 
rates were lower for 
blacks.  
provide any 
information 
regarding quality of 
life.  
Rathore  2006 Retrospective 
cohort 
30,968 
Medicare 
beneficiaries age 
65+, in the 50 
states and DC 
who were not 
excluded for 
specific co-
morbid 
conditions and 
who were 
hospitalized 
with heart 
failure between 
March 1998 and 
April 1999 
Medicare 
beneficiary 
medical 
records 
obtained 
through the 
National 
Heart Care 
Project, US 
Census data 
by ZIP code 
Readmission 
within 1 year 
of discharge, 
mortality 
within 30 days 
and 1 year of 
admission 
Hierarchical 
logistic regression 
models were used 
to assess the 
association of 
SES, quality of 
care and 
outcomes 
adjusting for 
patient, physician 
and hospital 
characteristics 
SES was not 
associated with 30-day 
mortality after 
multivariable 
adjustment. SES was 
associated with a 
higher risk of 1-year 
mortality. Lower SES 
patients had a higher 
risk of readmission 
within 1 year of 
discharge compared to 
higher SES patients. 
Use of census-level, 
rather than 
individual-level, 
data could limit 
accuracy, limiting 
the study population 
to patients’ age 65+ 
limits 
generalizability to 
younger 
populations, 
outcomes were 
limited to 
readmission and 
mortality.  
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Rodriguez 2011 Retrospective 
cohort 
4,550 hospitals 
and 1,173,153 
Medicare 
patients  
Medicare 
Provider 
Analysis 
Review 
files from 
1/1/06-
11/30/08; 
the 
American 
Hospital 
Association 
Annual 
Survey of 
Hospitals, 
Hospital 
Quality 
Alliance 
data 
30-day all-
cause 
readmission for 
heart failure 
and acute 
myocardial 
infarction 
Logistic 
regression models 
to test patient 
ethnicity as 
primary predictor 
of readmission 
and Hispanic 
serving hospitals 
as primary 
predictor of 
readmission and 
the interaction 
between the two 
(ethnicity and 
Hispanic serving 
hospital). Models 
were adjusted for 
patient 
comorbidities 
using the 
Elixhauser 
methodology and 
for hospital 
characteristics. 
Hispanic patients 
discharged for both 
conditions were 
younger, had more co-
morbid conditions and 
were more often 
female than white 
patients. Hispanic 
patients had slightly 
longer lengths of stay. 
Nearly 70% of 
Hispanic patients were 
served in Hispanic 
serving hospitals 
(those serving the top 
decile of Hispanic 
patients). After 
adjusting for 
comorbidities and 
patient characteristics, 
Hispanic patients had 
a 2% higher odds ratio 
of being readmitted in 
30 days for either 
condition compared to 
white patients. 
Hispanics served at 
Hispanic serving 
hospitals had the 
highest rates of 
readmission (quadrant 
analysis).  
Possible 
misclassification of 
individuals as 
Hispanic, use of 
administrative 
rather than clinical 
risk adjustment 
models, only 
included Medicare 
patients so possibly 
not generalizable to 
a younger 
population, lack of 
SES data to 
determine the 
impact of SES 
impact, lack of 
patient-level case 
mix (used hospital-
level data), lack of 
data regarding 
transitions of care 
and access to 
outpatient services.  
  
2
3
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Schmajuk  2011 Retrospective 
cohort 
Eligibility for 
the HEDIS 
rheumatoid 
arthritis (RA) 
measure per the 
measure 
specifications, 
participant age 
65+, residence 
in the 50 US 
States, survival 
through the 
measurement 
year. 
HEDIS data 
for 93,143 
individual 
patients 
>65 
DMARD 
(disease 
modifying 
Antirheuimatic 
drug) receipt 
among eligible 
enrollees  
3 versions of an 
analytic model. 
Model 1 adjusted 
for age, race, sex, 
income and year; 
Model 2 adjusted 
for everything in 
model 1 plus ZIP-
code- based SES, 
geography and 
residence in a 
HPSA; Model 3 
included all of 
model 2 plus plan 
attributes (model 
type, plan age, 
enrollment size 
and tax status). 
Assessed 
variability in plan 
performance and 
applied regression 
coefficients from 
multivariate 
logistic regression 
to calculate the 
predictive 
probability of 
DMARD receipt 
in each health 
plan for each 
individual.  
SES, geography, age 
and plan type matter. 
Patients who were 
older and who were 
male were less likely 
to receive DMARDs. 
Low personal income 
and low SES were 
associated with lower 
DMARD receipt. Low 
SES neighborhood 
had an effect 
independent of 
individual low 
income. Mid- and 
South-Atlantic 
residence correlated 
with less DMARD 
receipt. 70% spread 
between the worst and 
best performing health 
plans. Patients in 
HPSAs were 
significantly less 
likely to get 
DMARDs.  
RA diagnoses were 
obtained from 
administrative 
sources creating a 
possibility that some 
patients we 
misclassified. Lack 
of data on co-
morbidities and 
patient preferences 
that could have 
impacted 
prescribing 
practices. Lack of 
data on the 
prescriber's 
specialty. Lack of 
data on prescription 
drug benefits 
available by plan to 
determine the 
impact of out-of-
pocket cost on 
prescribing 
practices.  
  
  
2
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Schneider  2002 Retrospective 
cohort 
305,574 MA 
beneficiaries 
>65 who had 
data on 1 of 4 
HEDIS 
measures 
1998 
HEDIS file 
obtained 
from CMS 
Breast cancer 
screening, eye 
examinations 
for patients 
with diabetes, 
beta blocker 
use after an 
MI, follow up 
after 
hospitalization 
for mental 
illness 
The authors 
tabulated the 
number of 
enrollees by 
HEDIS measure 
and calculated the 
percentages with 
each SES 
characteristic; 
calculated 
performance on 
each measure as a 
percentage of 
eligible enrollees 
who received the 
specified service, 
comparisons were 
made using 
Χ2tests or 
ANOVA 
Blacks were 
significantly less 
likely than whites to 
receive each of the 
HEDIS measured 
services. The 
unadjusted differences 
ranged from 6.8% for 
eye examinations for 
patients with diabetes 
measure to 20.8% for 
the follow up after 
hospitalization for 
mental illness. These 
differences were not 
resolved as a result of 
controlling for SES 
and the impact of SES 
differed by measure. 
Part, but not all, of the 
disparity was 
explained by 
disproportionate 
enrollment of blacks 
in poorer performing 
health plans. 
The study was not 
designed to identify 
the features of 
managed care that 
were associated 
with racial 
disparities. The 
authors lacked 
information on 
comorbidities, and 
attitudes toward the 
health care system. 
The limitations of 
the HEDIS data and 
lack of utilization 
data outside the 
HEDIS 
specifications could 
have biased the 
results.  
  
  
2
3
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Scheingold 2016 Retrospective 
Cohort 
All US 
Hospitals 
and 
readmission 
for the 
relevant 
conditions in 
the time 
period 
(number 
unstated in 
the article) 
Medicare 
hospital claims 
data in 2009 
and 2012 to 
calculate 
HRRP 
penalties for 
2013 for HF, 
MI and CAP. 
Patient 
characteristics 
from Medicare 
claims data, 
hospital data 
from the 
American 
Hospital 
Association 
Annual 
Services and 
Area Health 
Resource files 
Readmission 
rates as 
defined under 
the HRRP for 
MI, HF and 
CAP to high 
and low DSH 
hospitals.  
Logistic 
regression 
consecutively 
adding 
hospital and 
person 
covariates 
with and 
without the 
HRRP risk 
adjustment 
variables 
measuring in 
method one 
relative risk of 
readmission 
and in method 
2 the odds 
ratio given 
certain 
factors. Wald 
test was used 
to measure the 
effect of the 
covariates 
separately on 
high and low 
DSH 
hospitals.  
In both years differences 
were found in high and 
low DSH hospitals. 
Patients in low DSH 
hospitals were less 
likely to be nonwhite or 
urban. Readmission 
rates higher in high 
DSH hospitals in both 
years. The unadjusted 
odds ratio of 
readmission in a high 
DSH hospital was 16-
17% higher than a low-
DSH hospital. Applying 
HRRP risk adjustment 
factors the difference 
fell to 11% in 2009 and 
12% in 2012. Adding 
patient-level SES, race 
and dual eligibility 
reduced it to 8% in 2009 
and 9% in 2012. Adding 
other variables, the odds 
of readmission remained 
6-7% greater. The 
current expected 
readmission rate 
formula accounts for 
most of the impact of 
other factors on High 
DSH hospitals.  
Only a limited number 
of covariates can be 
constructed from 
Medicare claims data, 
DSH percentage was 
used as a proxy for 
safety net hospital 
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Singh 2013 Retrospective 
cohort 
514,064 
admissions to 272 
hospitals in Texas 
for medical 
diagnoses from 
2008-2009 
Medicare 
summary files: 
MedPAR and 
OutSAF and 
Medicare Carrier 
files 
30-readmission 
rates for 
medical 
diagnoses 
Multivariate 
logistic 
regression.  
Measurable patient 
characteristics alone 
account for 56.2% of 
the variation in 
readmission rates. An 
additional 7.2% was 
explained when 
hospital characteristics 
were added and a 
further 0.8% when 
provider type was 
included. After 
adjustment for patient 
characteristics all 
hospitals’ readmission 
rates regressed toward 
the mean. Higher odds 
of readmission were 
associated with male 
gender, Medicaid 
eligibility, a higher 
DRG weight and 
having been admitted 
to the hospital in the 
prior year. Nonwhite 
populations had a 
protective effect when 
controlling for other 
factors.  
Study of a single 
state over a 2-year 
period limiting 
generalizability. 
Exclusion of 
patients who 
required care in an 
ICU also limiting 
generalizability to 
those patients.  
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Tsai  2014 Retrospective 
cohort 
1,508,402 
Medicare 
traditional 
beneficiaries aged 
65+ with 
admissions in the 
6 index procedures 
Medicare 
provider analysis 
review files from 
2007-2010 for 
inpatient 
hospitalizations; 
2010 American 
Hospital 
Association 
survey to 
identify hospital 
characteristics; 
Hospital 
compare 
Risk adjusted 
odds ratio of 
30-day all 
cause 
readmissions 
for patients 
with an index 
admission for 
coronary artery 
bypass grafting, 
pulmonary 
lobectomy, 
endovascular 
abdominal 
aortic aneurism 
repair, open 
abdominal 
aortic aneurism 
repair, 
colectomy, and 
hip replacement  
Multivariate 
logistic 
regression. 
Patients 
were 
categorized 
into 4 groups 
by race and 
hospital type 
and multiple 
sensitivity 
analyses 
were 
performed.  
Black patients had 
higher readmission 
rates than white 
patients. Both race and 
site of care were 
independent predictors 
of readmission. 
Hospitals serving high 
proportions of minority 
patients had higher 
readmission rates for 
both their black and 
white patients. 
Adjusting for teaching 
status, size, ownership 
and region did not 
significantly change 
these results.  
Administrative data 
were used for risk 
adjustment, lack of 
data on discharge 
planning and use of 
care transition 
practices, limited to 
age 65+ because of 
the use of Medicare 
data limiting 
generalizability to 
younger 
populations, cannot 
determine if the 
results are causal or 
correlative because 
it is an 
observational 
study.  
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Trivedi 2006 Retrospective 
cohort 
431,573 Medicare 
Advantage 
enrollees in 151 
plans  
HEDIS data for 
plans years from 
2002 to 2004, 
Medicare 
enrollment files, 
ZIP-code-level 
data on poverty 
and education 
from the 2000 
U.S. Census 
4 HEDIS 
measures: 
Blood Sugar 
control, LDL-C 
control among 
diabetics, 
Blood Pressure 
control, LDL-C 
control after a 
coronary event 
Bayesian 
estimation to 
achieve a 
95% CI. 
Using 6 
health plan 
fixed effects 
and 6 
individual 
fixed effects. 
Quality 
ratings were 
assigned by 
using a t-test 
of whether 
the plan's 
performance 
rate for 
whites was 
statistically 
different 
from the 
performance 
rate for 
whites in all 
other plans 
and 
comparing 
the absolute 
white-black 
disparity 
adjusted for 
age and sex.  
Disparities vary widely 
among plans and are 
only weakly correlated 
with the overall quality 
of care. The mean 
performance on all 4 
HEDIS measures was 
significantly lower for 
black enrollees than 
white enrollees 
(p<.001) with absolute 
percentage point 
differences ranging 
from 6/8% for blood 
pressure control to 
14.4% for LDL-C 
control. 
The authors lacked 
information about 
clinical and SES 
characteristics at 
the individual 
level. They were 
unable to include a 
provider-level 
analysis. They 
were unable to 
analyze disparities 
for Hispanic, 
Asian, and Native 
American 
Medicare 
beneficiaries due to 
data limitations.  
  
  
2
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Trivedi 2005 Retrospective 
cohort 
1.8 million 
individual-level 
observations from 
183 health plans 
that had been 
continuously 
enrolled in 
Medicare for 5 
years from 1997 
to 2003 
CMS HEDIS 
data for 
Medicare 
managed care 
plans for the 
reporting years 
1998-2004 for 
care that was 
delivered from 
1997-2003 
9 HEDIS 
measures 
related to 
breast 
cancer, 
diabetes 
care and 
cardiovasc
ular care 
Matched the health 
identification codes 
of each enrollee 
with HEDIS data 
on at least one 
measure to obtain 
demographic data 
on race, sex, age, 
and ZIP code. 
Fitted separate 
linear models to 
combine data from 
the first and last 
useable year for 
each measure. 
Conducted 
significance testing 
for quality and for 
race. Ran 3 models 
- the first adjusted 
for age and sex, the 
second for age, sex, 
rural residence and 
health plan, and the 
third for all 
covariates. All 
analyses are 
reported with 2-
tailed P-values 
Quality of care 
improved during the 
study for all measures 
for both blacks and 
whites. The disparity 
between blacks and 
whites narrowed 
significantly on 7 of 9 
measures. Adjustments 
for age and sex had 
little impact on 
disparities. Additional 
adjustment for health 
plan and rural residence 
reduced disparities in 
the initial and final year 
for 6 of 9 measures and 
rendered one disparity 
no longer significant. 
The additional 
adjustment for SES 
further reduced the 
magnitude of disparities 
in both the initial and 
final year. Disparities 
remained at 7% or 
greater for 3 measures 
(control of LDL 
cholesterol for enrollees 
with diabetes or heart 
disease) and control of 
glycosylated 
hemoglobin. 
The study was not 
designed to 
address the factors 
that may have 
caused the 
observed results. 
The study used 
only black and 
white race due to 
lack of race data. 
The study did not 
include risk 
adjusted outcome 
measures due to 
lack of detailed 
clinical 
information. The 
study did not 
include a provider-
level analysis due 
to lack of 
individual 
provider-level 
performance data.  
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Virnig 2002 Retrospective 
cohort 
7,498,496 enrollee 
records from 301 
M+C plans 
CMS Breast 
cancer 
screening, 
cholesterol 
control 
after AMI, 
diabetes 
care, 
control of 
high blood 
pressure 
All measures 
were adjusted 
for age and sex 
using direct 
standardization 
methods. 
Logistic 
regression was 
used to estimate 
adjusted odds 
ratios. Income 
adjustment was 
conducted for 
all multivariate 
regression 
models to 
confirm that 
estimates of 
racial/ethnic 
variation were 
not explained by 
income 
differences. The 
researchers 
calculated both 
the odds ratio of 
receiving the 
measured care 
and the rate of 
individuals 
receiving the 
needed care per 
100 enrollees 
Racial disparities 
persist even after 
controlling for age and 
sex. Compared with 
white women, Hispanic 
and native American 
women showed even 
greater disparities in 
mammogram receipt 
than black women. 
Black persons were the 
only group for which 
rates of diabetes care 
were significantly lower 
than for whites. 
The Medicare + 
Choice population 
is self-selected so 
the results may not 
be able to be 
generalized to the 
entire Medicare 
population. Data 
accuracy depends 
on CMS reporting 
accuracy. Racial 
groups are 
heterogeneous. 
There is no direct 
information on 
education or 
income. ZIP-code-
level data were 
used and aged. 
Lack of data for 
some variables 
impacts the 
statistical power of 
the findings. The 
data were not 
available to adjust 
for illness severity 
of comorbidity. 
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Virnig 2007 Retrospective 
cohort 
5.1 million 
Medicare+Choice 
enrollees in 2003 
from 148 plans 
2004 individual-
level HEDIS 
results for plans 
and 2003 
Medicare 
enrollment and 
demographic 
data and US 
Census data 
Breast 
cancer 
screening, 
comprehen
sive 
diabetes 
care, beta 
blocker 
after heart 
attack, 
cholesterol 
manageme
nt, 
controlling 
high blood 
pressure, 
follow up 
after 
hospitaliza
tion for 
mental 
illness 
Multiple 
regression 
models used to 
assess the 
impact of age, 
sex, area 
income, plan 
size, percentage 
of the region 
black, race, 
geography and 
race/geography 
interaction. 
Adjusted rates 
were calculated 
for each 
measure. 
For all measures, 
geographic areas with 
higher percentages of 
blacks had significantly 
lower HEDIS quality 
scores. Within all 
regions of the country 
small but significant 
levels of racial disparity 
were observed. The 
authors found 
significant 
geography/race 
interactions for all 
measures, except 
controlling high blood 
pressure. With few 
exceptions, the 
geographic disparity 
between regions is 
greater than the within 
region disparity.  
The authors were 
unable to assess 
whether racial 
disparities were 
similar in plans 
that did not submit 
data or submitted 
it without 
identifiers 
necessary to run 
the analysis.  
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Virnig 2004 Retrospective 
cohort 
Individual-level 
data from 301 
Medicare+Choice 
plans on 7,498,496 
persons aged 65+ 
Plan HEDIS 
data matched 
to the 
Medicare 
Denominator 
file for 1999 
Mental health 
inpatient 
discharges, 
Average LOS 
for mental 
health inpatient 
stays, % of 
members 
receiving 
mental health 
services, 7 and 
30 day follow 
up after 
hospitalization 
for mental 
illness, 
antidepressant 
medication 
management,  
Multivariate 
logistic 
regression  
The authors found a 
low quality of mental 
health care for all 
beneficiaries. 
Nonetheless, there 
was strong variation 
among racial groups 
on all measures. The 
odds ratio of follow 
up care after 
hospitalization for 
mental illness for 
African Americans 
was 0.5 compared 
with whites after 
controlling for age, 
sex, income, number 
of admissions, 
average length of 
stay, plan design and 
profit status and 
geography. These 
associations persist 
even after stratifying 
plans for minority 
enrollment. Racial 
variation in acute and 
continuation phase 
treatments persisted 
for all nonwhite 
populations after 
multivariate 
regression was 
applied.  
There is some level 
of disagreement 
about the measures 
that may be reflected 
in the data, the data 
are limited to the 
measurement period 
and don't include FFS 
history, and there is 
no ability to 
understand the 
reasons for the failure 
to receive adequate 
follow up care. 
HEDIS data report on 
rates of services 
delivered not need. 
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Young  2014 Retrospective 
cohort 
478 Medicare part 
D Health Plans 
CMS 
Medicare part 
D plan files  
Medication 
adherence 
measures for 
diabetes, blood 
pressure and 
cholesterol 
Univariate and 
multivariate 
regression 
analyses to 
assess the 
relationship 
between a 
health plan’s 
adherence 
scores and the 
socioeconomic 
composition of 
its enrollee 
population. 
Simulation of 
the impact of 
adjusting for 
socioeconomic 
characteristics 
of plan 
membership 
The socioeconomic 
composition of a 
Medicare part D 
contractor's enrollee 
population has a 
substantial influence 
on performance 
ratings.  
This study was 
conducted at the plan 
level rather than at 
the individual 
enrollee level 
creating the 
possibility of 
ecological fallacy. 
The study used proxy 
measures of SESS 
based on census data.  
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APPENDIX E: SES CHARACTERISTICS ACCOUNTED FOR BY HOSPITAL STUDY 
SES Characteristics Accounted for in the Studies of Hospital Readmissions 
 
Variable Aranda Arbaje ASPE Barnett Bernheim Blum Carey 
Calvillo-
King Damiani 
Age x X  X X X X N/A N/A 
Sex x X  X X X X N/A N/A 
Race x X X X     N/A N/A 
White 
(Caucasian) X   
 
X 
 
  
 
N/A N/A 
Black (African 
American) x   
X 
X 
 
  
 
N/A N/A 
Asian            N/A N/A 
Hispanic     X X     N/A N/A 
Other x X  X     N/A N/A 
Geography x X Rurality       N/A N/A 
Marital status   X 
 
X 
 
  
 
N/A N/A 
Comorbidities 
or HCC score x X Disability X X X X N/A N/A 
SES/Other 
 Previous 
hospitali-
zations, 
history of 
device 
implantati
on 
high school 
diploma, 
income 
<$25,000, 
Medicaid; 
Various social 
and functional 
characteristics 
Dual 
eligible; 
ZCTA level 
income, 
educational 
attainment, 
employment 
rate, home 
value and 
English 
proficiency 
Education, Labor force 
participation, total 
assets, household 
income, household 
debt, original reason 
for entitlement to 
Medicare, Medicaid, 
ESRD; various social 
and functional 
characteristics 
Zip code 
median 
income; 
hospital 
characteristics 
AHRQ 
SES 
index 
by 9-
digit 
ZIP 
code 
% of patients 
eligible for 
SSI; hospital 
characteristics 
hospital 
character
-istics 
hospital 
character
-istics 
 
  
2
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Variable Eapen Figueroa Fischer Greysen Gu Herrin 
Age X N/A N/A X X X 
Sex X N/A N/A X X X 
Race X N/A N/A X X  
White 
(Caucasian) X N/A N/A X   
 
Black (African 
American) X N/A N/A X 
% catchment 
area black 
 
Asian X N/A N/A      
Hispanic X N/A N/A X    
Other X N/A N/A X    
Geography X N/A N/A     X 
Marital status   N/A N/A X   
X 
Comorbidities 
or HCC score X N/A N/A X X 
 
X 
SES/Other 
Median household 
income, median home 
value, persons aged >25 
with a high school 
diploma or more, 
persons aged > 25 with 
4+ years of college or 
more, white collar 
workers; Hospital 
characteristics 
Hospital 
characteristics 
Hospital 
characteristics 
Income, wealth, 
high school 
diploma; 
functional 
impairment 
Dual eligible 
status; 
Hospital 
characteristics 
 
Hospital 
Characteristics, Nursing 
home characteristics, 
community 
characteristics, 
urban/rural, retirement 
destination, educational 
attainment, % Medicare   
  
  
2
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Variable Hu Joynt 2011 Joynt 2013 Kahn Kind 
Age X X N/A N/A X 
Sex X X N/A N/A X 
Race X X N/A N/A X 
White 
(Caucasian)   X N/A N/A X 
Black 
(African 
American)   X N/A N/A X 
Asian     N/A N/A   
Hispanic     N/A N/A   
Other     N/A N/A X 
Geography     N/A N/A X 
Marital 
status     N/A N/A   
Comorbiditi
es or HCC 
score X x N/A N/A X 
SES/Other 
Neighborhood SES 
poverty, education, 
median household income 
Medicaid eligible; Discharge 
destination, length of stay, 
death within 30 days, 
discharge from a minority 
serving hospital 
Hospital 
characteristics 
Hospital 
characteristics 
Residence in a 
neighborhood scored 
based on area 
deprivation index; 
Length of stay, 
discharge to a skilled 
nursing facility, 
hospital characteristics 
  
  
2
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Variable Krumholz & Parent Krumholz & Chen Lindenauer McHugh Nagasako 
Age X X X X X 
Sex X X X X X 
Race X X   X X 
White (Caucasian) X X   X   
Black (African 
American)       X   
Asian           
Hispanic       X   
Other X X   X   
Geography     X     
Marital status           
Comorbidities or 
HCC score X X X X   
SES/Other 
Medical history, 
Hospital 
characteristics 
Medical history, 
clinical 
characteristics, 
hospital course, 
discharge labs, 
discharge mobility  
Hospital 
characteristics 
Hospital 
characteristics 
Poverty rate, median 
income, educational 
attainment, housing 
vacancy rate and 
unemployment rate 
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Variable 
Rathore & 
Masoudi 
Rathore & 
Foody Rodriguez Scheingold Singh Tsai 
Age X X X X X X 
Sex X x X X X X 
Race X X X X X X 
White (Caucasian) X X X X X X 
Black (African 
American) X X   X X X 
Asian       X     
Hispanic     x X X   
Other X X   X X   
Geography       X     
Marital status             
Comorbidities or 
HCC score X X X     X 
SES/Other 
 Composite 
measures of SES 
based on ZIP-code-
level 
sociodemographic 
characteristics (ZQ 
rating); Admission 
characteristics, 
Hospital 
characteristics, 
Physician 
characteristics 
Admission 
characteristic
s, admission 
source, 
medical 
history 
Clinical 
characteristics, 
hospital 
characteristics, 
length of stay 
Dual 
eligible; 
Discharge 
destination 
Medicaid Eligibility; Hospital 
characteristics, Admission 
characteristics, DRG weights, 
relationship with a primary 
care physician, nursing home 
residence in the previous 90 
days, previous admissions 
Medicaid 
Eligibility; 
Hospital 
characteristic 
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APPENDIX F: SES CHARACTERISTICS ACCOUNTED FOR BY HEALTH PLAN STUDY 
SES characteristics accounted for in the studies of health plan quality 
 
Variable ASPE Ayanian Ayanian Bird Brennan Cahow Chou 2007a Chou 2007b 
Age  X X X   X  
Sex  X X X X  X X 
Race X X X X  X X  
White 
(Caucasian) 
 X X    X  
Black (African 
American) 
X X X Living in a 
predominantly 
black 
neighborhood 
 % service area 
black 
X  
Asian  X X      
Hispanic X X X      
Other         
Geography Rurality X X  X  X X 
Marital status         
Comorbidities or 
underlying health 
status 
Disabled as a 
reason for 
entitlement 
       
SES/Other Dual eligible; 
ZCTA level 
income 
% Dual 
eligible  
 Living in a high 
poverty neighbor-
hood 
Dual 
Eligible 
status 
% DSNP 
membership; 
median income of 
the population in 
the service area; 
educational 
attainment of the 
population in the 
service area 
Household 
income in 
four 
categories 
Household 
income in 
three 
categories 
 
  
  
2
4
8
 
 
Variable Couto Fremont Harman Holmes Inovalon 2013 Inovalon 
2014 
Inovalon 
2015 
Age X X X X X X X 
Sex X X X X X X X 
Race   X X X X X 
White 
(Caucasian) 
  X X X X X 
Black (African 
American) 
 Living in a majority 
black neighborhood 
X X X X X 
Asian    X X X X 
Hispanic   X X X X X 
Other   X X X X X 
Geography X  X  X X X 
Marital status   X    X 
Comorbidities 
or underlying 
health status 
  X X X X X 
SES Receipt of low-
income subsidy 
Living in a poor 
neighborhood 
Education level and 
home ownership 
% Eligible for 
LIS in 2008; plan-
level income 
geocoded from 
five-digit ZIP 
codes 
% SNP; dual 
status; receipt 
of low-income 
subsidy; 
income  
 
% SNP; dual 
status; 
receipt of 
low-income 
subsidy; 
income  
 
8 indicators 
of individual 
and 
community 
income and 
resources  
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Variable Jung Mahmoudi McBean Priest Qato Schmajuk Schneider 
Age X X X X X X X 
Sex X X X X X X X 
Race X  X  X X X 
White 
(Caucasian) 
X  X  X X X 
Black (African 
American) 
X  X  X X X 
Asian X  X     
Hispanic X  X    X 
Other     X X X 
Geography  X X  X X Rural residence 
Marital status  X      
Comorbidities 
or underlying 
health status 
X X  X    
SES/Other educational 
attainment, income, 
Medicare insurance 
plan, ADL 
impairments, self-
reported health, 
BMI 
Family income; 
Medicaid; health 
status; English 
speaking 
Medicaid 
enrollment 
Low-income 
subsidy 
Low personal 
income; low SES 
as defined using 
the AHRQ SES 
score 
Low personal 
income; low 
SES as defined 
using the 
AHRQ SES 
score 
Dual eligibility; 
low-income area 
(25% or more of the 
residents in the ZIP 
code who are 65+ 
receive public 
assistance; college 
attendance (three 
categories) 
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Variable Trivedi (2005) Trivedi (2006) Virnig & 
Lurie 
Virnig & Scholle Virnig & Huang Young 
Age X X X X X  
Sex X X X X X  
Race X X X X X % in the service 
area in a minority 
group 
White 
(Caucasian) 
X X X X X  
Black (African 
American) 
X X X X X  
Asian   X  X  
Hispanic   X  X  
Other   X    
Geography Urban Residence X  X X  
Marital status       
Comorbidities or 
underlying health 
status 
      
SES.Other % Medicaid eligible; 
% below poverty; % 
attended college 
% Medicaid eligible; 
% below poverty; % 
attended college 
Household 
income 
Income in four 
categories; median 
disposable income for 
households with 
persons age 65+ 
Median disposable 
income by ZIP 
code 
% LIS; % without a 
high school 
diploma in the 
service area 
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APPENDIX G: MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PART C AND D MEASURES 2008-2016  
(Medicare 2016 Part C & D Star Rating Technical Notes 2016) 
Part Measure name Data source 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 Notes 
C 
Access to Primary Care Doctor 
Visits 
HEDIS DMC11 
DMC1
0 
DMC12 
DMC1
2 
C11 C13 C12 C13 C09   
C Adult BMI Assessment  HEDIS C07 C08 C10 C10 C12 
DMC0
5 
        
C Annual Flu Vaccine CAHPS C03 C04 C06 C06 C06 C07 C06 C07 C07   
C 
Antidepressant Medication 
Management (6 months)  
HEDIS DMC03 
DMC0
3 
DMC03 
DMC0
3 
DMC0
3 
DMC0
3 
DMC0
4 
C28 C23   
C 
Appropriate Monitoring of 
Patients Taking Long-term 
Medications 
HEDIS DMC05 
DMC0
5 
DMC05 
DMC0
5 
DMC0
5 
C06 C05 C06 C06   
C 
Beneficiary Access and 
Performance Problems  
Administrati
ve Data 
C28 
DME0
8 
C31 C31 C32 C33 C30       
C Breast Cancer Screening HEDIS C01 
DMC2
2 
C01 C01 C01 C01 C01 C01 C01   
C Call Answer Timeliness  HEDIS DMC02 
DMC0
2 
DMC02 
DMC0
2 
DMC0
2 
DMC0
2 
DMC0
1 
C20 C16   
C 
Call Center – Beneficiary Hold 
Time 
Call Center DMC09   DMC09 
DMC0
9 
DMC0
9 
C34 C31       
C 
Call Center - Calls Disconnected 
When Customer Calls Health 
Plan  
Call Center DMC12   DMC15 
DMC1
5 
            
C 
Call Center – CSR 
Understandability 
Call Center             
DMC0
2 
      
C 
Call Center – Foreign Language 
Interpreter and TTY Availability  
Call Center C32   C36 C36 C36 C36 C33       
C 
Call Center – Information 
Accuracy 
Call Center     DMC10 
DMC1
0 
DMC1
0 
C35 C32       
C 
Cardiovascular Care – 
Cholesterol Screening  
HEDIS   C02 C03 C03 C03 C03   C03 C03 A 
C Care Coordination CAHPS C25 C28 C29 C29             
C 
Care for Older Adults – 
Functional Status Assessment  
HEDIS C10 C11 C12 C12 C14           
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Part Measure name Data source 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 Notes 
C 
Care for Older Adults – 
Medication Review 
HEDIS C09 C10 C11 C11 C13           
C 
Care for Older Adults – Pain 
Assessment  
HEDIS C11 C12 C13 C13 C15           
C Cholesterol Screening HEDIS             C03     B 
C Colorectal Cancer Screening  HEDIS C02 C01 C02 C02 C02 C02 C02 C02 C02   
C 
Complaints about the Health 
Plan 
CTM C26 C29 C30 C30 C31 C30 C26       
C 
Computer use by provider 
helpful 
CAHPS DMC21 
DMC2
0 
                
C 
Computer use made talking to 
provider easier 
CAHPS DMC22 
DMC2
1 
                
C 
Computer used during office 
visits  
CAHPS DMC20 
DMC1
9 
                
C 
Continuous Beta Blocker 
Treatment 
HEDIS DMC04 
DMC0
4 
DMC04 
DMC0
4 
DMC0
4 
DMC0
4 
DMC0
5 
C32 C27   
C Controlling Blood Pressure  HEDIS C16 C18 C19 C19 C21 C19 C15 C29 C24   
C Customer Service CAHPS C22 C25 C26 C26 C28 C27 C23 C22     
C Diabetes Care  HEDIS             C14     C 
C 
Diabetes Care – Blood Sugar 
Controlled 
HEDIS C15 C16 C17 C17 C19 C17   C26 C21 D 
C 
Diabetes Care – Cholesterol 
Controlled  
HEDIS   C17 C18 C18 C20 C18   C27 C22 D 
C 
Diabetes Care – Cholesterol 
Screening 
HEDIS   C03 C04 C04 C04 C04   C04 C04 A 
C Diabetes Care – Eye Exam  HEDIS C13 C14 C15 C15 C17 C15   C24 C19 D 
C 
Diabetes Care – Kidney Disease 
Monitoring 
HEDIS C14 C15 C16 C16 C18 C16   C25 C20 D 
C Doctor Follow up for Depression  HEDIS               C15 C11   
C Doctors who Communicate Well CAHPS DMC08 
DMC0
8 
DMC08 
DMC0
8 
DMC0
8 
C25 C21 C21 C17   
C 
Engagement of Alcohol or other 
Drug Treatment  
HEDIS DMC16 
DMC1
5 
DMC19               
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Part Measure name Data source 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 Notes 
C 
Follow-up visit after Hospital 
Stay for Mental Illness (within 
30 days of Discharge) 
HEDIS DMC01 
DMC0
1 
DMC01 
DMC0
1 
DMC0
1 
DMC0
1 
DMC0
3 
C14 C10   
C 
Getting Appointments and Care 
Quickly  
CAHPS C21 C24 C25 C25 C27 C26 C22 C17 C13   
C Getting Needed Care CAHPS C20 C23 C24 C24 C26 C24 C20 C16 C12   
C Glaucoma Testing  HEDIS     C05 C05 C05 C05 C04 C05 C05   
C 
Health Plan Quality 
Improvement 
Star Ratings C29 C31 C33 C33             
C Improving Bladder Control  
HEDIS / 
HOS 
  C20 C21 C21 C23 C22 C18 C33     
C 
Improving or Maintaining 
Mental Health 
HOS C05 C06 C08 C08 C09 C10 C09 C10     
C 
Improving or Maintaining 
Physical Health  
HOS C04 C05 C07 C07 C08 C09 C08 C09     
C 
Initiation of Alcohol or other 
Drug Treatment 
HEDIS DMC15 
DMC1
4 
DMC18               
C 
Members Choosing to Leave the 
Plan  
MBDSS C27 C30 C32 C32 C33 
DMC0
6 
C29       
C Monitoring Physical Activity 
HEDIS / 
HOS 
C06 C07 C09 C09 C10 C12 C11 C12     
C 
Osteoporosis Management in 
Women who had a Fracture  
HEDIS C12 C13 C14 C14 C16 C14 C13 C23 C18   
C Osteoporosis Testing 
HEDIS / 
HOS 
DMC06 
DMC0
6 
DMC06 
DMC0
6 
DMC0
6 
C11 C10 C11     
C 
Pharmacotherapy Management 
of COPD Exacerbation – 
Bronchodilator  
HEDIS DMC14 
DMC1
3 
DMC17               
C 
Pharmacotherapy Management 
of COPD Exacerbation – 
Systemic Corticosteroid 
HEDIS DMC13 
DMC1
2 
DMC16               
C Plan All-Cause Readmissions  HEDIS C19 C22 C23 C23 C25           
C 
Plan Makes Timely Decisions 
about Appeals 
IRE / 
Maximus 
C30 C32 C34 C34 C34 C31 C27 C35 C28   
C Pneumonia Vaccine  CAHPS DMC10 
DMC0
9 
DMC11 
DMC1
1 
C07 C08 C07 C08 C08   
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Part Measure name Data source 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 Notes 
C Rating of Health Care Quality CAHPS C23 C26 C27 C27 C29 C28 C24 C18 C14   
C Rating of Health Plan  CAHPS C24 C27 C28 C28 C30 C29 C25 C19 C15   
C Reducing the Risk of Falling 
HEDIS / 
HOS 
C18 C21 C22 C22 C24 C23 C19 C34     
C Reminders for appointments  CAHPS DMC17 
DMC1
6 
                
C Reminders for immunizations CAHPS DMC18 
DMC1
7 
                
C Reminders for screening tests  CAHPS DMC19 
DMC1
8 
                
C Reviewing Appeals Decisions 
IRE / 
Maximus 
C31 C33 C35 C35 C35 C32 C28 C36 C29   
C 
Rheumatoid Arthritis 
Management  
HEDIS C17 C19 C20 C20 C22 C20 C16 C30 C25   
C 
Special Needs Plan (SNP) Care 
Management 
Plan 
Reporting 
C08 
C09/D
MC11 
DMC14 
DMC1
4 
            
C 
Testing to Confirm Chronic 
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease  
HEDIS DMC07 
DMC0
7 
DMC07 
DMC0
7 
DMC0
7 
C21 C17 C31 C26   
D 4Rx Timeliness 
Acumen/OI
S (4Rx) 
        
DMD0
3 
D07 D07   D09   
D 
Adherence - Proportion of Days 
Covered 
Prescription 
Drug Event 
(PDE) 
          
DMD0
7 
        
D Appeals Auto–Forward 
IRE / 
Maximus 
D02 D01 D02 D03 D03 D05 D05 D05 D13   
D Appeals Upheld  
IRE / 
Maximus  
D03  D02  D03  D04  D04  D06  D06  D06  D14    
D 
Beneficiary Access and 
Performance Problems 
Administrati
ve Data 
D06 
DME0
8 
D05 D07 D07 D10 D11       
D 
Call Center – Beneficiary Hold 
Time 
Call Center DMD04   DMD04 
DMD0
4 
DMD0
5 
D01 D01 D01 D01   
D 
Call Center – Calls 
Disconnected - Pharmacist 
Call Center             
DMD0
5 
D04 D04   
D 
Call Center - Calls Disconnected 
When Customer Calls Drug Plan 
Call Center DMD03   DMD03 
DMD0
3 
DMD0
4 
DMD0
4 
DMD0
4 
D02 D02   
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Part Measure name Data source 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 Notes 
D 
Call Center – CSR 
Understandability 
Call Center             
DMD0
6 
      
D 
Call Center – Foreign Language 
Interpreter and TTY Availability  
Call Center  D01    D01  D02  D02  D04  D04        
D 
Call Center – Information 
Accuracy 
Call Center     DMD05 
DMD0
5 
DMD0
6 
D03 D03       
D 
Call Center – Pharmacy Hold 
Time  
Call Center  DMD11   DMD15  D01  D01  D02  D02  D03  D03    
D Complaint Resolution CTM             
DMD0
7 
      
D Complaints – Benefits CTM               D07 D11   
D Complaints – Enrollment CTM           D08 D08 D08 D12   
D Complaints – Other CTM           D09 D09 D10     
D Complaints – Pricing CTM               D09 D17   
D Complaints about the Drug Plan  CTM  D04  D03  D04  D06  D06        D05    
D Diabetes Medication Dosing 
Prescription 
Drug Event 
(PDE) 
DMD06 
DMD0
4 
DMD07 
DMD0
7 
DMD0
8 
DMD0
6 
DMD0
9 
      
D Diabetes Treatment  
Prescription 
Drug Event 
(PDE)  
  D10  D12  D15  D14  D17  D19        
D 
Drug Plan Provides Current 
Information on Costs and 
Coverage for Medicare’s Web 
site 
Acumen/OI
S (LIS 
Match 
Rates) 
DMD07 
DMD0
5 
DMD08 
DMD0
8 
DMD0
9 
D14 D15 D15 D10   
D Drug Plan Quality Improvement Star Ratings D07 D05 D07 D09             
D Drug-Drug Interactions 
Prescription 
Drug Event 
(PDE) 
DMD05 
DMD0
3 
DMD06 
DMD0
6 
DMD0
7 
DMD0
5 
DMD0
8 
      
D Enrollment Timeliness  MARx      DME01  D05  D05  
DMD0
3  
DMD0
3  
      
D 
Getting Information From Drug 
Plan 
CAHPS DMD10 
DMD0
9 
DMD14 D10 D09 D11 D12 D12 D06   
D 
Getting Needed Prescription 
Drugs  
CAHPS  D09  D07  D09  D12  D11  D13  D14  D14  D08    
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Part Measure name Data source 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 Notes 
D High Risk Medication 
Prescription 
Drug Event 
(PDE) 
D11 D09 D11 D14 D13 D16 D18 D19     
D 
Medication Adherence for 
Cholesterol (Statins) 
Prescription 
Drug Event 
(PDE) 
D14 D13 D15 D18 D17           
D 
Medication Adherence for 
Diabetes Medications 
Prescription 
Drug Event 
(PDE) 
D12 D11 D13 D16 D15           
D 
Medication Adherence for 
Hypertension (RAS antagonists) 
Prescription 
Drug Event 
(PDE) 
D13 D12 D14 D17 D16           
D 
Medication Therapy 
Management Program 
Completion Rate for 
Comprehensive Medication 
Review 
Prescription 
Drug Event 
(PDE) 
D15 
DMD0
7 
DMD12 
DMD1
2 
            
D Member Retention MBDSS               D11     
D 
Members Choosing to Leave the 
Plan 
MBDSS D05 D04 D06 D08 D08 
DMD0
9 
D10       
D MPF – Composite  
Plan Finder 
Data  
        D12  D15          B  
D MPF – Stability 
Plan Finder 
Data 
DMD08 
DMD0
6 
DMD10 
DMD1
0 
    D16 D17 D16 A 
D MPF – Updates 
Plan Finder 
Data 
    DMD09 
DMD0
9 
DMD1
0 
DMD0
8 
DMD1
0 
D16 D15   
D MPF Price Accuracy 
Plan Finder 
Data 
D10 D08 D10 D13     D17 D18   A 
D 
Plan Submitted Higher Prices for 
Display on MPF 
Plan Finder 
Data 
DMD12 
DMD1
0 
DMD16               
D 
Rate of Chronic Use of Atypical 
Antipsychotics by Elderly 
Beneficiaries in Nursing Homes 
Fu 
Associates 
DMD09 
DMD0
8 
DMD13 
DMD1
3 
            
D Rating of Drug Plan CAHPS D08 D06 D08 D11 D10 D12 D13 D13 D07   
D Reminders to fill prescriptions CAHPS DMD15 
DMD1
3 
                
D Reminders to take medications CAHPS DMD16 
DMD1
4 
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Part Measure name Data source 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 Notes 
D Timely Effectuation of Appeals 
IRE / 
Maximus 
DMD02 
DMD0
2 
DMD02 
DMD0
2 
DMD0
2 
DMD0
2 
DMD0
2 
      
D 
Timely Receipt of Case Files for 
Appeals  
IRE / 
Maximus  
DMD01 
DMD0
1  
DMD01  
DMD0
1  
DMD0
1  
DMD0
1  
DMD0
1  
      
D 
Transition monitoring - failure 
rate for all other drugs 
Transition 
Monitoring 
Program 
DMD14 
DMD1
2 
                
D 
Transition monitoring - failure 
rate for drugs within classes of 
clinical concern 
Transition 
Monitoring 
Program 
Analysis 
DMD13 
DMD1
1 
                
Part C Notes: 
A: Part of composite measure Cholesterol Screening in 2010 
B: Composite Measure - combined Cardiovascular Care – Cholesterol Screening and Diabetes Care – Cholesterol Screening measures 
C: Composite Measure - combined Diabetes Care – Blood Sugar Controlled, Diabetes Care – Cholesterol Controlled, Diabetes Care – Eye Exam 
and  
  Diabetes Care – Kidney Disease Monitoring measures 
D: Part of composite measure Diabetes Care in 2010 
Part D Notes: 
A: Part of composite measure MPF - Composite in 2011 – 2012 
B: Composite measure - combined MPF - Accuracy and MPF Stability 
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APPENDIX H: AREA DEPRIVATION INDEX (HEALTH INNOVATION, 2014) 
The ADI is promulgated by the Health Innovation Program (HIP) at the University of Wisconsin 
at Madison and is based on an index originally developed by Gopal Singh, PhD, MS, MSc ( Singh, 2003). 
ADI provides a measure of deprivation on a neighborhood basis (Health Innovation Program, 2014). A 
higher ADI indicates a more socioeconomically deprived neighborhood, a lower level of ADI indicates a 
lower level of deprivation.  
The ADI is an American version of a composite deprivation index. Composite deprivation indices 
have in use internationally for many years (Singh, 2003). ADI is an oft-cited measure of deprivation. In 
fact, according to PubMed, 71 articles have referenced this original article. One of those conducted in 
2016 by researchers associated with Intermountain Healthcare, tested the specifications and calculation of 
an ADI for the state of Utah. They found promising evidence of value in the use of ADI in that system’s 
quality improvement efforts (Knighton, 2016).  
The HIP version of ADI uses 2000 census block group-level data. The ADI is promulgated at 
multiple levels, including at the ZIP code, ZIP code +4, and county level. Because MA plans are filed at 
the county level, for the purpose of this study, county-level ADI was utilized. The ADI describes the 
neighborhood level of deprivation using the following variables: 
 % aged 25+ with < 9 years of education 
 % aged 25+ with at least a high school diploma 
 % of people 16+ who are employed in white-collar occupations 
 Median family income (US dollars) 
 Income disparity 
 Median home value (US dollars) 
 Median gross rent (US dollars) 
 259 
 
 Median monthly mortgage (US dollars) 
 % owner-occupied housing units 
 % civilian labor force population aged 16+ unemployed 
 % families below federal poverty level 
 % below 150% of the federal poverty threshold 
 % single-parent households with children < 18 years of age 
 % households without a motor vehicle 
 % households without a telephone 
 % occupied housing units without complete plumbing 
 % households with more than 1 person per room 
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APPENDIX I: LINKS TO SOURCE DATA 
Benefits 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/Benefits-Data.html 
Monthly Enrollment by Contract, Plan, State, County 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/Monthly-Enrollment-by-Contract-Plan-State-County.html 
Monthly Enrollment by Plan 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/Monthly-Enrollment-by-Plan.html 
LIS MAPD & MAPD Enrollment by Plan 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/LIS-Enrollment-by-Plan.html 
Landscape 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovGenIn/index.html 
 
  
2
6
1
 
APPENDIX J: COEFFICIENTS 
  Transportation ben Meal ben Nutritional ben 
Parameter   Est. SE Exp. Est   Est. SE ExpEst   Est. SE Exp. Est   
Intercept     -1.379 -0.169 0.252 *** -1.283 -0.16 0.277 *** -1.755 -0.195 0.173 *** 
SNP 1   2.454 -0.207 11.633 *** 0.939 -0.221 2.558 *** 2.246 -0.227 9.453 *** 
Weighted average ADI 
quintile 
1   -0.092 -0.185 0.912   -1.129 -0.218 0.323 *** -0.596 -0.216 0.551 ** 
  2   -0.021 -0.184 0.979   -0.303 -0.183 0.739   -0.103 -0.206 0.902   
  4   -0.198 -0.175 0.82   -0.072 -0.172 0.93   -0.21 -0.199 0.811   
  5   0.132 -0.182 1.142   0.091 -0.176 1.095   0.062 -0.205 1.064   
Clis_mapd_cp_per     0.002 -0.003 1.002   0.003 -0.003 1.003   -0.004 -0.003 0.996   
Year 2015   0.048 -0.109 1.05   0.325 -0.124 1.385 ** -0.248 -0.142 0.78   
County-weighted 
average stars 
    0.214 -0.095 1.239 * 0.675 -0.082 1.964 *** 1.188 -0.114 3.281 *** 
County-weighted 
percentage_rate_cap_0 
    -0.016 -0.007 0.984 * 0.003 -0.004 1.003   -0.018 -0.005 0.982 *** 
County weighted 
percentage 
_rate_cap_35 
    -0.006 -0.005 0.994   0.005 -0.004 1.005   0.024 -0.006 1.024 *** 
County-weighted 
percentage 
_rate_cap_5 
    -0.002 -0.003 0.998   -0.006 -0.003 0.994   -0.017 -0.005 0.983 ** 
cp_avg_ma_quintile 1   0.05 -0.17 1.051   0.207 -0.155 1.23   0.02 -0.192 1.02   
  2   0.084 -0.147 1.087   0.18 -0.137 1.197   0.149 -0.174 1.16   
  4   -0.302 -0.152 0.739 * -0.107 -0.136 0.898   -0.379 -0.18 0.685 * 
  5   0.087 -0.15 1.091   -0.511 -0.149 0.6 *** -0.148 -0.179 0.862   
wa_adi_quintile*year 1 2015 0.033 -0.143 1.034   0.491 -0.187 1.634 ** 0.462 -0.191 1.588 * 
  2 2015 0.074 -0.141 1.076   -0.203 -0.173 0.816   0.243 -0.193 1.276   
  4 2015 0.011 -0.158 1.011   0.131 -0.168 1.14   -0.476 -0.22 0.622 * 
  5 2015 0.077 -0.15 1.08   0.007 -0.168 1.007   -0.609 -0.223 0.544 ** 
year*SNP 2015 1 -0.462 -0.151 0.63 ** -0.317 -0.193 0.728   -1.574 -0.233 0.207 *** 
Clis_mapd_cp_pe*year 2015   0.004 -0.002 1.004   -0.003 -0.002 0.997   0.002 -0.003 1.002   
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    Telemonitoring Premium  EDM 
Parameter    Est. SE Exp. 
Est 
  Est. SE Exp. 
Est 
  Est. SE Exp. 
Est 
  
Intercept     -1.851 -0.219 0.157 *** -0.491 -0.182 0.612 ** -2.176 -0.234 0.113 *** 
SNP 1   0.754 -0.253 2.125 ** -1.801 -0.264 0.165 *** 0.907 -0.261 2.478 *** 
Weighted average ADI 
quintile 
1   -0.145 -0.238 0.865   0.419 -0.174 1.521 * 0.125 -0.255 1.133   
  2   -0.355 -0.244 0.701   0.086 -0.17 1.09   -0.538 -0.293 0.584   
  4   -0.404 -0.25 0.668   0.099 -0.171 1.104   -0.57 -0.293 0.566   
  5   -1.019 -0.295 0.361 *** 0.095 -0.177 1.1   -1.287 -0.354 0.276 *** 
Clis_mapd_cp_per     -0.016 -0.004 0.984 *** -0.048 -0.006 0.953 *** -0.019 -0.005 0.981 *** 
Year 2015   0.009 -0.144 1.009   -0.068 -0.182 0.934   -0.865 -0.247 0.421 *** 
County-weighted 
average stars 
    -0.104 -0.105 0.901   0.305 -0.094 1.356 ** 0.124 -0.138 1.132   
County-weighted 
percentage_rate_cap_0 
    -0.005 -0.006 0.995   0.025 -0.007 1.025 *** 0.003 -0.006 1.003   
County-weighted 
percentage 
_rate_cap_35 
    -0.014 -0.005 0.986 ** 0.006 -0.004 1.006   0.003 -0.006 1.003   
County-weighted 
percentage 
_rate_cap_5 
    0.007 -0.003 1.007 * 0.005 -0.003 1.005   -0.002 -0.005 0.998   
cp_avg_ma_quintile 1   -0.641 -0.254 0.527 * -0.137 -0.171 0.872   -1.058 -0.313 0.347 *** 
  2   0.041 -0.188 1.042   0.13 -0.146 1.139   -0.504 -0.246 0.604 * 
  4   -0.44 -0.203 0.644 * -0.05 -0.138 0.951   -0.416 -0.245 0.66   
  5   -0.869 -0.225 0.419 *** -0.735 -0.137 0.479 *** -0.348 -0.236 0.706   
Weighted average ADI 
quintile*year 
1 2015 0.132 -0.178 1.141   -0.086 -0.17 0.918   -0.127 -0.283 0.88   
  2 2015 0.576 -0.216 1.779 ** -0.091 -0.18 0.913   0.154 -0.302 1.166   
  4 2015 0.121 -0.22 1.128   -0.262 -0.192 0.769   0.115 -0.292 1.122   
  5 2015 0.365 -0.219 1.44   0.073 -0.187 1.075   -0.379 -0.332 0.685   
year*SNP 2015 1 -0.17 -0.137 0.844   -0.099 -0.28 0.906   .   .   
Clis_mapd_cp_pe*year 2015   -0.001 -0.003 0.999   -0.01 -0.008 0.99   -0.04 -0.011 0.961 *** 
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APPENDIX K: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  Transportation Ben Meal Ben Nutritional Ben 
  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Attribute 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 
Number of plans 12,92 1,244 613 587 1,494 1,338 411 493 1,398 1,503 393 235 
Proportion of 
SNP plans 
0.077 0.092 0.54 0.518 0.183 0.2 0.382 0.304 0.137 0.196 0.478 0.281 
Mean # of 
counties the in 
which the Plan 
Offering was 
available 
17.9 17.695 13.38 13.106 16.682 16.561 15.586 15.308 18.303 17.008 9.443 9.387 
Mean LIS MAPD 
enrollment 
1,240.455 1,319.396 2,291.869 2,706.293 1,721.102 1,899.738 1,061.453 1,395.688 1,566.893 1,639.661 1,552.99 2,160.63
8 
Mean MAPD 
enrollment 
6,663.512 7,114.469 5,466.31 6,319.499 6,980.162 7,479.509 3,726.869 5,177.207 6,725.615 6,900.9 5,328.865 7,782.2 
Mean proportion 
of LIS 
MAPD/MAPD 
enrollment 
0.211 0.217 0.486 0.476 0.276 0.29 0.388 0.327 0.254 0.285 0.401 0.279 
Mean total plan 
enrollment 
6,714.525 7,147.186 5,582.458 6,372.7 7,050.785 7,517.603 3,803.747 5,219.72 6,787.667 6,938.584 5,436.651 7,833.16
6 
Proportion of 
plans in the first 
quintile of total 
plan size 
0.129 0.107 0.186 0.157 0.129 0.118 0.214 0.136 0.127 0.121 0.214 0.115 
Proportion of 
plans in the 
second quintile of 
total plan size 
0.178 0.187 0.217 0.201 0.175 0.182 0.248 0.219 0.177 0.184 0.229 0.221 
Proportion of 
plans in the third 
quintile of total 
plan size 
0.215 0.219 0.21 0.223 0.207 0.221 0.238 0.217 0.207 0.209 0.204 0.234 
Proportion of 
plans in the 
fourth quintile of 
total plan size 
0.251 0.244 0.176 0.186 0.238 0.22 0.185 0.239 0.245 0.242 0.183 0.166 
Proportion of 
plans in the fifth 
quintile of total 
plan size 
0.227 0.243 0.21 0.233 0.251 0.259 0.114 0.189 0.245 0.244 0.17 0.264 
Mean weighted 
star rating 
3.804 3.867 3.742 3.827 3.765 3.786 3.854 4.04 3.725 3.829 4.001 4.166 
  
2
6
4
 
  Transportation Ben Meal Ben Nutritional Ben 
Mean of the 
weighted 
proportion of 
counties with a 
stars bonus cap of 
0% 
0.099 0.095 0.033 0.033 0.075 0.07 0.087 0.09 0.084 0.076 0.038 0.065 
Mean of the 
weighted 
proportion of 
counties with a 
stars bonus cap of 
3.5% 
0.182 0.178 0.069 0.085 0.143 0.147 0.155 0.154 0.154 0.144 0.102 0.176 
Mean of the 
weighted 
proportion of 
counties with a 
stars bonus cap of 
5% 
0.256 0.249 0.126 0.143 0.216 0.216 0.21 0.213 0.231 0.215 0.138 0.212 
Mean weighted 
ADI 
80.096 79.271 77.263 75.524 77.629 76.149 84.841 83.284 79.214 79.57 80.901 72.881 
Proportion of 
plans in the first 
quintile of 
weighted ADI 
0.188 0.203 0.21 0.228 0.223 0.235 0.095 0.146 0.203 0.201 0.148 0.213 
Proportion of 
plans in the 
second quintile of 
weighted ADI 
0.188 0.195 0.21 0.208 0.194 0.212 0.2 0.162 0.179 0.182 0.232 0.285 
Proportion of 
plans in the third 
quintile of 
weighted ADI 
0.197 0.201 0.189 0.187 0.187 0.188 0.224 0.221 0.196 0.194 0.209 0.234 
Proportion of 
plans in the 
fourth quintile of 
weighted ADI 
0.221 0.206 0.188 0.174 0.2 0.179 0.246 0.241 0.211 0.208 0.209 0.14 
Proportion of 
plans in the fifth 
quintile of 
weighted ADI 
0.206 0.196 0.202 0.203 0.196 0.187 0.236 0.229 0.211 0.215 0.204 0.128 
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  Telemonitoring Benefit Premium  EDM 
  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Attribute 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 
Number of plans 1,622 1,542 169 196 1,079 1,033 820 788 1,671 1,641 120 97 
Proportion of SNP plans 0.211 0.209 0.219 0.199 0.383 0.387 0.022 0.023 0.206 0.22 0.283 0 
Mean number of counties 
the in which the Plan 
Offerings were available 
17.123 16.745 9.024 9.939 13.495 12.621 20.318 20.924 16.642 16.291 12.425 10.67 
Mean LIS MAPD 
enrollment 
1,619.789 1,809.77 1,026.888 925.99 2,286.54
7 
2,481.16
3 
642.812 792.751 1,605.904 1,761.68 978.142 837.557 
Mean MAPD enrollment 6,650.287 7,402.178 4,200.521 4,013.83
7 
7,174.82
1 
7,475.06
4 
5,035.539 5,846.91
5 
6,472.829 7,049.524 5,671.3 6,521.66 
Mean proportion of LIS 
MAPD/MAPD enrollment 
0.292 0.293 0.23 0.218 0.425 0.428 0.136 0.134 0.292 0.294 0.206 0.123 
Mean total plan enrollment 6,725.436 7,445.223 4,243.225 4,025.26
5 
7,295.86
9 
7,531.91
5 
5,043.11 5,861.42
4 
6,549.611 7,091.561 5,678.017 6,517.876 
Proportion of plans in the 
first quintile of total plan 
size 
0.151 0.119 0.101 0.133 0.158 0.136 0.135 0.108 0.148 0.124 0.117 0.062 
Proportion of plans in the 
second quintile of total 
plan size 
0.183 0.179 0.237 0.27 0.168 0.188 0.221 0.199 0.189 0.191 0.175 0.155 
Proportion of plans in the 
third quintile of total plan 
size 
0.2 0.204 0.266 0.276 0.204 0.21 0.228 0.236 0.202 0.208 0.267 0.289 
Proportion of plans in the 
fourth quintile of total plan 
size 
0.231 0.237 0.231 0.184 0.212 0.208 0.246 0.251 0.235 0.23 0.183 0.258 
Proportion of plans in the 
fifth quintile of total plan 
size 
0.235 0.261 0.166 0.138 0.259 0.258 0.17 0.206 0.226 0.247 0.258 0.237 
Mean weighted star rating 3.782 3.875 3.817 3.872 3.689 3.762 3.907 3.975 3.774 3.869 3.946 3.969 
Mean of the weighted 
proportion of counties with 
a stars bonus cap of 0% 
0.077 0.078 0.043 0.049 0.035 0.037 0.134 0.126 0.075 0.074 0.067 0.087 
Mean of the weighted 
proportion of counties with 
a stars bonus cap of 3.5% 
0.149 0.153 0.082 0.115 0.079 0.091 0.233 0.224 0.146 0.145 0.098 0.209 
Mean of the weighted 
proportion of counties with 
a stars bonus cap of 5% 
0.214 0.216 0.181 0.198 0.141 0.147 0.312 0.304 0.214 0.211 0.164 0.267 
Mean Weighted ADI 79.916 79.082 76.4 75.39 79.271 77.817 79.274 78.381 80.232 78.959 70.557 73.695 
Proportion of plans in the 
first quintile of weighted 
ADI 
0.187 0.2 0.225 0.224 0.198 0.219 0.187 0.201 0.184 0.199 0.283 0.268 
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  Telemonitoring Benefit Premium  EDM 
Proportion of plans in the 
second quintile of weighted 
ADI 
0.189 0.187 0.201 0.265 0.196 0.197 0.195 0.202 0.192 0.196 0.175 0.206 
Proportion of plans in the 
third quintile of weighted 
ADI 
0.191 0.196 0.272 0.224 0.199 0.196 0.19 0.198 0.193 0.194 0.275 0.289 
Proportion of plans in the 
fourth quintile of weighted 
ADI 
0.213 0.204 0.189 0.163 0.206 0.198 0.217 0.189 0.213 0.2 0.175 0.175 
Proportion of plans in the 
fifth quintile of weighted 
ADI 
0.219 0.213 0.112 0.122 0.2 0.19 0.211 0.211 0.218 0.211 0.092 0.062 
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APPENDIX L: PHASE 2 DATA TABLES 
Risk difference of transportation benefit inclusion by weighted average ADI quintile  
Test- ADI quintile Referent ADI quintile  Test year Referent year RD 
1 1 2015 2014 -0.037 
1 2 2014 2014 -0.018 
1 2 2015 2015 -0.027 
1 3 2014 2014 -0.023 
1 3 2015 2015 -0.014 
1 4 2014 2014 0.026 
1 4 2015 2015 0.03 
1 5 2014 2014 -0.056 
1 5 2015 2015 -0.066 
2 2 2015 2014 -0.028 
2 3 2014 2014 -0.005 
2 3 2015 2015 0.013 
2 4 2014 2014 0.043 
2 4 2015 2015 0.057 
2 5 2014 2014 -0.038 
2 5 2015 2015 -0.039 
3 3 2015 2014 -0.046 
4 3 2014 2014 -0.049 
4 3 2015 2015 -0.044 
4 4 2015 2014 -0.042 
4 5 2014 2014 -0.082 
4 5 2015 2015 -0.096* 
5 3 2014 2014 0.033 
5 3 2015 2015 0.051 
5 5 2015 2014 -0.028 
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Risk difference of a premium required by ADI weighted average quintile  
Test- ADI quintile Referent- ADI quintile Test 
year 
Referent  
year 
RD 
1 1 2015 2014 -0.035 
1 2 2014 2014 0.058 
1 2 2015 2015 0.053 
1 3 2014 2014 0.071* 
1 3 2015 2015 0.052 
1 4 2014 2014 0.056 
1 4 2015 2015 0.074** 
1 5 2014 2014 0.057 
1 5 2015 2015 0.027 
2 2 2015 2014 -0.029 
2 3 2014 2014 0.013 
2 3 2015 2015 -0.001 
2 4 2014 2014 -0.002 
2 4 2015 2015 0.021 
2 5 2014 2014 -0.002 
2 5 2015 2015 -0.026 
3 3 2015 2014 -0.015 
4 3 2014 2014 0.015 
4 3 2015 2015 -0.022 
4 4 2015 2014 -0.052 
4 5 2014 2014 0.001 
4 5 2015 2015 -0.047 
5 3 2014 2014 0.015 
5 3 2015 2015 0.025 
5 5 2015 2014 -0.005 
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Risk difference of telemonitoring benefit inclusion by weighted average ADI quintile  
Test- ADI quintile Referent ADI quintile Test year Referent 
year 
RD 
1 1 2015 2014 0.006 
1 2 2014 2014 0.021 
1 2 2015 2015 -0.029 
1 3 2014 2014 -0.017 
1 3 2015 2015 -0.002 
1 4 2014 2014 0.025 
1 4 2015 2015 0.028 
1 5 2014 2014 0.068** 
1 5 2015 2015 0.057* 
2 2 2015 2014 0.056** 
2 3 2014 2014 -0.038 
2 3 2015 2015 0.027 
2 4 2014 2014 0.004 
2 4 2015 2015 0.056* 
2 5 2014 2014 0.047* 
2 5 2015 2015 0.086** 
3 3 2015 2014 -0.009 
4 3 2014 2014 -0.042 
4 3 2015 2015 -0.029 
4 4 2015 2014 0.004 
4 5 2014 2014 0.043* 
4 5 2015 2015 0.029 
5 3 2014 2014 -0.085*** 
5 3 2015 2015 -0.059* 
5 5 2015 2014 0.017 
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Risk difference of meals benefit inclusion by ADI quintile  
Test- ADI quintile Referent- ADI quintile Test 
year 
Referent 
year 
RD 
1 1 2015 2014 0.089*** 
1 2 2014 2014 -0.118*** 
1 2 2015 2015 -0.023 
1 3 2014 2014 -0.177*** 
1 3 2015 2015 -0.124*** 
1 4 2014 2014 -0.162*** 
1 4 2015 2015 -0.138*** 
1 5 2014 2014 -0.196*** 
1 5 2015 2015 -0.147*** 
2 2 2015 2014 -0.006 
2 3 2014 2014 -0.059 
2 3 2015 2015 -0.102** 
2 4 2014 2014 -0.044 
2 4 2015 2015 -0.115** 
2 5 2014 2014 -0.079* 
2 5 2015 2015 -0.124*** 
3 3 2015 2014 0.037 
4 3 2014 2014 -0.015 
4 3 2015 2015 0.013 
4 4 2015 2014 0.065* 
4 5 2014 2014 -0.034 
4 5 2015 2015 -0.009 
5 3 2014 2014 0.019 
5 3 2015 2015 0.022 
5 5 2015 2014 0.039 
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Risk difference of nutrition benefit inclusion by ADI quintile  
Test ADI quintile Referent ADI quintile Test year Referent 
year 
RD 
1 1 2015 2014 -0.083*** 
1 2 2014 2014 -0.096* 
1 2 2015 2015 -0.036 
1 3 2014 2014 -0.118** 
1 3 2015 2015 -0.016 
1 4 2014 2014 -0.073 
1 4 2015 2015 0.053* 
1 5 2014 2014 -0.132** 
1 5 2015 2015 0.042 
2 2 2015 2014 -0.143*** 
2 3 2014 2014 -0.023 
2 3 2015 2015 0.019 
2 4 2014 2014 0.023 
2 4 2015 2015 0.089*** 
2 5 2014 2014 -0.037 
2 5 2015 2015 0.078** 
3 3 2015 2014 -0.185*** 
4 3 2014 2014 -0.045 
4 3 2015 2015 -0.07** 
4 4 2015 2014 -0.21*** 
4 5 2014 2014 -0.059 
4 5 2015 2015 -0.011 
5 3 2014 2014 0.014 
5 3 2015 2015 -0.058* 
5 5 2015 2014 -0.258*** 
 
  
 272 
 
Risk difference of EDM benefit inclusion by weighted average ADI quintile  
Test- ADI quintile Referent- ADI quintile Test year Referent 
year 
RD 
1 1 2015 2014 -0.066** 
1 2 2014 2014 0.054* 
1 2 2015 2015 0.016 
1 3 2014 2014 0.012 
1 3 2015 2015 0 
1 4 2014 2014 0.056* 
1 4 2015 2015 0.018 
1 5 2014 2014 0.087*** 
1 5 2015 2015 0.042*** 
2 2 2015 2014 -0.028 
2 3 2014 2014 -0.041 
2 3 2015 2015 -0.016 
2 4 2014 2014 0.002 
2 4 2015 2015 0.002 
2 5 2014 2014 0.033* 
2 5 2015 2015 0.026** 
3 3 2015 2014 -0.053*** 
4 3 2014 2014 -0.043 
4 3 2015 2015 -0.019 
4 4 2015 2014 -0.029* 
4 5 2014 2014 0.031 
4 5 2015 2015 0.024* 
5 3 2014 2014 -0.074*** 
5 3 2015 2015 -0.042*** 
5 5 2015 2014 -0.021** 
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Comparison of benefit availability/premium requirement by year, by SNP versus non-SNP plans 
(EDM is excluded because it was not available to SNP plans beginning in 2015) 
  
Test SNP indicator 
(yes=1, no=0)  
Referent SNP 
Indicator (yes=1, 
no=0) 
Test year Referent year RD 
Transportation   
1 1 2015 2014 -0.08** 
1 0 2015 2015 0.449*** 
1 0 2014 2014 0.542*** 
0 0 2015 2014 0.013 
Meals  
1 1 2015 2014 0.022 
1 0 2015 2015 0.128** 
1 0 2014 2014 0.171*** 
0 0 2015 2014 0.065*** 
Nutrition  
1 1 2015 2014 -0.405*** 
1 0 2015 2015 0.074** 
1 0 2014 2014 0.447*** 
0 0 2015 2014 -0.031*** 
Telemonitoring    
1 1 2015 2014 0.01 
1 0 2015 2015 0.06* 
1 0 2014 2014 0.069** 
0 0 2015 2014 0.018** 
Premium  
1 1 2015 2014 -0.018 
1 0 2015 2015 -0.282*** 
1 0 2014 2014 -0.294*** 
0 0 2015 2014 -0.03 
 274 
 
APPENDIX M: PHASE 1 KEY INFORMANT RECRUITMENT LETTER 
 
 
 
JANUARY 22, 2016 
 
[Key Informant Name, Address] 
Dear [Key Informant], 
I am writing to request your participation as a key informant in the research I am conducting entitled 
“The Potential Implications of the Medicare Stars Methodology for Plans Serving Low Socioeconomic 
Status Communities.” The purpose of this research is to investigate the potential impact of the Medicare 
stars quality and payment system on health plan performance, particularly as it relates to individuals and 
communities with lower SES status. Specifically, the purpose of this study is to understand whether 
Medicare Advantage plans that serve high proportions of individuals with low SES status face barriers in 
performing well under the stars methodology, whether Medicare Advantage plans have modified or intend 
to modify their policies and practices in light of the Medicare stars program, and to explore the policy 
implications of any changes and/or barriers identified. You have been asked to participate in this study 
because you are a Medicare provider. 
 
I am conducting this interview as a part of my dissertation for the Doctorate of Public Health 
program at the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill. The results of this study will be used to develop 
recommendations to health plans and policymakers regarding the need for and, if necessary, possible 
methods to modify the stars methodology to effectively address the differential needs of Medicare 
beneficiaries who possess SES characteristics associated with poorer health outcomes. 
 
The Doctorate of Public Health program at the University of North Carolina is an executive 
program. Each of the participants work full time in health related fields. In my case, in addition to pursuing 
my doctorate, I am a vice president at WellCare Health Plans which is a Medicare Advantage plan sponsor. 
In order to protect against bias in my research results, I have engaged the assistance of an independent 
biostatistician to assist with the design of my quantitative analysis and a second coder to assist with the 
analysis of my qualitative results. In addition, my research is actively supervised by my dissertation 
committee chaired by Dr. Pam Silberman. In addition, all information from respondents will be 
confidential, and I will send you back my summary of our interview notes so that you can review them for 
accuracy. Finally, I’m glad to send you a copy of my research findings if you are willing to participate in 
the study. 
 
The interview will take approximately an hour. Your participation is a critical component in gaining 
a complete understanding of the potential impact of the Medicare stars quality as it relates to plans serving 
individuals and communities with lower SES status.  
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH POLICY 
AND MANAGEMENT 
1101A MCGAVRAN-GREENBERG HALL 919.966.6328 
CAMPUS BOX 7411  919.843.6308 
CHAPEL HILL, NC 27599-7411  www.sph.unc.edu/hpm 
 
SHOOU-YIH DANIEL LEE, MS, PHD 
Professor and Chair 
Department of Health Policy and Management 
 
MARK HOLMES, PhD   JOHN E. 
PAUL, PhD 
Associate Chair for Research   Associate 
Chair for Academics 
 275 
 
 
If you are interested in participating, please reply to this letter via email at ecgoodma@live.unc.edu 
or call me at 813-758-1006. You can also contact my faculty advisor, Dr. Pam Silberman, JD, Dr.PH at 
919-966-4525 or pam_silberman@unc.edu if you have any questions or concerns. I will also be following 
this letter shortly with a call to your office to answer any questions you might have about the study or the 
interview. Thank you in advance for your consideration.  
Very Truly Yours, 
Elizabeth Cahn Goodman 
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APPENDIX O: STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
Stakeholders Likely position on improving 
the quality of care for low 
SES MA beneficiaries 
Power of the group and the 
resources they bring to bear 
Likelihood of 
engagement 
Factors that might influence 
their participation 
Organizations that 
advocate for people 
with disabilities, 
seniors and Medicare 
consumers (e.g., 
Disability Policy 
Consortium, 
Community Catalyst, 
AARP, Medicare 
Rights Center, Justice 
in Aging, the Centers 
for Independent 
Living) 
Consumer representatives 
interviewed in phase 1 opposed 
risk adjustment, but supported 
stratification. Some expressed 
concern that tailoring benefits 
to low SES populations could 
be used to reduce benefit 
package for all consumers. 
Certain consumer organizations 
frequently engage in advocacy 
on the issues related to 
MA.(Sanders, 2014) 
Power: Moderate 
 
Resources: Large grassroots 
networks, long-standing 
relationships with state 
agencies and legislatures, 
CMS and Congress 
Likelihood of 
Engagement: High 
 
They have long been 
involved in issues related 
to MA, Medicaid and 
quality. 
Direct personal request to 
participate 
 
Alignment of these efforts with 
ongoing MassHealth restructuring 
 
Potential inclusion of MA and SES 
on the agenda of Congress and 
Trump Administration 
 
Participation of aligned 
organizations could influence their 
participation 
Physician 
organizations (e.g., the 
State and American 
Medical Association 
(AMA), the National 
Medical Association 
(NMA), and the 
National Hispanic 
Medical Association 
(NHMA, CAPG))  
Deeply engaged on how quality 
will be measured in the 
MassHealth restructuring 
programs and in the federal 
value based payment programs 
required under MACRA 
.("Medicare Access and CHIP 
Reauthorization Act of 2015," 
2015) Engaged to the extent 
that it impacts physicians 
participate in MA networks.  
Power: Strong 
 
Resources: Large membership 
networks including 
physicians, employed staff 
and affiliated institutions, 
large financial resources, large 
presence in Washington, DC, 
and all state Capitols 
Likelihood of 
Engagement: Medium 
 
Given their focus on the 
MassHealth restructuring 
and MACRA, these 
organizations would be 
more likely to participate 
in a coalition focused on 
the broader impact of SES 
on quality measurement  
Direct personal outreach to the 
staff engaged on physician quality 
measurement. 
 
Alignment of these efforts with 
ongoing MassHealth restructuring 
 
Direct impact on members 
 
Participation of aligned 
organizations could influence their 
participation 
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Stakeholders Likely position on improving 
the quality of care for low 
SES MA beneficiaries 
Power of the group and the 
resources they bring to bear 
Likelihood of 
engagement 
Factors that might influence 
their participation 
Patient and provider 
organizations focused 
on minority 
communities (e.g., 
NAACP, National 
Council of La Raza, the 
Urban League, the 
National Alliance for 
Hispanic Health, NMA, 
MHMA, and the 
National Minority 
Quality Forum) 
Active on the issue of Medicare 
Advantage(Dawes, 2015; 
Delgado, 2015; "The Better 
Medicare Alliance: Our Allies," 
2015) these organizations 
represent racial and ethnic 
groups that have traditionally 
been subject to health disparities. 
Given the proportion of low SES 
populations that are also people 
of color they have long been 
engaged in issues of health 
equity. Likely proponents of 
efforts to improve quality for 
low SES populations. 
Power: Moderate 
 
Resources: These 
organizations have long-
standing relationships with 
CMS and Congress but only a 
few have a significant 
presence at the state level 
 
Likelihood of 
Engagement: High 
 
These organization have 
long been involved in the 
issues of quality of care 
and health disparities  
Participation of aligned 
organizations could influence their 
participation 
 
Potential inclusion of MA and SES 
on the agenda of Congress and 
Trump Administration 
 
Hospital Associations 
(e.g., the American 
Hospital Association, 
Massachusetts Hospital 
Association and the 
Federation of American 
Hospitals) 
General concern about 
establishing fair measurement 
methodologies throughout 
Medicare, impact of the HRRP 
and other penalty programs of 
hospitals and the implementation 
of the Hospital five-star program 
(C. N. Kahn et al., 2015) , 
Critical stakeholder in 
MassHealth restructuring but 
their presence in post-acute and 
long term care is limited  
Power: Strong 
 
Resources: Large membership 
networks including employed 
staff and community 
leadership, large financial 
resources, a large presence in 
Washington, DC, and all state 
Capitols 
Likelihood of 
engagement: Medium 
 
Given their engagement 
on other quality 
measurement programs it 
is more likely that they 
would participate if the 
effort includes the quality 
of care for all low SES 
patients rather than just 
MA beneficiaries 
Direct personal outreach to the 
staff engaged on hospital quality 
measurement. 
 
The other organizations and 
individuals that agree to participate 
in, support, or validate the 
activities of the coalition. 
 
Impact on Chronic Disease and 
Rehab hospitals and services 
provided by hospital-led health 
systems  
 
Alignment with MassHealth 
restructuring and national Medicare 
activity 
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Stakeholders Likely position on improving 
the quality of care for low 
SES MA beneficiaries 
Power of the group and the 
resources they bring to bear 
Likelihood of 
engagement 
Factors that might influence 
their participation 
Safety Net Provider 
Organizations (e.g., 
America’s Essential 
Hospital and the 
American Association 
of Medical Colleges, 
National Association 
of Community Health 
Centers, Massachusetts 
League of Community 
Health Centers) 
Represent safety net hospitals, 
community health centers and 
medical faculties. Long 
supportive of  efforts to risk 
adjust the HRRP for 
socioeconomic status. Actively 
lobbying Congress address the 
issue of SES in the HRRP in 
the current lame duck session 
(Dixon, 2016). Critical 
stakeholder in MassHealth 
restructuring but their presence 
in post-acute and long term 
care is limited 
Power: Strong to Moderate 
 
Resources: Large membership 
networks including 
physicians, employed staff 
and affiliated institutions, 
large financial resources, a 
large presence in Washington, 
DC, and all state capitols. 
Likelihood of 
engagement: Medium 
 
Given their engagement 
on other quality 
measurement programs it 
is more likely that they 
would participate if the 
effort includes the quality 
of care for all low SES 
patients rather than just 
MA beneficiaries 
Direct personal outreach to the 
staff engaged on hospital quality 
measurement. 
 
The other organizations and 
individuals that agree to participate 
in, support, or validate the 
activities of the coalition. 
 
Impact on services delivered by 
safety-net providers  
 
Alignment with MassHealth 
restructuring and national Medicare 
activity 
Nursing Home and 
Long Term Care 
Provider Organizations 
(e.g., American 
Healthcare 
Association, Leading 
Age, Mass Senior 
Care) 
Represent nursing homes, 
assisted living residences and 
low income housing for seniors 
and people with disabilities 
Power: Strong  
 
Resources: Large membership 
networks, politically powerful 
in D.C. and in the states. 
Likelihood of 
engagement: High 
 
The planning quality 
measurement effort will 
directly impact the 
providers they represent 
Direct personal outreach to the 
local trade association leadership 
 
The other organizations and 
individuals that agree to participate 
in, support, or validate the 
activities of the coalition. 
 
Alignment with MassHealth 
restructuring and national Medicare 
activity 
  
  
2
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Stakeholders Likely position on improving 
the quality of care for low SES 
MA beneficiaries 
Power of the group and the 
resources they bring to bear 
Likelihood of engagement Factors that might 
influence their 
participation 
Health plans and 
trade associations 
(examples include: 
MAHP, AHIP, 
ACHP, ACAP, 
MHPA, SNP 
Alliance, BCBSA, 
Better Medicare 
Alliance) 
Positions differ based on 
proportion of high performing 
and low-income serving 
plans. Generally concerned 
about the impact of the many 
cuts to the program since 
ACA but likely to take 
differing positions on the 
proposed changes 
(Bringewatt, 2005; Cahow et 
al., 2010; Myers, 2014; 
Swanson & Goetsch, 2015; 
Weiss & Pescatello, 2014) 
Power: Strong 
 
Resources: Large financial 
resources, a large presence in 
Washington, DC, and all state 
capitols 
Likelihood of engagement: 
Dependent on the 
organization:  
 
Those focused on duals and 
Medicaid (SCO and One Care 
plans, ACAP, SNP Alliance, 
and MHPA) are highly likely 
to engage; those focused on 
commercial insurers or 
anchored by high performing 
plans (Better Medicare 
Alliance, BCBSA, AHIP) will 
engage only if they feel the 
proposals will benefit their 
membership 
Impact on plan 
operarations and 
compensation 
 
Engagement of member 
plans and trade association 
staff focusing on those 
who have expressed a 
favorable position on 
addressing the issue in the 
past.  
MedPAC Has identified disparate 
performance between high 
and low dual eligible plans.  
 
Concerned about differential 
cost of MA and traditional 
Medicare (Harrison & 
Zarabozo, 2014) 
Power: High 
 
MedPAC advises Congress 
and the executive branch on 
policy related to the Medicare 
program. Their reports are 
reviewed by member of 
Congress, their staff and the 
executive branch and their 
research is generally 
considered cited as 
authoritative in the field. 
Likelihood of engagement: 
None 
 
 
This effort is outside of 
MedPAC’s role. However, 
if the results of these 
efforts produce actionable 
data, they could be willing 
to discuss outcomes. 
  
  
2
8
3
 
Stakeholders Likely position on  improving the 
quality of care for low SES MA 
beneficiaries 
Power of the group and 
the resources they bring 
to bear 
Likelihood of engagement Factors that might influence 
their participation 
CMS/HHS/Administration Concerned about protecting the 
integrity of the existing stars program. 
Made significant changes to both the 
stars methodology with the 
application of CAI and the risk 
adjustment program in 2017 (CMS, 
2015b)  
 
ASPE report acknowledging 
disparities in performance among 
beneficiaries with social risk factors 
issued in the previous administration. 
Position on the issue under new 
leadership unclear (Report to 
Congress: Social Risk Factors and 
Performance Under Medicare's 
Value-Based Purchasing Programs, 
2016). 
Power: Strong  
 
CMS’s engagement and 
and support of this effort is 
a critical determinant of its 
success or failure. 
 
Payment methodologies for 
Medicaid covered services 
must be approved under a 
waiver or via the state plan.  
 
Massachusetts and CMS 
partner on the 
administration of the SCO 
and One Care programs.  
 
Likelihood of engagement: 
Unknown 
 
The technical support from 
CMS received to date is an 
indication of support of 
MassHealth’s efforts to 
move toward value based 
purchasing. Their 
willingness to be active 
thought partners in the 
development of the measure 
set and the accounting for 
SES and other factors is, as 
yet, unknown 
The change in administration 
 
Budget neutrality 
 
Stakeholder feedback 
 
Alignment with CMS policy  
Organization that represent 
states and their agencies 
(e.g., the National 
Governors 
Association/National 
Association of Medicaid 
Directors/National 
Association of State Health 
Policy) 
 
States are required to contract with 
DSNP plans for service to duals,  
 
Constituents are impacted by the 
quality of the health plan,  
 
States have long been engaged on 
issues related to dual eligible 
beneficiaries (Dual Eligibles: Making 
the Case for Federalization 2005) and 
are increasingly active on due to 
concerns about costs to states of their 
Medicare premium (Crippen, 2016; 
"NAMD statement on 2017 Medicare 
part B premiums," 2016) 
Power: Moderate 
 
States have a great deal of 
power when working 
collaboratively with their 
Congressional delegations.  
 
States work closely with 
CMS on issues related to 
Medicaid  
Likelihood of engagement: 
Moderate 
 
The change in 
administration and 
Congressional efforts to 
repeal and replace 
Obamacare and block grant 
Medicaid have led to 
significant engagement with 
HHS and Congress by these 
organizations 
States and the organizations 
representing states look to 
their members to form their 
agenda.  
 
Only once the program is in 
place and data become 
available regarding its impact 
and with the approval of my 
superiors would outreach to 
these organizations would be 
appropriate.  
  
2
8
4
 
Stakeholders Likely position on  improving the 
quality of care for low SES MA 
beneficiaries 
Power of the group and 
the resources they bring 
to bear 
Likelihood of engagement Factors that might influence 
their participation 
Quality Measurement 
Organizations (e.g., 
National Quality Forum 
(NQF), the Pharmacy 
Quality Alliance (PQA), 
and National Committee 
on Quality Assurance 
(NCQA)) 
The NQF is piloting risk adjustment 
for sociodemographic factors.(Burstin, 
H., Amin, T., Isijola, W., 2015) They 
are actively engaged in evaluating 
disparities-sensitive measures and 
modifying measurement processes to 
address health 
disparities.("Disparities,") PQA is 
undertaking a similar effort with 
respect to measures of medication 
adherence. NCQA is the promulgator 
of HEDIS measures. The NCQA has 
publicly opposed to risk adjustment of 
individual measures, supportive of 
stratification and financial incentives 
(O'Kane, 2014)  
Power: High 
 
These organizations are 
Thought leaders in the 
quality improvement 
community and vendors to 
CMS for the development 
and endorsement of 
measures of quality. 
Likelihood of engagement: 
High 
 
These organizations are 
important resources for input 
and guidance in program 
design  
Outreach from MassHealth 
leadership 
 
Use of measures promulgated 
or endorsed by these 
organizations 
 
Alignment with their ongoing 
efforts 
Think Tanks/Policy 
Entrepreneurs/Academics 
and Consultants 
(examples range from 
research organizations 
including the New 
England Health Policy 
Institute, the Blue Cross 
Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts 
Foundation, the Pioneer 
Institute, local 
universities  
Important partners in furthering a 
quality and equity strategy. 
 
Many of the individuals published in 
the review of the literature are, or 
were, affiliated with universities in 
the Boston area and represent an 
important program design resource  
Power: Dependent on the 
Think Tank/Policy 
Entrepreneur/Academic  
 
Dependent on the Think 
Tank/Policy 
Entrepreneur/Academic  
 
Outreach to request they present 
their work in the area and/or 
take a thought leadership role in 
design and evaluation  
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